OPTIMISING THE ROK’S DIALOGUE PARTNERSHIP WITH IORA DURING INDIA’S CHAIRSHIP

In 2022, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration unveiled the Republic of Korea (RoK)’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, marking a significant shift towards a more proactive regional role.  The strategy reaffirmed Korea’s enduring commitment to promoting freedom, peace, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, while embracing the principles of openness, inclusiveness, and rules-based order.  It underscores Seoul’s ambition to evolve from a regional player into a global pivotal State, contributing meaningfully to the stability and resilience of the Indo-Pacific.

A central pillar of this strategy is the enhancement of partnerships with like-minded countries that share democratic values, economic interests, and a commitment to multilateralism.  Amongst these, India features prominently, along with countries in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region, reflecting the RoK’s recognition of the strategic and economic weight that these regions hold.  The strategy envisions deeper engagement through economic cooperation, maritime security, sustainable development, and technological collaboration, positioning the Republic of Korea as a constructive and reliable partner in shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific.[1]

Why the Indian Ocean Region Matters to the RoK

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is of growing strategic significance to the RoK, given its centrality to global trade, energy flows, and maritime security.  As a heavily trade-dependent economy, Korea relies on secure and open international shipping lanes (ISLs)— particularly through the Indian Ocean— for the uninterrupted flow of its merchandise imports and exports.  Over 80% of Korea’s energy imports traverse the Indian Ocean, making the region critical to Korea’s energy security and economic stability.

In addition to trade and energy considerations, the IOR has emerged as a key geopolitical theatre where regional and extra-regional powers intersect.  This dynamic reinforces the need for Korea to engage more robustly with the region to contribute to maritime stability, uphold the rules-based international order, and counter non-traditional security threats such as piracy, climate change, and transnational crime.

The IOR also aligns with the RoK’s aspiration to become a “Global Pivotal State” as articulated in its 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy.  By deepening its presence and partnerships in the Indian Ocean, the RoK can reinforce its image as a responsible stakeholder, support capacity-building, capability-enhancement, promote development cooperation, and work with key regional partners— most notably India— to foster sustainable growth, infrastructure development, and resilience in the region.

Further, the RoK’s expanding economic, diplomatic, and development engagements through regional frameworks such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) present opportunities to collaborate on blue economy initiatives, scientific research, and climate adaptation— areas that are vital for the future of littoral and island States in the IOR.

In essence, a stable, inclusive, and cooperative Indian Ocean region is indispensable for the RoK’s strategic interests, and sustained engagement with IORA and its member States will enhance the RoK’s long-term economic security, geopolitical relevance, and global partnerships.

RoK’s Footprints in IORA

The RoK was made a dialogue partner of IORA, during the 18^th IORA Council of Ministers Meeting, which was held in 2018.  As the eighth dialogue partner— following the US, China and Japan— the RoK’s engagement with IORA underscores its recognition of the Association as a pivotal inter-governmental organisation with substantial potential for fostering regional and economic growth.[2]  The RoK recognises the significance of IORA and its position as an increasingly important geopolitical and geoeconomic nexus.  From a broader strategic standpoint, the RoK is acutely aware of the escalating strategic competition between the US and China in the IOR and, consequently, assigns considerable strategic importance to enhancing multilateral and regional cooperation through regional institutions such as IORA.  This is also emblematic of RoK’s foreign policy orientation that is aimed at contributing constructively to regional stability, connectivity and sustainable development.

From a maritime and security standpoint, the RoK’s engagement with the IORA reflects its strategic intent to position itself as a ‘quasi-island’ maritime nation,[3] thereby expanding its geopolitical reach through active participation in regional cooperative mechanisms.  This aligns with Seoul’s broader objective of reconfiguring its foreign policy architecture around multilateral and regionally anchored frameworks.[4]  Further, the RoK acknowledges that maritime cooperation within the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is increasingly organised through an evolving mix of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral arrangements, with institutions such as IORA serving as central platforms for dialogue and collaboration.  Consequently, RoK’s accession as a Dialogue Partner to IORA is not merely a symbolic extension of its foreign policy footprint but carries substantive maritime and strategic connotations.  Notably, the RoK’s aspirations to emerge as a maritime power with extended regional influence were articulated well before the formulation of its New Southern Policy (NSP) or its Indo-Pacific Strategy.[5]  Indeed, these ambitions are rooted in earlier national strategic documents relating to the RoK’s self-assessment as a maritime State.  The more important of these are its turn-of-the-millennium policy initiative, entitled “Ocean Korea 21” covering the period 2001-2010, and its successor, the “Second Ocean Korea 21” that sought to refine and extend this national ocean policy over the period 2011 to 2020.  Importantly, midway through this latter period, in the year 2014, the RoK’s Office of National Security published a strategy document (as distinct from these ocean policy ones) entitled, “A New Era of Hope: National Security Strategy”.  This strategy outlined South Korea’s vision for its national security and foreign policy in the 21st century, emphasizing cooperation and trust-building in the Asia-Pacific region as prerequisites for the realisation for the RoK’s ambition to be amongst the world’s top five maritime powers.[6]

