Abstract: Türkiye’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean has emerged as a subject of growing interest within Indian strategic discourse, particularly in light of its increasing engagement in the western Indian Ocean region. This development carries significant implications for India’s maritime geostrategy and its broader Indo-Pacific vision. As Türkiye deepens its diplomatic, economic, and military footprint—most notably through its partnerships in East Africa and its strengthening defence ties with Pakistan—questions arise about the potential impact on India’s strategic positioning. This article, the first in a multi-part series, provides an initial assessment of Türkiye’s maritime activities in the region and explores the extent to which these may hinder India’s pursuit of its maritime goal of “obtaining and retaining a favourable geostrategic maritime position.” By mapping Türkiye’s evolving maritime posture, the paper lays the groundwork for a more comprehensive evaluation of its long-term implications for regional stability and India’s maritime strategy.
Keywords: TÜRKIYE, INDIAN OCEAN REGION (IOR), WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN, DEFENCE MODERNISATION, DEFENCE DIPLOMACY, NAVAL PRESENCE, TÜRKIYE–PAKISTAN RELATIONS, EAST AFRICA, SOMALIA.
Türkiye’s maritime outlook, and its preference for ‘maritimity’ over ‘continentality’ as conceptualised by Saul Cohen, appears to be shaped more by geography and necessity than by strategic choice.[1] Bordered by seas on three sides— the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the Mediterranean— along with strategic control over the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits, Türkiye’s emphasis on maritime affairs, particularly its maritime defence industry, assumes considerable importance.[2] As a result, maritime focus has been integrated into national policy since the early years of the Republic. This is best reflected in the words of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who stated, “We must think of maritime as the great national ideal of Turks and achieve it as soon as possible.”[3]
However, being surrounded by water does not automatically translate into maritime power, and Türkiye is no exception. The concept of ‘maritime’ power— often incorrectly conflated with ‘sea’ power— encompasses more than naval strength alone. It may be defined as “the ability (to use the seas for one’s own purposes while dissuading, deterring and preventing others from using them in ways that are to our disadvantage)… and comprises ‘political’, ‘economic’ and ‘military’ power exercised through the use of the sea.”[4] While Türkiye has long depended on maritime trade and activity due to its geographic proximity to major waterways, it is only in the past decade or two that it has started to operationalise a coherent maritime strategy and integrate it into its evolving foreign policy. This newfound coherence and assertive maritime strategy largely emerged as a response to its conflicts in the Mediterranean, particularly regarding maritime borders with Greece and Cyprus, which led to the formation of the Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) doctrine. The Blue Homeland doctrine— central to Türkiye’s maritime policy— outlines its perceived maritime borders in the Black Sea, Mediterranean, Marmara, and Aegean Seas.[5] In essence, Blue Homeland defines the “geographic boundaries of Türkiye’s maritime rights and interests”.[6] It provides a basis for Türkiye’s maritime claims, helps secure its energy interests, and, most importantly, outlines a path for broader international engagement—particularly in Africa and Asia. While its application lacks the consistency and coherence necessary to be considered a fully-fledged policy, Blue Homeland functions as political leverage in Türkiye’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and active neutrality.[7] This is especially relevant as Ankara attempts to carefully balance its interests between the West, Asia, and Africa.
Expanding Influence in the Indian Ocean and Beyond
Although Türkiye has not historically been considered a maritime power, it now aspires to become one, leveraging its extensive 8,333-kilometre coastline.[8] Like other emerging powers, Türkiye’s maritime ambitions have expanded beyond its immediate neighbourhood. Yet, Türkiye’s increasing engagement in the Indian Ocean signals a maritime vision that transcends traditional geographic limits. This shift suggests a broader strategic intent, one that goes beyond the conventional scope of the Blue Homeland doctrine and aligns Türkiye’s maritime assertiveness with its expanding foreign policy agenda.
