INFUSING MARITIMITY INTO INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN AFRICA – POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Keywords: India, Eastern African littoral and island States, Foreign Policy, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Kampala Principles, India-Africa Forum Summits

India’s maritime policy of SAGAR[1] was a comprehensive statement of India’s policy-intent in progressing its maritime relations with the island- and coastal States of eastern Africa.  Its subsequent amplification into ‘MAHASAGAR’, has extended India’s maritime strategic outlook to the wider Indo-Pacific.[2]  This policy extension underscores a more inclusive and cooperative approach, aimed at addressing a broader range of evolving threats across maritime domain.   That said, it is somewhat surprising to note that issues pertaining to maritime security and commerce tend to be unduly played-up by New Delhi, even while its endeavours in other facets of this policy, such as the building of capacity and enhancing of capability in the areas of human and societal development tend to be underplayed and understated.  This creates the impression — at least amongst the lay public — that India is principally interested in its own maritime security rather than in strengthening developmental activity that would prove to be beneficial to its African partners.  It is not that India is not doing a great deal of work in maritime developmental activities along the eastern African littoral and in eastern Africa’s island States.  It is more a matter of New Delhi balancing the form, content, and slant of its strategic messaging.  After all, with the duality of ‘security’ and ‘growth’, the former is relevant principally in the manner in which — as also the degree to which — the former enables, shapes, and promotes the latter.

India’s development partnership with Africa dates to the 1960s, when it began collaborating with developing countries based on the principles of partnership and cooperation for mutual benefit.[3]  However, despite the evolution of this partnership to include an increasing variety of forms of engagement, the degree of centrality that ought to have been accorded to maritime development continues to be quite inadequate.  Consequently, the feeling persists that in the practical execution of India’s maritime policy towards Africa (an execution that ought to be guided by the seven lines-of-thrust encompassed within India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI)[4] that provides first-order-specificity to SAGAR, and now to MAHASAGAR), India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis eastern Africa still lacks a holistic maritime development framework, maintaining only a skewed maritime focus.

In engaging Africa, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has adopted a triadic policy approach, progressing its engagement at bilateral, multilateral, and sub-regional diplomatic levels.  Yet, despite this multi-layered engagement, a certain maritime myopia remains evident in India’s approach towards the continent.  For example, there is a clear need to build policy bridges between India and the maritime-congruent structures of eastern African coastal and island States, which would allow these nations to replicate India’s maritime development model.  This article aims to highlight the range of maritime activities that India undertakes with these countries across a variety of domains; it analyses how these activities have influenced New Delhi’s foreign policy, and simultaneously critiques the lack of a structured approach.

India’s foreign policy compass has deflected in various directions over the years.  Geography, being a significant factor, has influenced its progress.  A major tactical shift arose when India chose to change its focus from ‘continentality’ to ‘maritimity’.  However, achieving a strong maritime orientation, or ‘maritimity,’ remains a challenge.  The concept of ‘maritimity,’ introduced by Saul B Cohen, reflects a nation’s inherent inclination towards the maritime realm and its ability to harness the ocean’s offerings.[5]  It represents a nation’s penchant to continuously maintain maritime ties and manoeuvre its activities in all plausible maritime directions.  The scope of this concept is broad enough to encompass economic interests, while still being specific enough to focus on fostering immigrant ties.  This concept of maritimity, therefore, plays a crucial role in adopting this geographic role, given that India’s maritime domain forms an elemental part of its foreign policy.  India is the 16^th largest maritime State, with a recently estimated and promulgated coastline stretching to 11,084 km, and some 14,500 km of navigable inland waterways.  India’s maritime profile is quite elaborate and incorporates nine coastal states and as many as 1,382 islands.  The maritime sector significantly boosts India’s overall trade, with 95% of trade volume and 68% of trade value being conducted through maritime transport.  Along its extensive coastline, India hosts 12 major ports and approximately 205 non-major ports, with a combined cargo handling capacity of 2627 Million Tonnes Per Annum MTPA (1617 MTPA from major ports and 1010 MTPA from non-major ports).[6]

Historically, India’s maritime character has been shaped by the Indian Ocean, and today, its geoeconomic and geopolitical interests are converging in expanded strategic regions such as the Indo-Pacific.  The nature of these diplomatic spaces is predominantly maritime, with eastern Africa acting as the western gateway to the Indo-Pacific.  India views the Indo-Pacific as its strategic geography — a geography that stretches across from the shores of eastern Africa to those of the Americas.  The countries on the eastern African coast largely fall within India’s western geostrategic gaze and form an indispensable part of its proximate maritime neighbourhood.  Coastal eastern Africa, stretching from Somalia to segment of South Africa’s coast washed by the waves of the Indian Ocean, along with the Vanilla Islands,[7] boasts of an approximate coastline length of 16,147 km and borders three major waterways — the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden.  The region also encompasses four significant maritime chokepoints, namely, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, the Mozambique Channel, and the Cape of Good Hope.  Beyond its geopolitical significance, the whole of Africa reflects a coherent biogeographic, climatic, and socio-political region, covering 30 million square kilometres, which is equivalent to 8.1% of the global ocean surface, with exclusive economic zones (EEZs) spanning over 6 million square kilometres.  A geo-spatial assessment of the eastern African sub-region also reveals that it hosts critical coastal and marine resources as is evidenced by its establishment of more than 143 Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) or equivalent, covering a total area of 555,436.68 square kilometres.[8]