Towards this, in June 2020, RoK further submitted its future plans to the IORA Secretariat, conveying its intention of actively contributing to three of IORA’s six priority sectors, namely, “Maritime Safety and Security”, “Academic Co-operation”, and “Trade and Investment Facilitation”, as also both IORA’s ‘Special Crosscutting Areas’, namely, “the Blue Economy” and “Women’s Economic Empowerment”.[7]  These offer areas of clear convergence with the RoK’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy” (2022) and its nine core lines of action, thereby establishing a robust platform for long term cooperation.[8]  Thus convergence opens up a large space for Track One-point-Five/ Track-Two engagements.  Table 1 provides a summary of engagements that the RoK has thus far established with IORA through Track 1.5 Partnership Seminars:

Source: Compiled by the Author

As may be gathered from Table 1 above, the RoK has demonstrated an increasingly active and influential role as a Dialogue Partner of IORA, marked by substantive engagement and strategic outreach.  One of the most significant instances of this partnership was the seminar held in 2021, which featured the participation of two prominent Korean government-funded thinktanks— the Korea Maritime Institute (KMI) and the Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology (KIOST).[9] This particular event underscored the RoK’s commitment to contributing advanced marine science and technology towards the sustainable and efficient utilisation of marine resources among IORA member states.

Continuing its proactive engagement with IORA, a high-level delegation from the RoK visited the IORA Secretariat on 04 April 2025 to explore additional avenues for enhanced cooperation, once again focusing upon IORA’s priority areas and the two cross cutting ones.  Discussions focused on the potential signing of a MoU between IORA and RoK that would formalise and deepen cooperation.  While the details of the MoU are yet to be disclosed, the visit reaffirmed RoK’s strategic interest in the region and commitment to support regional capacity building initiatives.[10]  Hence, RoK’s engagements is reflective of convergence of interests and presents new opportunities for multilateral collaboration in maritime governance, sustainable development and institutional capacity enhancement.

RoK’s ITEM Strategy: A Leap towards Enhanced Maritime Cooperation

In 2024, the Government of RoK conducted a mid-term evaluation of its Indo-Pacific Strategy during the second session of the government wide implementation review.  Cho Gu-rae, Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Diplomatic Strategy and Information Bureau, introduced a new set of strategic directives, encapsulated within the acronym “ITEM”, were aimed at refining and advancing the operationalisation of Seoul’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.[11]  In his address, Director Cho emphasised the RoK’s aspiration to contribute to the proliferation of the principles of freedom, peace and prosperity throughout the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions.  He noted that the ‘ITEM’ framework was particularly calibrated to align with the RoK’s evolving maritime and international stature.  Within this acronym:

The letter ‘I’ stands for ‘Institutionalisation’ (제도화) and emphasises the formalisation of strategic dialogues.  In line with this directive, bilateral and trilateral Indo-Pacific dialogues, namely, the “Korea-France” bilateral dialogue and the “Korea-US-Japan”, the “Korea-Japan-Australia” trilateral dialogues were inaugurated in 2024,[12] to foster deeper policy coordination and strategic alignment.  Building upon this momentum, the RoK had expressed its intent to launch additional dialogues with the European Union (EU) and Canada in the forthcoming years, thereby expanding the institutional framework for regional cooperation and enhancing its maritime stature in the region.  The review also suggested similar lines of effort to be launched with countries such as India and Germany.  This proactive engagement of both, resident and non-resident powers in the region, represents a major shift away from the RoK’s traditional reticence.