Türkiye’s intent to affirm its position in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) is evident in the words of President Erdoğan, who described the nation’s interests as “residing in the Suez Canal, the adjacent seas, and from there extending to the Indian Ocean.” [9] Unlike its immediate and pressing concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean, Türkiye’s presence in the Indian Ocean is driven by its strategy to diversify its foreign policy and adapt to the region’s geopolitical shifts. These evolving relations take various forms, including bilateral trade, defence agreements, and humanitarian aid. Through these engagements, Türkiye aims to reduce its reliance on traditional allies by expanding its bilateral partnerships. Its most notable presence has been in parts of Africa, where Türkiye has emerged as a significant player and a reliable partner alongside other major powers.[10] Over the past twenty-five years, Türkiye’s expanding footprint in Africa has drawn considerable attention, strengthening its influence in the region and extending its reach into the Indian Ocean.
The deliberate and institutionalised integration of Africa into Türkiye’s foreign policy, which began in 1998 with the initiation of the Africa Action Plan by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has evolved into a robust and multidimensional presence, positioning Türkiye as a notable actor alongside other major external powers operating on the continent in the past two decade. While Türkiye’s activities across Africa carry broad geopolitical consequences, its presence in Somalia is of particular relevance for Indian policymakers, as they provide Ankara with a direct gateway to the Indian Ocean.
A key milestone in this trajectory was the establishment of the TURKSOM military base in 2017, located southeast of Mogadishu.[11] At the time of its construction, TURKSOM was Türkiye’s largest military base abroad, symbolising a deepening strategic commitment.[12] This presence gained renewed importance in 2024, when Türkiye and Somalia signed two major agreements: a comprehensive maritime and defence pact in February, followed by an oil and gas cooperation deal in March.[13] Under the maritime agreement, Türkiye will rebuild, equip, and train the Somali Navy in exchange for 30 per cent of the revenue generated from Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).[14] This arrangement is particularly consequential, not only because it reinforces Türkiye’s defence ties with a strategically located littoral state, but also because it facilitates access to critical maritime chokepoints such as the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Mozambique Channel. Collectively, these developments contribute to the consolidation of Türkiye’s strategic presence in the Western Indian Ocean and underscore its long-term ambitions as a maritime actor in the region.
In addition to its growing role in Africa, Türkiye has been fostering closer ties with countries like Pakistan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and others in the Indo-Pacific. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has acknowledged that “the defining theme of the 21st century will be the rise of the Asia-Pacific region,” reflecting Türkiye’s recognition of the region’s strategic importance.[15] Launched in 2019, Türkiye’s Asia Anew initiative offers a renewed vision for its foreign policy towards the continent.[16] While Türkiye’s engagement with Asia is not entirely new, its formal inclusion in the country’s foreign policy framework carries strategic implications for other major players in the region. Furthermore, Türkiye’s involvement with multilateral organisations such as the G20, IORA, ASEAN, and the SCO, along with its growing interest in BRICS, warrants a detailed analysis. In this regard, groupings like MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Türkiye and Australia) needs separate attention.
Türkiye’s Strategic Realignment
Türkiye’s shift in stance and its aspiration to re-establish itself as a connecting hub between Europe and Asia are drawing it closer to its non-traditional allies like Russia and China. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict further amplifies its significance, as Türkiye, despite being a NATO member and a strategic partner of EU, has positioned itself as a mediator, balancing between opposing sides.[17] On one hand, Türkiye continues to secure bilateral trade and defence deals with Russia, resulting in reactions and sanctions like CAATSA from the US.[18] On the other, it remains cautiously engaged with the EU, prioritising its more pressing concerns. Although relations with the United States are expected to improve under Trump administration, Türkiye seeks to strategically balance its ties with both Russia and the US without fully aligning with one at the expense of the other. Nonetheless, the path forward remains uncertain. This shift in Türkiye’s foreign policy— centred on diversifying partnerships and reducing dependence on the West— has emerged from years of dissatisfaction and perceived neglect by its traditional allies.