 

Bridging ‘Maritime’ and ‘Policy’

Eastern Africa provides India with fertile ground in which to grow its diplomacy.  India’s maritime connection to the sub-region predates the establishment of formal diplomacy, but the post-colonial era brought a renewed focus on the region.  At the critical juncture of newly independent India’s post-colonial foreign missions, Appa Saheb Pant, aboard the SS Khandala —the oldest vessel of the P&O line — arrived in colonial East Africa, which then included Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar, as the first Indian Commissioner in the newly established African diplomatic arena.[9]  Pant aptly observed, “India and East Africa may seem to be distanced from each other by salt water.  But they are, and always have been ‘next shore neighbours’, and surely their future lies in the direction of mutually profitable co-operation.”  However, it was not until 2015 that the enduring maritime bonds between India and East Africa were truly galvanised with Prime Minister Modi’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy expanding its regional maritime focus and including eastern Africa within its ambit.  During a visit to Mauritius in March 2015, Modi unveiled India’s inaugural maritime policy, SAGAR—an acronym for ‘Security and Growth for All in the Region’.[10]  In the same year, the Indian Navy unveiled its latest maritime-security strategy entitled, “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy,” which outlined India’s intention to “shape a favourable and positive environment by curbing security threats and challenges spread across its maritime neighbourhood and adjacent areas”.[11]   It is evident that India’s earstwhile maritime policy (SAGAR) aims to deepen India’s economic and security cooperation with its maritime neighbours, build their maritime security capacities, and imbue them with desired capabilities to safeguard their respective shores.[12]

Traditionally, India’s relations with eastern African States have focused upon leveraging material resources to assert India’s geopolitical influence and gain competitive advantages.  These efforts are often evaluated through metrics such as trade-volume, the establishment of diplomatic missions, defence agreements, and military exercises.[13]  In 2023, eastern Africa distinguished itself by having the highest number of countries with GDP growth rates exceeding 5%, underscoring the sub-region’s robust performance and economic diversity.[14]  Notably, the island nations of Seychelles and Mauritius recorded impressive GDP per capita figures of USD 16,940 and USD 11,530 respectively, with their economies being primarily driven by tourism, fishing, and financial services.[15]  The ‘Focus Africa Programme,’ launched by India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 2002, set a benchmark in accelerating India’s trade with Africa.[16]  In the first phase of the programme, seven countries were targeted, primarily in eastern Africa, including South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, and Mauritius.  A glance at the value of Indian exports to East African countries in FY 2024 shows that Indian exports to Tanzania had the highest value among the eastern African group amounting to 4.6 billion USD followed by Kenya with 3.1 billion USD.[17]

The eastern coast of African littoral comprises a diverse set of economies of both mainland-coastal States (Somalia, Kenya, Mozambique, and South Africa) and island ones (Madagascar, Seychelles, Comoros, Mauritius, and French-administered territories of Mayotte and La Reunion).  India has maintained a broad and comprehensive outlook towards each of them.  Many of these countries have elevated their bilateral relationships with India to “strategic partnerships,” with South Africa leading the way in 1997.  The Overseas Indian Community across these nations’ numbers 30,83,851, contributing inward remittances to India of approximately 273.97 million USD.[18]  India’s total trade with these countries amounts to around 630.61 billion USD, with South Africa and Kenya receiving the highest levels of Indian exports, and South Africa and Tanzania leading the import figures.  The table below provides some details of India’s bilateral economic engagements with each country in the region.

	Country	GDP (2023)     (Mn USD)[19]	Total Bilateral Trade (2023)   (Mn USD)	Population of Overseas Indians[20]	Remittances Received by Countries from India (2021) (Mn USD)[21]
1.	Somalia	11,679.80	832.48	100	NA
2.	Kenya	107,440.58	3,291.51	80,000	37.21
3.	Tanzania	79,158.29	7,157.93	28262	26.67
4.	Mozambique	20,624.60	4,415.11	56,524	9.18
5.	South Africa	377,781.60	18,872.25	17,00,000	123.67
6.	Madagascar	16,031.70	361.4	10,500	6.55
7.	Seychelles	2,141.45	85.15	13,238	30.73
8.	Mauritius	14,397.13	869.53	894848	39.97
9.	Comoros	1352.38	44.06	220	NA
10.	Mayotte (France)				NA
11	Reunion Island (France)		74.19	300159
Table 1: India’s Bilateral Economic Engagement with Eastern Africa Source:  Collated and Tabulated by Author

These sub-regional States also make up the membership of major African ‘Regional Economic Communities’ (RECs) such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Eastern African Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).[22]  These RECs are the prime facilitators of regional economic integration in the region.  The 2019 Africa Regional Integration Index had ranked the EAC as the most integrated bloc in the region.[23]  The mainland-coastal and island States of eastern Africa are not concentrated within any specific RECs but rather, are dispersed across multiple RECs, with many having overlapping memberships.