The letter ‘T’ denotes ‘Tailored’ (맞춤형) and seeks to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation by identifying and prioritising specific areas of strategic interest, such as strategic communication, maritime security, and the countering of foreign information-manipulation.  This approach is designed to be adaptive, taking into careful consideration the respective capacities, policy orientations and strategic preferences of each key partner within the region.[13]  By aligning its own model of cooperation with the unique contexts of its partners, the RoK aims to foster more effective and mutually responsive partnerships under its Indo-Pacific Strategy.  Further, in line with this directive, the RoK wishes to establish a “Comprehensive Basic Plan” and an “Implementation Plan” for international development cooperation that would enhance its Official Developmental Assistance (ODA) policies.

The third letter, ‘E’ denotes ‘Expand’ (확장형) and aims to expand the geographical scope of cooperation beyond East Asia to the Pacific and the Indian Ocean region.  The RoK would strategize the use of this pillar through several bilateral cooperation funds, including the ‘RoK-Indian Ocean Cooperation Fund’, which would further maritime cooperation projects, and expand the scope of emerging technologies.  The approach would be similar to the ones RoK has devised for IP4, NATO and G7.[14]

The final letter, namely, ‘M’, denotes ‘Maritime’ (해양) and seeks to establish a ‘rules based maritime order’ that is directly related to the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region and forms the core of the RoK’s national security.  It also outlines the RoK’s efforts to cooperate with Coast Guards and Navies across the region in order to build its capacity and enhance its capability in areas such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), the countering of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF), and the suppression of Illicit Maritime Activities (IMA).[15]

RoK Indian Ocean Cooperation Fund: A Chapter for Future Cooperation

Despite domestic political turmoil in the country, the RoK has been able to demonstrate notable policy continuity in advancing its Indo-Pacific Strategy.  As previously discussed, the RoK’s strategic engagement through its ITEM framework has underlined a coherent and multidimensional approach to regional cooperation, particularly in the Indian Ocean.  Hence at the 24^th IORA Ministerial Meeting held on 21^st May 2025, the RoK announced the establishment of the ‘RoK Indian Ocean Cooperation Fund’.[16]   This fund has been established as part of the ‘Expand’ pillar of the “ITEM” directives and reflects the RoK’s broader foreign policy orientation that entails inclusivity, multilateral maritime cooperation and its commitment to contributing to regional stability driven by economic development.  With an initial allocation of US$ 400,000, the fund aims to support cooperative initiatives in key strategic areas.  The national statements presented by the Member States and Dialogue Partners of IORA reveals a shared recognition of the need to reorient IORA’s operational framework toward greater institutional coherence and outcome-driven collaboration.  In particular, there was consensus on the importance of developing more structured mechanisms for engagement between Member States and Dialogue Partners.

Although the operational details of the KICF is yet to be formally disclosed, the RoK has expressed a clear commitment to fostering sustainable port development, advancing the responsible utilisation of marine resources, and promoting cooperative initiatives that are mutually beneficial to the RoK and IORA member States.  These are important trajectories along which this fund can be utilised in pursuit of broader regional development priorities, particularly in the maritime domain.

At present, the fund remains largely in conceptual and ideational phase.  However, it holds out considerable promise as a strategic and instrumental mechanism for capacity building and capability-enhancement within the IORA framework.  Drawing parallels with past initiatives, one may consider the ‘ASEAN-Korea Cooperation Fund (AKCF)’ to be an illustrative precedent.  Established in 1990, the AKCF has supported over 400 projects across diverse domains such as technology transfer, economic development, human resource enhancement, and even people-to-people exchanges.[17]  The AKCF has thus played a significant role in strengthening both institutional and developmental linkages between the RoK and ASEAN member States and similar benefits may be anticipated for IORA.  However, the success of the KICF will depend on the extent to which it can foster inclusive and participatory governance structures that would lead to capacity and capability development in line with the strategic interests of the other IORA member States.

Leveraging India’s Imminent Assumption of the IORA Chair

The RoK recognises India to be a like-minded partner within the framework of its Indo-Pacific Strategy, particularly in terms of shared democratic values and commitment to a rules-based regional order.  However, persistent inertia in managing mutual expectations continues to hinder the realisation of deeper strategic engagement.  Within the RoK, India is often perceived primarily as a ‘market’, rather than as a comprehensive strategic partner.  Hence a strategic shift needs to be engendered.