Among recent developments in Türkiye’s regional engagement, its bilateral relationship with Pakistan has garnered particular attention due to deepening strategic and defence ties. Beyond longstanding diplomatic relations, Türkiye has emerged as the second-largest arms supplier to Pakistan, reinforcing a significant defence partnership.[19] This relationship is further complemented by a growing maritime dimension, which has become increasingly central to their cooperation. Both navies participate regularly in key bilateral and multilateral exercises—TURGUTREIS, hosted by Türkiye, and AMAN, conducted by Pakistan—aimed at enhancing interoperability and advancing strategic coordination.[20] Türkiye has also supported Pakistan through initiatives in naval training and base development, reflecting a broader effort to institutionalise defence cooperation. A prominent example of this collaboration is the MILGEM/BABUR-class corvette programme, under which two vessels have been constructed in Türkiye and two more are being built at Karachi Shipyard through a Transfer of Technology (ToT) agreement.[21] In addition, joint efforts in naval platform modernisation, including the Mid-Life Upgrades (MLU) of the Agosta-90B submarines, have extended the operational life and effectiveness of critical assets in the Pakistan Navy’s fleet.[22] Looking ahead, both countries are considering further joint initiatives in shipbuilding, maritime patrol platforms, and advanced naval weapons systems. The port call of the Turkish naval vessel TCG Büyükada in Karachi[23], during a period of heightened regional tensions, alongside reports of the deployment of 300 to 400 Turkish drones— reportedly the Asisguard Songar model— against India[24], signified not only a demonstration of solidarity but also underscored the strategic depth of the evolving maritime partnership.
Their ideological alignment, combined with a deepening defence partnership, has raised questions about the strategic implications for India. In the wake of heightened tensions between India and Pakistan following the Pahalgam terror attack, Turkish support for Pakistan, alongside China, has intensified concerns about a potentially emerging Pakistan-Türkiye-China nexus aimed at counterbalancing India.[25] Whether these developments carry lasting strategic weight or represent short-term diplomatic manoeuvres driven by immediate interests will be examined separately, with particular attention to the underlying motivations shaping Türkiye-Pakistan ties. A nuanced understanding of these dynamics could help India chart a more informed strategic path—anticipating possible rifts between the other two nations and identifying opportunities to convert regional shifts into strategic advantage.
Türkiye’s strategic recalibration is interpreted differently across the global landscape. For the United States and Europe, its deepening alignment with Russia and China is seen as a potential move towards an alternative power bloc—one that poses considerable challenges to the Western-led order, particularly given underlying ideological divergences. Conversely, for India, Türkiye’s growing proximity to China and Pakistan raises serious concerns, especially as it threatens India’s ambitions to sustain a dominant maritime presence in the Indian Ocean region.
Military Modernisation and Maritime Ambitions
Türkiye’s transformation from an import-dependent defence industry to a prominent global arms exporter marks a significant shift in its strategic military objectives. Over the past two decades, this shift has been particularly successful, with Turkish defence imports—accounting for around 80% in 2004—falling to just 20% by 2022.[26] This evolution, driven by substantial increases in defence spending, has been especially evident in the navy, which has become central to Türkiye’s growing military ambitions. The commissioning of the TCG Anadolu in 2023, Türkiye’s largest warship and reportedly the world’s first drone carrier, epitomises the country’s emergence as a serious maritime power, although experts, including retired Admiral Alaettin Sevim, have noted that “Türkiye remains in a transitional phase. While it is recognised as a large-scale regional naval force, it is still seeking to establish itself as a medium-sized global player.”[27]
The simultaneous development of the MILGEM (National Ship Project), MILDEN (National Submarine Project), and MUGEM (National Aircraft Carrier Project) reflects Türkiye’s ambitious naval expansion.[28] This coordinated effort, encompassing the construction of 31 new warships— including an aircraft carrier and destroyer— represents the largest naval investment in Türkiye’s history, with an estimated cost of US$8 billion.[29] These initiatives underscore Türkiye’s intent to modernise its naval capabilities and project influence beyond its traditional regional sphere, particularly targeting the strategically vital Indian Ocean region. The Indian Ocean, with its critical sea lanes and increasing geopolitical relevance, presents Türkiye with an opportunity to showcase its advanced naval capabilities, build strategic partnerships, and challenge the existing power dynamics, particularly those involving India.
Way Forward: Recommendations for India
In response to Türkiye’s expanding naval capabilities and its strategy of projecting influence into the Indian Ocean region, India must adopt a calibrated and multidimensional maritime strategy. This should include strengthening strategic partnerships with key littoral states, enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), and accelerating naval modernisation to safeguard India’s strategic interests and maintain regional maritime primacy. In addition to bolstering defence and security cooperation in the Indian Ocean, India should deepen partnerships with states that share converging concerns about Türkiye’s assertive posture— particularly Greece and Cyprus, with whom India enjoys long-standing diplomatic ties.