These RECs have been playing a transformational role as many of them have developed regional blue economy goals, while the maritime strategies envisaged by member States and have been contributing to the enhancement of maritime security as well.  Of these, the SADC offers a prime example, with its pursuit of maritime security in the southern African maritime domain being notable.  Its Standing Maritime committee (SMC) is the longest lasting and consistently convened forum dedicated to the goal of common maritime security.[24]  Due to the presence of many mainland-coastal and island States within these RECs, economic communities have developed distinct maritime political geographies,[25] which have become temporal and spatial constructs within which growth and prosperity have come to reside.  Over the years, these blocs have established maritime appropriate/inclusive structures, which have been involved in furthering the blue economy aspirations of the member States.  Since a ‘blue economy’ is the major economic derivative of any maritime space, it has imbued a collective realisation amongst the African States that they must utilise the ‘African Maritime Domain’ to harness their respective ocean potential.

However, geopolitics is unfolding at sea just as dynamically as it is on land, and in this ‘Asian Century’, it is Africa that is emerging as the brightest beacon of hope.  ‘Maritime Africa’ is not defined merely by the expanse of its seas but by the maritime inclusivity of its pan-African and national developmental arrangements.  Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 (AIMS 2050) has emerged as a foundational document wherein a multi-layered action plan has been incorporated by the African Union (AU).  Recognising the vast maritime potential within the African Maritime Domain (AMD), AIMS 2050 stands as a forward-looking blueprint with a strong emphasis on the blue economy.  Its overarching goal is to “foster increased wealth creation from Africa’s oceans and seas by developing a sustainable, thriving blue economy in a secure and environmentally sustainable manner.” [26]  The “African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development in Africa” (known popularly as the “Lomé Charter”) has a soft (non-binding) legal approach and is the only existing document that uses “subsidiarity” as a principle that advocates freedom at the local level.[27]  Each strategic initiative, whether continental or national in scope, is directed towards achieving unified African maritime growth by aligning the ‘blue economy’ and maritime security as complementary rather than isolated goals.  Similarly, pan-African initiatives such as “Africa 2063” have acted as “positive perception builders”, positioning Africa at the forefront of the foreign policies of partner nations.  The “Agenda 2063” has developed two maritime-related goals, namely, Goal 6 and Goal 7.  Goal 6 prioritises the blue economy for accelerated economic growth by focusing on marine resources and energy, ports operations, and marine transport.  Goal 7 aims at fostering environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient economies and communities.  Table 2 below provides details of these two maritime-oriented goals:

AGENDA 2063
Goal 6	Blue Economy for accelerated economic growth
Priority Area – Marine Resources and Energy; Ports Operation and Marine Transport
Goal 7	Environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient economies and communities
Sustainable natural resource management and Biodiversity conservation Sustainable consumption and production patterns Water security Climate resilience and natural disasters preparedness and prevention Renewable energy

Africa has emerged as a growing market for both investment and development.  Its youthful population offers a favourable demographic dividend, while forward-looking policies for businesses and relaxed restrictions on resource sharing have renewed global interest in the continent.  Africa’s abundant natural resources and the recent discoveries of fossil fuels, including oil, gas, and coal, have led to a resurgence of investment in the continent.  On the maritime canvas, India’s engagement with the littoral and island States of eastern Africa has progressed beyond merely addressing maritime insecurity.  New Delhi’s interests now transcend traditional trade, with a significant portion of India’s diversified energy portfolio expected to come from this subregion.  Offshore gas exploration in Mozambique is an excellent example.  According to the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (PPAC), India’s LNG imports grew by 17.5% year-on-year in FY24, reaching 23.5 million metric tonnes per annum (MMTPA).[28]  India’s involvement in Mozambique’s Rovuma Offshore Area 1 project reflects its growing demand for clean energy, with a consortium of ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL), Bharat PetroResources Ltd (BPRL), and Oil India Ltd (OIL) having diversified stakes.

India’s commercial interests have increasingly been intensified along maritime development corridors tied to mining.  Vulcan, a subsidiary of the Jindal Group, acquired the Nacala Logistics Corridor and took over the Moatize coal mining asset, along with the 920-km Nacala Logistical Corridor from Brazilian mining giant Vale in December 2021, with a cumulative investment of USD 270 million.[29]  India’s envisioned Critical Mineral Mission, as outlined in the Union Budget 2024-25, seeks to incentivise the acquisition of overseas assets.  Given that Africa holds 30% of the world’s critical minerals, India needs to strengthen its capacity-building efforts in African nations to accelerate mining exploration and extraction while minimising ecological impacts.  Additionally, India can offer technology for the beneficiation of mineral ores.  Due to aplicability of this envisaged collaboration, it is enumerated below in the ‘way forward’ section as a policy suggestion.

