‘NET SECURITY PROVIDER’ DEFINED: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA’S NEW MARITIME STRATEGY-2015

During the Naval Commanders Conference held in New Delhi on 26 October 2015, the   Indian   Defence   Minister   Shri   Manohar   Parrikar   released   India’s   revised maritime-military  strategy  titled,  ‘Ensuring  Secure  Seas:  Indian  Maritime  Security Strategy’ (IMSS-2015). It supersedes the 2007 strategy document titled, ‘Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime-Military Strategy (IMMS-2007). This essay seeks to examine the salient features of the new strategy, including in comparison to IMMS-2007.

IMSS-2015 is the first strategy document released by the Indian Navy since the 26 November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai (26/11), when jihadi operatives well- versed in nautical skills used the sea route from Karachi to Mumbai, and carried out dastardly  cold-blooded  killings  in  India’s  ‘financial  capital’.  In  wake  of  26/11,  the Indian government designated the Indian Navy as the nodal authority responsible for overall maritime security, including coastal and offshore security. The new strategy reflects   the   overwhelming   imperative   for   the   Navy   to   counter   state-sponsored terrorism that may manifest in the maritime domain, and prevent a repeat of 26/11. It   also   addresses   India’s   response   to   other   forms   of   non-traditional   threats emanating  ‘at’  and  ‘from’  the  sea  that  pose  security  challenges  to  ‘territorial’  India and its vital interests.

While 26/11 may have  been  among the  major ‘triggers’ for India  to review its maritime-military  strategy,  IMSS-2015  clearly  indicates  that  proxy  war  through terrorism has not prevented India to adopt an outward-looking approach to maritime security. The new strategy dilates the geographical scope of India’s maritime focus. Ever   since   the   Navy   first   doctrinal   articulation   in   2004—the   Indian   Maritime Doctrine, 2004, which was revised in 2009—India’s areas of maritime interest have been  contained  within  the  Indo-Pacific  region,  with  the  ‘primary  area’  broadly encompassing  the  northern  Indian  Ocean  Region  (IOR).  IMSS-2015  expands  the areas  of  interest  southwards  and  westwards  by  bringing  in  the  South-West  Indian Ocean  and  Red  Sea  within  its  ‘primary  area’;  and  the  western  Coast  of  Africa,  the Mediterranean Sea and “other areas of national interest based on considerations of Indian  diaspora,  overseas  investments  and  political  reasons”  within  its  ‘secondary area’ of interest.

IMSS-2015 is merely an expression of intent of the Indian Navy to engage with the countries and shape the maritime environment in these areas. Nonetheless, the Navy’s multi-vectored and expanding footprint in recent years through the overseas deployments clearly indicates that the maritime force is developing the capabilities to implement the intent.

India  has  always  maintained  that  the  International  Shipping  Lanes  (ISL)  and the  maritime  choke-points  of  the  IOR  constitute  the  primary  area  of  its  interest. However, the new strategy goes beyond IMMS-2007 to include two additional choke- points:  the  Mozambique  Channel  and  Ombai-Wetar  Straits,  which  are  strategically located   at   the   far   end   of   the   south-western   and   south-eastern   Indian   Ocean (respectively). Through a formal ‘recognition’ of these choke-points, IMSS-2015 not only reiterates  the embayed  nature of  the Indian  Ocean,  but  also highlights—albeit implicitly—the Ocean’s geo-strategic ‘exclusivity’ for India.

IMSS-2015 also clarifies India’s intent to be a ‘net security provider’ in its areas of interest. The concept of ‘net security’ has hitherto been ambiguous and subject to varied interpretations. It is, therefore, refreshing to note that the document defines the  concept,  as  “…the  state  of  actual  security  available  in  an  area,  upon  balancing prevailing threats, inherent risks and rising challenges in the maritime environment, against  the  ability  to  monitor,  contain  and  counter  all  of  these”.  In  the  process, India’s role in this context also stands clarified. India seeks a role as a ‘net security provider’  in  the  region,  rather  than  being  a  ‘net  provider  of  security’  as  a  regional ‘policeman’.

IMSS-2015  also  expounds  on  India’s  strategy  for  deterrence  and  response against  conventional  military  threats  and  the  attendant  capability  development, sufficiently enough for an unclassified document. In doing so, it may be inferred that the concept of ‘maritime security’—at least in the Indian context—operates across the entire  spectrum  of  conflict.  The  new  strategy  attributes  this  to  the  “blurring  of traditional   and   non-traditional   threats…(in   terms   of   their)   sources,   types   and intensity…(necessitating)   a   seamless   and   holistic   approach   towards   maritime security.”  Notably,  in  contrast,  for  the  established  naval  powers  of  the  ‘western hemisphere’  ,  the  usage  of  the  concept  of  ‘maritime  security’  is  limited  to  ensuring security  at  sea  against  non-traditional  threats,  including  those  posed  by  non-State actors.

Although  the  epithet  of  India’s  maritime-military  strategy  has  changed  from“Freedom  to  Use  the  Seas”  (IMMS-2007)  to  “Ensuring  Secure  Seas”  (IMSS-2015),‘freedom  of  seas’  for  national  purposes  remains  inter  alia  a  key  objective  of  the current  strategy,  which  is  sought  to  be  achieved  through  the  attainment  of  a  more‘encompassing’ end-state of ‘secure seas’.

India’s  role  as  a  ‘net  maritime  security  provider’  in  the  region  is  not  only  its normative responsibility as a regional power, but is also closely interwoven with the nation’s own economic growth and prosperity. The ‘roadmap’ in IMSS-2015 provides a  direction  to  the  Navy  to  play  this  role  as  an  effective  instrument  of  the  nation’s proactive  foreign  policy,  in  consonance  with  the  ongoing  endeavour  of  its  apex political leadership, and echoes the enunciation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of “SAGAR” (Security and Growth for All in the Region). However, it remains to be seen how India’s navy would effectively balance the rather conflicting national security  priorities  of  ensuring  territorial  defence  across  its  oceanic  frontiers  versus providing ‘net maritime security’ in its regional neighbourhood.

About the Author 

Captain  Gurpreet  S  Khurana,  PhD  is  the  Executive  Director,  National  Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the  official  policy  or  position  of  the  NMF,  the  Indian  Navy,  or  the  Government  of India. He can be reached at gurpreet.bulbul@gmail.com