The assumption of the Chair of IORA by India for the period 2025-2027 will provide an invaluable moment for New Delhi to underscore India’s enduring commitment to regional cooperation and sustainable development across the IOR.  This will also serve as an excellent opportunity for the RoK to establish and proceed with the fund in areas that would not only benefit the IORA member States but also help the RoK itself establish itself as a ‘true’ partner in the region.  Within IORA, India has emerged as a champion of the ‘Blue Economy’ through sustainable development of ocean resources, including fisheries, marine biotechnology, and renewable energy.  This is in line with the RoK’s own desire to utilise the fund for sustainable development for IORA member States.[18]

Further, India’s efforts have focused on the sustainable management of ocean resources, the promotion of innovations in disciplines such as marine biotechnology, and ensuring that these efforts and endeavours remain aligned with IORA’s Action Plan 2017-2021, which includes capacity-building programmes in the sectors of fisheries and renewable energy.[19]  Additionally on the utilisation of marine resources and capacity development, the RoK, acting through India, can leverage the IORA Indian Ocean University Network (UNIOR) and meaningfully foster collaboration amongst universities, academics, and think tanks.[20]

Recommendations

The establishment of the KICF marks a significant milestone, laying a robust foundation for deeper collaboration between India and the RoK.  With the fund now in place, both countries need to realise the strong potential that this provides to explore new avenues of partnership across diverse sectors such as technology, infrastructure, energy, innovation, and cultural exchanges.  The KICF can serve as a strategic vehicle to support joint ventures, facilitate investment, and promote sustainable development.

Towards this end, the following is recommended:

• Strengthen Communication. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), particularly the Indo-Pacific and IOR Division, needs to initiate structured communication with the Embassy of the Republic of Korea (RoK) in New Delhi to identify potential areas of collaboration that align with the objectives of the IORA framework.  The MEA must actively engage the Korean side to explore and articulate concrete proposals, as also project ideas and thematic priorities that would facilitate the effective and timely utilisation of the KICF within IORA.
• Participate in Track 1.5 Partnership Seminars and Dialogues. The sixth RoK-IORA Partnership Dialogue, as indicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, will focus on the theme of Marine Spatial Planning (MSP).  In this context, the RoK needs to be encouraged to engage with policy-oriented institutions and dialogue partners such as the National Maritime Foundation (NMF) in India, which can offer valuable strategic insights and technical expertise to support evidence-based and regionally relevant policy formulation on MSP.
• Blue Economy Innovation Hubs. Establish joint RoK-India Blue Economy Innovation Hubs in select IORA coastal member States to promote collaboration in sustainable fisheries management, port infrastructure development, and marine biotechnology.  These hubs should serve as regional centres for capacity building and capability enhancement through technology transfers and pilot projects, leveraging Korea’s technological expertise and India’s regional presence to foster inclusive and sustainable blue growth across the Indian Ocean region.
• IORA Climate Resilience Taskforce. India and the RoK should co-chair a dedicated taskforce under IORA, focused on climate adaptation strategies and early warning systems, with the aim of offering targeted technical assistance to vulnerable member States, thereby building capacity and enhancing capability.  This taskforce could also serve as a platform for advancing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) cooperation through regional capacity-consolidation and capability-enhancement, thus enabling timely and coordinated responses to natural disasters and climate-related emergencies across the Indian Ocean Region.
• Joint R&D Mechanisms. Promote collaborative research and development (R&D) initiatives between India and the Republic of Korea through co-financing models, with a focus on climate resilience, oceanography, and marine environmental science.  These joint projects would facilitate the exchange of knowledge towards building scientific capacity and capability across IORA member States, and generating region-specific solutions to shared climate (and marine) challenges.

Conclusion

The establishment of the KICF does mark a pivotal milestone in the evolving strategic partnership between India and the RoK, offering a robust platform for deepening bilateral and regional cooperation.  As India assumes the Chairship of IORA, a convergence of this leadership role with the operationalisation of the KICF presents a unique and timely opportunity to synergise efforts for sustainable development and regional integration.