India has been building capacity in Africa through its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme since 1964.  The ITEC is certainly India’s most successful development partnership program and has the maximum reach in Africa.  However, it is not the only one.  India’s Africa policy was revitalised in 2001 with numerous capacity-building initiatives, such as the “Focus Africa Programme” in 2002, the “Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme” (IDEAS) initiative in 2004, and the “Team 9” initiative.  Yet, these cross-sectoral, multi-nation targeting plans were largely ad-hoc in nature and did not seem to flow from a comprehensive strategy for Africa.  In 2018, during PM Modi’s visit to Uganda, ten guiding principles for India’s engagement with Africa were enunciated, which for the first time articulated the fundamental bases of India’s engagement with Africa.[31]  Three of these ten Principles carry predominant maritime connotations:

• Principle 5. This principle is focused upon agriculture, within which a special segment on the ‘blue economy’ has been incorporated to augment cooperation in the sustainable development of marine resources.  It seeks to place fisheries at the fulcrum of sustainable engagement and to focus on eradicating illegal fishing, managing marine resources, and exploring non-marine resources.
• Principle 6. Principle 6 deals with climate change.  Like India, Africa, too, has been bearing a disproportionate brunt of the adverse impacts of climate change, given that the continent contributes only 3.6 per cent to total global emissions.[32]  Africa and India both realise that addressing climate change requires a strong and focused engagement plan.  The UNECA-TERI climate centre, established in Addis Ababa, was made possible through the efforts of The Energy and Resource Institute (TERI) which associated itself with the “New Partnership for African Development” (NEPAD) initiative, and was greatly facilitated by Indian embassies in Africa.[33]  This association highlights the potential of domestic institutions to play key roles in building pan-continental architectures.
• Principle 8. This principle focuses upon maritime security.  Indeed, given the persistent instability in the waters surrounding Africa, maritime security forms the bedrock of India’s association with the continent.  Since the inception of Somali piracy as a major global threat adding significantly to other non-traditional maritime risks and challenges, India’s evolving role as a preferred security-partner has become increasingly critical.  This highlights the relevance and value of the Indian Navy, which has consistently responded to crises along the eastern African littoral, offering vital assistance whenever catastrophe has struck.

The engagement between India and Africa has been further invigorated through high-level political dialogue under the aegis of successive editions of the “India-Africa Forum Summit” (IAFS).  The first two, IAFS I in 2008 and IAFS II in 2011, were conducted using the Banjul format of interaction by which the African Union (AU) would nominate a representative sample of only 15 countries (of the 54 comprising the AU) to engage with India at the summit level.  These summits were complemented by meetings with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the first of which took place in 2010.  At the conclusion of the first summit, two key documents were adopted: the “Delhi Declaration” and the “India-Africa Framework of Cooperation”.  The second summit produced the “Addis Ababa Declaration”.  These documents addressed bilateral, regional, and international interests for both India and Africa.  Both summits, through these declarations, focused on capacity-building and capability-enhancement, with specific, albeit limited emphasis upon maritime training.  Initiatives under IAFS II included programmes such as human resource development (HRD) and scholarships and did impact the shipping and maritime sectors more significantly, covering areas such as nautical science, marine engineering, ocean engineering, and naval architecture.  Additionally, specialised training courses in maritime sectors and climate change were envisioned.  IAFS III, held in 2015 abandoned the Banjul formula and resulted in another “Delhi Declaration”, which recognised the ‘blue economy’ as an area of collaboration to “promote cooperation in the Blue/Ocean economy, towards the sustainable development of marine resources; place special emphasis on closer collaboration in developing sustainable fisheries, combating illegal and unregulated fishing, managing the marine resources, exploring non-marine resources, conducting hydrography surveys, promoting eco-tourism, developing renewable energy, disaster risk reduction through modern early warning tools, pollution control and other coastal and ocean studies.”[34]

The IAFS process has thus far established new paradigms of cooperation, with capacity-building (which term incorporates capability-enhancement within it) as its core philosophy.  However, India’s overall lack of a clear maritime vision has stunted such initiatives.

 

Revitalising Relations through a Renewed Maritime Approach

For India to pursue a more effective and distinctive partnership path in Africa, it must revamp its policy approach.  This requires reshaping its engagement strategies to align with the ambitions and developmental plans of African nations.  Maritime collaboration needs to be a central component of India’s diversified action plan, especially if it aligns with the existing frameworks in eastern Africa.  The mainland-coastal and island States of this sub-region need an India that can build capacities and augment capabilities within the eastern African maritime domain to meet their evolving needs.  To transform their maritime boundaries into key geostrategic assets, these nations must fully harness their oceanic potential.

Accordingly, India should not only re-engineer its existing maritime initiatives for the region but also design new ones that would help these nations to embrace the concept of holistic maritime security.  Summarised below are some recommendations to help redefine this approach:

• Threats across the African maritime domain have diversified, posing new challenges, particularly in the eastern African maritime subregion, where non-traditional security threats have become increasingly evident. Somali piracy has remained a persistent issue, partially mitigated over time but not fully eliminated.  In addition to this enduring threat, various organised criminal activities are commonplace in these waters.  The 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) identifies these risks, which include “money laundering, illegal arms and drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea, illegal oil bunkering and crude oil theft along African coasts, maritime terrorism, human trafficking, human smuggling, and the movement of asylum seekers by sea”.[35]

Political instability on the land frequently spills over into the maritime domain, creating a pathway for transnational organised crime.  Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Ahlu Sunna Wa Jama’a (ASWJ) in Mozambique are two active, Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs), who can and do carry out violence at sea, and have expanded the threat seascape of these littorals.  Ensuring regional maritime stability is a critical security priority for India, as it is widely acknowledged that political instability in neighbouring countries can significantly and adversely affect national economies.[36]   The eastern African coastal region includes two politically fragile states, namely, Somalia and Mozambique, which rank first and twenty-fifth, respectively, on the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index 2024.[37]   Additionally, the ACLED Conflict Index 2024 categorises Mozambique, South Africa, and Madagascar as turbulent countries, while Somalia and Kenya are classified as high-risk.  This peculiar risk profile of the sub-region calls for enhanced security-measures.