As Türkiye extends its reach through defence diplomacy in the Gulf and East Africa, India must also expand its own military partnerships and training programmes in these regions to maintain strategic balance. Multilateral platforms such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) should be further leveraged to institutionalise regional cooperation and present a collective front to extra-regional actors. While preserving diplomatic engagement with Türkiye, India must clearly articulate its strategic red lines and institutionalise scenario-based planning to anticipate and effectively respond to the evolving maritime dynamics.
Conclusion
Türkiye’s naval expansion is not merely a reflection of national pride or technological ambition, but a deliberate strategy aimed at projecting influence. Through joint exercises, port visits, and defence partnerships with littoral states, Türkiye seeks to enhance its defence-industrial footprint, strengthen its role in extra-regional security affairs, and position itself as a significant actor in global maritime security. This strategic shift, underpinned by substantial investments in advanced naval platforms, reflects Türkiye’s growing aspirations to match— if not directly compete with— the naval capabilities of established global powers such as the United States and China. By extending its reach into the Indian Ocean, Türkiye is employing its maritime forces not only as instruments of influence but also as tools for shaping the broader geopolitical landscape, thereby reinforcing its image as a globally engaged maritime power. Although Türkiye does not currently qualify as a global naval power and its activities may not pose an immediate threat to India’s objective of obtaining and retaining a favourable geostrategic maritime position, disregarding its expanding presence could prove strategically costly. Over time, Türkiye’s sustained naval growth may afford it greater leverage in regional affairs, potentially undermining India’s long-term maritime interests and ambitions.
******
About the Author
Ms Aditi Thakur is a Research Associate at the National Maritime Foundation. She holds a Master’s degree in Political Science from Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Her research primarily focuses upon the manner in which India’s own maritime geostrategies in the Indo-Pacific are impacted by those of Russia and Türkiye. She may be contacted at irms3.nmf@gmail.com.
Endnotes:
[1] Captain Sarabjeet S Parmar, “National Perspectives: India’s Maritime Outlook,” National Maritime Foundation, 15 May 2022. https://maritimeindia.org/national-perspectives-indias-maritime-outlook/
[2] Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “Türkiye (Turkey) | Location, Geography, People, Economy, Culture, & History,” last updated 6 April 2025. https://www.britannica.com/place/Türkiye
[3] Turkish Chamber of Shipping (TCS), “Turkish Maritime Sector Economic Value and Employment Inventory Project Report” (Kaykayoglu Innovation Group, October 2020), accessed 27 March 2025 https://cdn.denizticaretodasi.org.tr/media/SharedDocuments/envanter/DTO_Rapor_13_05_ENG.pdf
[4] Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan, “Maritime India: Facing Strong Headwinds”, Ananta Aspen Centre Policy Brief No 4, https://anantaaspencentre.in/policy-papers/
[5] Turkish Chamber of Shipping (TCS), “Turkish Maritime Sector Economic Value and Employment Inventory Project Report”
[6] Serhat S Çubukçuoğlu, “Türkiye’s Naval Activism: Maritime Geopolitics and the Blue Homeland Concept,” (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), 3
[7] Çubukçuoğlu, “Türkiye’s Blue Homeland Concept,” (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), 55
[8] Turkish Chamber of Shipping (TCS), “Turkish Maritime Report”
[9] Hürriyet Daily News, “Sino-Saudi Alignment Creates Strategic Opportunity for Türkiye,” 22 March 2017. https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/sino-saudi-alignment-creates-strategic-opportunity-for-Türkiye-111135