India’s Chairship of IORA further amplifies the significance of the KICF by aligning its objectives with the broader vision of a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.  Through this alignment, the KICF can be instrumental in fostering regional connectivity, strengthening maritime cooperation, and building resilient supply chains among IORA member states.  As such, the fund holds immense promise as a catalyst for not only advancing India-RoK bilateral ties but also for contributing meaningfully to regional peace, stability, and shared prosperity.

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 About the Author

Ms Arijita Sinha-Roy is a Research Associate at the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi.  Her research focuses on the manner in which the maritime geostrategies of India are impacted by those of the Republic of Korea (RoK). She holds a Master’s degree in East Asian Studies, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi.  She is also an alumnus of the Yeosu Academy of the Law of the Sea (2024).  Arijita can be reached out at irms4.nmf@gmail.com

Endnotes:

[1] Cho Won Deuk, “Strategic Developments and Maritime Cooperation in the Indian Ocean: Implications

for ROK-India Maritime Cooperation,” IFANS Perspective, 23 January 2024. https://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/ifans/eng/pblct/PblctView.do?pblctDtaSn=14299&clCode=P19&koreanEngSe=ENG

[2] Cho Won Deuk, “South Korea’s IORA Dialogue Partnership and its Implications for the New Southern Policy,”

IFANS Focus, 12 November 2018.  https://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/ifans/eng/pblct/PblctView.do?pblctDtaSn=14299&clCode=P19&koreanEngSe=ENG

[3] Rear Admiral Monty Khanna coined the term at the ‘Track 1.5 RoK-India-US Dialogue’ organised by the ORF and EoK, New Delhi on 29 April 2025.

[4] Ibid. 2, Cho Won Deuk, “South Korea’s IORA Dialogue Partnership and its Implications for the New Southern Policy”.

[5] Sukjoon Yoon, “Maritime Asia: A South Korean Perspective” in The Changing Maritime Scene in Asia: Rising Tensions and Future Strategic Stability ed Till Geoffrey, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

[6] Cho Won Deuk, “South Korea’s IORA Dialogue Partnership and its Implications for the New Southern Policy,”

IFANS Focus, 12 November 2018.  https://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/ifans/eng/pblct/PblctView.do?pblctDtaSn=14299&clCode=P19&koreanEngSe=ENG

[7] Report of the Tenth Bi-Annual Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), IORA Secretariat, July 2020.

[8]Anil Sooklal, “The IORA Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Building Partnerships for Mutual Cooperation and Sustainable Development,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol 19, Issue 3, 12 September 2023. https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2023.2252189

[9] Sukjoon Yoon, “Maritime Asia: A South Korean Perspective.”

[10] Indian Ocean Rim Association, X Post (Formerly Twitter), April 9, 2025, 3:37 PM, https://x.com/IORAofficial/status/1909911006769184916

[11] Ji Yeon Kim, “Government Presents ITEM as the Direction of the In-Tae Strategy,” Yonhap News, 3 December 2024. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20241203115300504

[12] Ibid.11, Ji Yeon Kim, “Government Presents ITEM as the Direction of the In-Tae Strategy”.

[13] Ibid.11, Ji Yeon Kim, “Government Presents ITEM as the Direction of the In-Tae Strategy”.

[14] Ibid.11, Ji Yeon Kim, “Government Presents ITEM as the Direction of the In-Tae Strategy”.

[15] Ibid.11, Ji Yeon Kim, “Government Presents ITEM as the Direction of the In-Tae Strategy”.

[16] Republic of Korea, “Deputy Foreign Minister attends 24th Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Ministerial Meeting and announces plans to establish Korea-Indian Ocean Cooperation Fund,” 21 May 2025. https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=376101&page=1&pitem=10&fbclid=IwQ0xDSwKbe7hjbGNrApt7ZmV4dG4DYWVtAjExAAEetRFQnYFOO9J9AlMQidxDrqdjOR7BuXs4iLM2kFXt72aFRbnWW-i1elsTRW0_aem_deeHOxT6BTgL0vgHSFpSsA

[17] ASEAN-Korea Cooperation Fund, “About Us,” last accessed 17 May 2025. www.aseanrokfund.com.

[18] John J Vachaparambil and Muskan Rai, “IORA at 28: India’s Chairmanship and the Path Forward,” National Maritime Foundation, 7 March 2025. https://maritimeindia.org/iora-at-28-indias-chairmanship-and-the-path-forward/

[19] Ibid, 18

[20] Ibid, 18