India began anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden (GoA) in 2008, and by 2023, it had deployed nearly 107 ships for these missions.  In 2017, the Indian Navy adopted a Mission-Based Deployment (MBD) strategy, and it currently mounts operations under the “Patrol off the Gulf of Aden Deployment” (POGDEP).  The Indian Navy has also conducted Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NCEO), such as Operation KAVERI, under which 278 Indians were evacuated by sea aboard INS Sumedha from conflict-ridden Sudan between 24 April and 05 May 2023.  In addition to this, there are Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations, which are recognised as the most celebrated activities of the Indian Navy in the subregion.

As India’s strength lies in capability enhancement, it is crucial to grasp the unique maritime security challenges emerging in the subregional African waters.  None of the ten mainland-coastal and island States of eastern Africa thus far possess fully coherent national maritime security strategies that would enable them to independently manage their maritime zones.  However, they are trying to do so.  While Somalia and Tanzania have established maritime coordination committees, and Kenya, with the support of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), is developing a National Maritime Security Risk Register (NMSRR), Mozambique has implemented the Policy and Strategy of the Sea (POLMAR).  South Africa, however, is still in the process of formulating its Maritime Security Strategy.  India, as part of its capability-augmenting efforts, could and should assist these countries in developing a maritime security framework that aligns their national objectives with maritime security goals.  Through the ITEC I, II, and III programs, India has been providing Navy-to-Navy training, offered either by invitation or upon request, which has previously included the development of staff college curricula for these countries.  To enhance the resilience of these nations in securing their waters, India must take the following urgent steps:

• At the institutional level, New Delhi should propose organisational and functional support to the African Union’s “Peace and Security Council”. This should include assisting in the development of a naval component within the “African Standby Force” (ASF), a key pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture.  Given that the ASF comprises military, police, and civilian personnel, Indian cross-disciplinary support would enhance the former’s capability to combat maritime crimes at multiple levels.
• Internationally, maritime security frameworks in the sub-region are often format driven. An example is the Djibouti Code of Conduct-Jeddah Amendment (DCoC-JA).  The DCoC-JA is facilitated by the IMO, which convenes discussions between the ministries of transport from eastern and southern Africa and the Arab Peninsula on issues of maritime security and safety.  Another example is the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)-led and European Union funded, multilateral “Safe Seas Africa Programme” (a continuation of MaSé Programme), which promotes information-sharing and collaboration within the eastern African region.  Likewise, the “Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime” (IOFMC) fosters regional law enforcement cooperation.  On the other hand, the “Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activities” (CGIMA), despite an expanded mandate, has yet to play an active part and this provides an opportunity to New Delhi.  As a member, India should propose CGIMA as a unified platform where all relevant frameworks could converge.  Being an observer in DCoC, India has already proposed to invite first multilateral DCoC liaison officer at IFC-IOR.  Additionally, India could assist in building ‘maritime risk profiles’ for these nations, helping them better understand their risk landscape and protect their interests more effectively.  This would also be an excellent area of concentration for the proposed joint India-UK “Regional Maritime Security Centre of Excellence” (RMSCE).

 

Maritime Situational/Domain Awareness (MSA/ MDA) and Information-Sharing 

India has made significant progress in expanding its Maritime Situational/ Domain Awareness (MSA/ MDA) capabilities.  In 2014, it established the Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC), followed by the creation of the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in 2018.  Located in Gurugram, the IFC-IOR hosts International Liaison Officers (ILOs) from a number of countries (14 as of May 2025) and is connected to 50 organisations across 25 nations.  These centres play a crucial role in operational information sharing.  A recent success involved coordinated efforts by Sri Lankan and Seychellois liaison officers, which led to the interception of the hijacked Sri Lankan fishing vessel Lorenzo Putha 04, located approximately 955 nautical miles east of Somalia.[38]  To enhance effectiveness, the centre should include ILOs from all eastern African littoral and Island States.  Furthermore, since instability at sea often reflects instability on land, data analysis on maritime crimes should be diversified.  The centre should use conflict indices such as the “ACLED Conflict Database” to study land-based conflicts, so as to generate a comprehensive threat picture.