[10] Anne-Sophie Vial and Émile Bouvier, “Türkiye, the New Regional Power in Africa (1/3): ‘African Solutions for African Problems’,” Les Clés du Moyen-Orient, 21 February 2025. https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Turkiye-the-new-regional-power-in-Africa-1-3-African-solutions-for-African.html
[11] Anne-Sophie Vial and Émile Bouvier, “Türkiye, the New Regional Power in Africa (3/3): A Military Presence That Is Now Greater Than That of the Former European Powers,” Les Clés du Moyen-Orient, 6 March, 2025. https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Turkiye-the-new-regional-power-in-Africa-3-3-A-military-presence-that-is-now.html
[12] Vial and Bouvier, “Türkiye, the New Regional Power in Africa (3/3)”
[13] Kiran Baez, “Türkiye Signed Two Major Deals with Somalia. Will It Be Able to Implement Them?” Atlantic Council, 18 June 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/Türkiyesource/Türkiye-signed-two-major-deals-with-somalia-will-it-be-able-to-implement-them/
[14] Baez, “Türkiye Signed Two Major Deals with Somalia”
[15] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Türkiye’s Relations with The Asia-Pacific Region”, last accessed 27 March 2025. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/Türkiyes-relations-with-east-asia-and-the-pacific.en.mfa#:~:text=T%C3%BCrkiye’s%20bilateral%20trade%20with%20the,by%20the%20end%20of%202017
[16] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Türkiye’s Relations with The Asia-Pacific Region”
[17] Mehmet O Tulun, “Türkiye’s Mediation in the Ukraine-Russia War,” Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi (AVİM), 23 September 2024. https://avim.org.tr/en/Analiz/TURKIYE-S-MEDIATION-THE-UKRAINE-RUSSIA-WAR
[18] “Turkey’s CAATSA Reactions & Statements.” Defence Turkey, 5 January 2021. https://www.defenceTürkiye.com/en/content/Türkiye-s-caatsa-reactions-statements-4384
[19] Rupert Stone, “Pakistan & Türkiye: Brothers in Arms,” Pakistan Politico, 10 September 2018. https://pakistanpolitico.com/pakistan-Türkiye-brothers-in-arms/
[20] “Pakistan, Turkiye Hold Naval Exercise TURGUTREIS-XI,” The Diplomatic Insight, 21 January 2025. https://thediplomaticinsight.com/pakistan-turkiye-hold-naval-exercise-turgutreis-xi/
[21] “AMAN-25 Multinational Maritime Exercise & Pakistan – Türkiye Defence Industry Cooperation Special Issue.” Defence Turkey, 22 January 2025. https://www.defenceTürkiye.com/en/content/aman-25-multinational-maritime-exercise-pakistan-turkiye-defence-industry-cooperation-special-issue-6184
[22] “AMAN-25 – Türkiye Defence Industry Cooperation Special Issue.” Defence Turkey
[23] “Turkish Warship Docks in Karachi: Ankara-Islamabad Tighten Military Axis Amid India-Pakistan Standoff,” Defence Security Asia, 2 May 2025. https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/turkish-warship-docks-in-karachi-ankara-islamabad-tighten-military-axis-amid-india-pakistan-standoff/
[24] PIB India, “Press Briefing on Operation Sindoor,” YouTube video, 21:30, 9 May 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sAEKInbDqDc.
[25] Anil Trigunayat, “Pahalgam Terror Attack: China-Pak ‘Ironclad’ Axis Raises Concerns for India,” CNBC-TV18, 29 April 2025. https://www.cnbctv18.com/india/pahalgam-terror-attack-china-pak-ironclad-axis-india-indus-water-treaty-unsc-19596101.htm
[26] Ali Bakir, “Türkiye’s Defense Industry Is on the Rise. The GCC Is One of Its Top Buyers,” Atlantic Council, 4 August 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/Türkiye-defense-baykar-gcc-gulf/
[27] Erman Çete, “What Accounts for Turkiye’s Aggressive Naval Expansion?,” thecradle.co, 30 January 2025. https://thecradle.co/articles-id/28676
[28] Tayfun Ozberk, “Turkish Navy Starts Construction of 3 Major Projects: MUGEM Aircraft Carrier, TF-2000 Destroyer, MILDEN Submarine,” Naval News, 2 January 2025. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/turkish-navy-starts-construction-of-3-major-projects-mugem-aircraft-carrier-tf-2000-destroyer-and-milden/
[29] Ragip Soylu, “Türkiye Building 31 Warships to Boost Regional Dominance and Global Power,” Middle East Eye, 8 January 2025. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/Türkiye-building-31-warships-boost-regional-dominance-and-global-power
Leave a Reply
Want to join the discussion?Feel free to contribute!