Maritime Situational Awareness in the sub-region is largely achieved by digital tools such as SeaVision—a web-based maritime situational awareness tool developed by the United States Department of Transportation, and the IORIS platform, which the EU insists is a neutral and secure information-exchange system.  Currently, it is fully funded and supported by the “CRIMARIO II” programme for regional partners across the Indo-Pacific.[39]  In a similar effort to enhance interoperability with friendly maritime neighbours, the Indian Navy has developed MITRA, a communication platform that utilises the NISHAR (Network for Information Sharing) tool.  NISHAR provides a secure, encrypted web- and satellite-based tool that enables real-time communication and supports the creation of a ‘Common Operational Picture’ (COP), which is a key function of the IFC-IOR.[40]

 

African Continental Free Trade Area: An Impetus to Maritime Trade

The “African Continental Free Trade Area” (AfCFTA) aims to create a single market of 1.3 billion people, making it one of the largest trade agreements since the WTO’s founding in 1995. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) estimates that a successfully implemented AfCFTA could boost intra-African trade by over 50% by reducing import tariffs by 90%.  India-Africa trade, growing at an annual rate of 18% since 2003, reached $103 billion in 2023, placing India as Africa’s third-largest trading partner after the EU and China.  With around 90% of Africa’s trade conducted by sea, the continent’s vast coastlines emphasise its strategic importance.  The “Maritime Transport Review” of 2021 — an annual publication by the UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) — forecasts growth in African maritime trade, driven by AfCFTA, which will increase demand for transportation infrastructure.  Ports in eastern African States such as Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros, and Mozambique, are expected to experience heightened traffic.  A major hope of India, kindled by the launch of the AfCFTA, is that Africa will become a more organised market and overcome the challenge of trade financing.

Mundra-Mombasa Shipping Route.  The Mundra-Mombasa shipping route is a key link between India and eastern Africa, with Mombasa serving as a gateway for landlocked countries (these are better thought-of as “land-linked” countries) such as South Sudan, Uganda, and Rwanda.  The recent surge of container traffic around the Cape of Good Hope due to the Red Sea Crisis has exposed capacity shortfalls in southern and eastern African ports.  Ports in South Africa, Mauritius, and Madagascar had faced infrastructure challenges that militate against their competitiveness, despite volume growth.  Indian firms are expanding their investments in African port infrastructure.  A new joint venture, the “East Africa Gateway Limited” (EAGL), has been formed with the Adani group being the primary shareholder, albeit in partnership with the AD Ports Group and the East Harbour Terminals Limited (EHTL), through which the Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd (APSEZ) has acquired a 95% stake in Tanzania’s TICTS for $39.5 million.[41]   Projects like these could help close Africa’s infrastructure gap, aligning with the continent’s “Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa” (PIDA).

 

Way Forward

 India’s enhanced maritime posture lends it a geostrategic salience that helps in realising the country’s geoeconomic goals, as also its ‘non-geoeconomic’ ones.  Geoeconomic goals for India include promoting maritime connectivity and port-led development, developing inland waterways, and building resilient high-quality infrastructure capable of withstanding adverse climate impacts.  Additionally, India aims to transition from a ‘brown’ model of economy to a ‘blue’ one that emphasises sustainability, while simultaneously aiming for enhanced ‘energy security’ and assured ‘security-of-energy’.  In parallel, India’s non-geoeconomic goals include maintaining territorial and cartographic integrity, strengthening its maritime identity, and building a reputation for responsible leadership within the Indo-Pacific region.  Furthermore, India aspires to be the first responder in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations and to counter illicit maritime activities.  It also seeks to be proactive in regional cooperative security frameworks.

India’s diverse initiatives, though not always directly linked to its mainstream foreign policy, have helped solidify these maritime objectives.  The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), conceived by the Indian Navy in 2008, became the first major maritime security initiative of the 21^st century.  IONS provided a collaborative platform for Indian Ocean littoral navies to engage in holistic maritime security programmes and work toward collective maritime security.  Currently, India’s maritime diplomacy is evolving through inclusive frameworks such as the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the 14^th East Asia Summit in Bangkok in November 2019.  The IPOI, an open and non-treaty-based initiative, aims to address maritime challenges in the Indo-Pacific through cooperative mechanisms.  As mentioned earlier, the IPOI provides first-order-specificity to the country’s present maritime policy of ‘MAHASAGAR’ and marks an expansion of India’s maritime approach beyond traditional naval operations.  As India’s maritime policy expands, it now involves more than the navy-coast guard amalgam, addressing a range of areas including maritime security, marine ecology, technological and scientific cooperation, academic collaborations, disaster risk management, capacity building, resource sharing, trade connectivity, maritime transport, and the sustainable use of marine resources.  The seven pillars of the IPOI reflect this broader maritime diplomacy, underscoring India’s intent to be an influential player in shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific region.

India’s fundamental approach to maritime strategy within African littorals is one of ‘constructive engagement.’  Its efforts in the eastern African littorals are more deeply entrenched than what is often reflected in policy discourse.  To provide a comprehensive maritime development framework for these countries, India needs to focus on pan-African frameworks and initiatives. Key programs, such as the “Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme” (CAADP), the “Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa” (PIDA), the “African Mining Vision” (AMV), the “Science and Technology Innovation Strategy for Africa” (STISA), “Boosting Intra-Africa Trade” (BIAT), and the “Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa” (AIDA), are all advancing country-specific agendas to achieve blue economy goals and address maritime infrastructure challenges.  Additionally, eastern African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have adopted maritime security and blue economy action plans to support the maritime needs of their member states.  For instance, IGAD has developed a “Blue Economy Strategy and Implementation Plan” (BESIP),[42] which its member countries can adapt and fit into their own national strategies.

India’s envisioned Critical Mineral Mission, as outlined in the Union Budget 2024-25, seeks to incentivise the acquisition of overseas assets.  Given that Africa holds 30% of the world’s critical minerals, India needs to strengthen its capacity-building efforts in African nations to accelerate mining exploration and extraction while minimising ecological impacts.  Additionally, India can offer technology for the beneficiation of mineral ores.[43]  To achieve this, India must align its initiatives with the “Africa Mining Vision”, which aims to integrate mining into local, national, and regional development policies.   India can add value by transforming Africa’s critical mineral landscape, building competitive infrastructure across the mining chain, and contributing to sustainable development in the sector

As India prepares for the “India-Africa Forum Summit IV” (IAFS IV), it needs to give special consideration to the maritime needs of Africa, with a particular focus on the eastern African mainland-coastal and island States.  To deepen collaboration, India should organise a “Maritime Dialogue” with these countries and their respective RECs on the sidelines of the upcoming IAFS IV.  India’s policy approach should embrace, internalise, and advocate a narrative of “holistic maritime security,” a concept originally articulated by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the first Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS).  This concept advocates maritime security as comprising “freedom from threats arising ‘in,’ ‘from,’ or ‘through’ the sea” and incorporates both traditional/military and non-traditional/human security dimensions.  This aligns closely with the 2050 AIMS, which underscores maritime security as fundamental to achieving blue economy objectives.  Additionally, the Kampala Principles should be expanded to include all relevant maritime industries where India can partner with eastern African nations.

Climate Change is increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events.  Countries located on and in the proximity of the Horn of Africa experienced prolonged droughts between 2020 to 2023.  The challenges posed by climate change, as evidenced by the recent droughts and the devastation caused by Cyclone HIDAYA, highlight the urgency for resilient infrastructure in the region.  India’s international “Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure” (CDRI) offers an ideal platform for collaboration in building sustainable port and coastal infrastructure. Expanding CDRI’s membership to include additional eastern African countries will not only support local resilience but also strengthen India-Africa ties in the face of shared environmental threats.  Together, these initiatives can build a more secure, prosperous, and resilient maritime future for both regions.

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Endnotes:

[1] SAGAR is an acronym for “Security and Growth for All in the Region” and is the encapsulation of India’s maritime policy.

[2] Media Center, “Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi announced Vision MAHASAGAR- “Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions” for the Global South in Mauritius”, 12 March 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/newsdetail1.htm?13355/

[3] Gurjit Singh, The Harambee Factor—India-Africa Economic and Development Partnership, (Macmillan Publishers: 2022), 1-421

[4] The IPOI, which was articulated 04 November 2019 by India’s Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, at the 14^th East Asia Summit in Bangkok, has seven pillars: (1) maritime security, (2) marine ecology, (3) marine resources, (4) capacity building and resource sharing, (5) trade, connectivity, and maritime transport, (6) disaster risk reduction and management, and (7) science, technology, and academic cooperation.  See: Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Prime Minister’s Speech at the East Asia Summit, 04 November 2019. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32171/Prime_Ministers_Speech_at_the_East_Asia_Summit_04_November_2019

[5] Saul B. Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography of the International Relations, (Rowman & Littlefield: London, 2003), 1-504.

See Also: The continental-maritime dynamic was originally explored by the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, who speculated on the relationship between ‘continentality’ and ‘maritimity.’  Continentality reflects landward, inward-looking political and economic structures, whereas ‘maritimity’ embodies a more expansive political, economic, and cultural outlook.

[6] Indian Economic Service (GoI), “Economic Contribution of the Indian Ports”, https://www.ies.gov.in/pdfs/ports-economic-contribution.docx

[7] The Vanilla Islands (French: Les Îles Vanille) is an affiliation of the Indian Ocean islands of Comoros, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion (France), and Mayotte (France)

[8] Country Chapter: Kenya, “Western Indian Ocean : Marine Protected Areas Outlook”, UNEP, 2021, https://nairobiconvention.org/clearinghouse/sites/default/files/MPA%20Outlook_Kenya.pdf

[9] Benegal Pereira, “Apa Pant in East Africa—Nehru’s Prodigy,” benegal.com, https://www.benegal.com/pant/apa.htm.

[10] Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), “Text of the PM’s Remarks on the Commissioning of Coast Ship Barracuda,” Press Information Bureau, 12 March 2015, https://pib.gov.in/newsite/printrelease.aspx?relid=116881

[11] Sanjay J Singh et al., “Ensuring Secure Sea: Indian Maritime Security Strategy,” Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015, https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf

[12] Rajesh Mittal, “India and the Strategic Salience of The Mozambique Channel States – Case for A More Robust Partnership with Comoros, Madagascar, and Mozambique,” Maritime Affairs 19, No 2, (2023)

[13] Karoline Eickhoff and Tobias Berger, “Multipolarity in East Africa: India’s Role in Kenya,” Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik, 10 July 2022, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/multipolarity-in-the-horn-of-africa-indias-role-in-kenya

[14] African Development Bank Group, “Macroeconomic Performance and Prospects” in “Africa’s Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook” January 2024, Pg 10

[15] Data Bank, “World development Indicators”, World Bank Group, 2023, https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GNP.PCAP.CD&country=WLD

[16] Policy, “Maran launches ‘Focus: Africa’ programme,” The Economic Times, 31 March 2002. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/maran-launches-focus-africa-programme/articleshow/5455788.cms?from=mdr

[17] A Minhas, “Value of Indian exports to East African Countries FY 2024,” Statista, 14 June 2024. https://www.statista.com/statistics/653046/export-value-east-africa-from-india/.

[18] https://www.statista.com/statistics/1382786/bilateral-remittances-india/

[19] World Bank, GDP-DataCatalogue, 2023, https://datacatalogfiles.worldbank.org/ddh-published/0038130/DR0046441/GDP.pdf?versionId=2024-07-01T12:42:23.8710032Z

[20] Consular Services, “Population of Overseas Indians,” Ministry of External Affairs (GOI), 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/population-of-overseas-indians.htm

[21] Statsita, “Bilateral Remittances of India,” Statista.Com, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1382786/bilateral-remittances-india/

[22] African Union, “Regional Economic Communities of Africa,” https://au.int/en/recs

[23] African Union et al, “Africa Regional Integration Index (Report 2019),”

[24] Republic of South Africa, “SADC’s Maritime Committee to strengthen relations,” SA Government News Agency, 26 August 2010, https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sadcs-maritime-committee-strengthen-relations

[25] Timothy Walker, “SADC’S PURSUIT OF MARITIME SECURITY IN A REGION LACKING REGIONALISM,” South African Journal of Military Studies 47, No 2, 2019, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342071325_SADC’S_PURSUIT_OF_MARITIME_SECURITY_IN_A_REGION_LACKING_REGIONALISM

[26]  African Union, “Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy” 2012.

[27] African Union, “AFRICAN CHARTER ON MARITIME SECURITY AND SAFETY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (LOMÉ CHARTER),” adopted by the Extraordinary Session of the Assembly, 15 October 2016, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37286-treaty-african_charter_on_maritime_security.pdf

[28] Utpal Bhaskar, “India’s wait for Mozambique LNG gets longer, at stake $8 bn investment,” Mint, 27 August 2024, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/indias-inordinate-wait-for-mozambique-lng-gets-longer-at-stake-8-billion-investment-11724566573571.html

[29] Economic and Commerce, “India-Mozambique Economic and Commercial Relations,” High Commission of India (Maputo, Mozambique), https://www.hcimaputo.gov.in/page/india-mozambique-economic-and-commercial-relations

[30] Veda Vaidyanathan, “Africa can make India’s ‘critical mineral mission’ shine,” The Hindu, 6 September 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/africa-can-make-indias-critical-mineral-mission-shine/article68610753.ece

[31] Elizabeth Roche, “Narendra Modi’s 10 guiding principles for India Africa ties,” Mint, 25 July 2018, https://www.livemint.com/Politics/nYzBEWMFuwAdAgxeb2BBKM/Narendra-Modis-10-guiding-principles-for-India-Africa-ties.html

[32] Marta Baraibar and Abubakr A. M. Salih, “10 Climate Change impacts in East Africa you didn’t know about,” Medium, 7 April 2021

[33] Industry, TERI to set up Centre in Ethiopia, The Economic Times, 28 March 2008, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/education/teri-to-set-up-centre-in-ethiopia/articleshow/2907303.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

[34] Ministry of External Affairs, “Delhi Declaration 2015,” Government of India, 29 October 2015, https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/25980_declaration.pdf

[35] African Union, “Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy” 2012

[36] Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan, “India as a Net Security-Provider in the Indian Ocean and Beyond,” CIMSEC, 29 April 2016, https://cimsec.org/india-net-security-provider-indian-ocean-beyond/

[37] Fragile State Index 2024, “Global Data,” The Fund for Peace, 2024, https://fragilestatesindex.org/global-data/

[38] Himadri Das, “Twenty-Five Years of India’s Transformative Response to Maritime Piracy: 1999-2024,” Maritime Affairs 20, No 1 (2024): 72-85

[39] FAQ<About, “Who Administers IORIS?,” IORIS.Org, https://ioris.org/media/#faq

[40] Saaz Lahiri, “A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’s KEY MARITIME SECURITY ENGAGEMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN,” National Maritime Foundation, 17 April 2024, https://maritimeindia.org/a-critical-analysis-of-the-european-unions-key-maritime-security-engagements-in-the-indian-ocean/

[41] Dhruvaksh Saha, “Adani Ports signs 30-year concession pact to operate Tanzania Port Terminal”, Business Standard, 31 May 2024, https://www.business-standard.com/companies/news/adani-ports-signs-30-year-concession-pact-to-operate-tanzania-port-terminal-124053101809_1.html

[42] Intergovernmental Authority on Development, “Regional Blue Economy and Implementation Plan for 5 years (2021-2025), October 2020, https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/IGAD-Blue-Strategy-Draft.pdf

[43] Veda Vaidyanathan, “Africa can make India’s ‘critical mineral mission’ shine,” The Hindu, 6 September 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/africa-can-make-indias-critical-mineral-mission-shine/article68610753.ece