https://pragyata.com/The preceding part of this two-part article examined the Mauryan Empire’s efforts to integrate coastal dominion into its imperial logic in order to expand its power. It concluded that ancient Indian polities, although constrained by their technological and institutional limitations[1], nevertheless exercised a conscious and deliberate form of maritime agency. The workings of the maritime domain were not ancillary to political power; rather, they were central to it.
This second part continues the enquiry into the maritime motivations of ancient Indian polities, which then inevitably contributed to the nation’s strategic history. Building upon the preceding examination of India’s maritime past, this article delves deeper into the formative impact of maritime activity on the subcontinent’s spatial evolution and cultural articulation from antiquity to the present. This interpretive reorientation rejects the long-standing academic privileging and emphasis on the Mauryan Empire’s continental orientation — a tendency likely shaped by inherited (and largely incomplete) cartographic imageries. Sadly, such imageries and the spatial and territorial representations they connote, continue to persist to this very day and pervade Indian mass scholarship related to the development of the country’s strategic thought and consciousness. The consequences remain significant, as not only does this view of maintaining land-centric spatial imaginations perpetuate an incomplete, if not skewed, understanding of the subcontinent’s geographical evolution and shaping, but it further aggravates the cause by deliberately obscuring deep-rooted maritime legacies. This land-centric perspective has contributed mightily to the prevailing sea blindness of the Indian polity. Consequently, when reaching for maritime expression, Indian elites — and the Indian polity at large — is driven into a Eurocentric embrace that is vicelike in its hold upon the Indian mind. To break out of this gilded cage of Eurocentric (and more recently American) thinking, indigenous historic maritime legacies are what contemporary India most pressingly needs in order to reclaim a coherent tradition of maritime thought, cultural identity, and strategic orientation. In this regard, it is encouraging (and also fairly surprising) to note that despite the sustained onslaught of land-centric conceptualisations and Eurocentric maritime ones, at least a few indigenous maritime legacies have managed to persevere — quite in defiance of interpretive obstacles.
Thus, in an India that is, in the twenty-first century, rediscovering the conceptual intricacies of Kautilyan thought, it is critical to recognise the extent to which the oceans were embedded within the Mauryan conception of imperial might and territorial expansion. By directing the attention of the Indian masses, as also its elites, to the role of maritime trade corridors, port-polity linkages, and seaborne diplomatic exchanges, these articles seek to revalidate the enduring fact that the maritime domain, which was a central dimension of Mauryan statecraft, remains equally relevant to contemporary India.
Only an outlook that draws the centrality of ancient maritime consciousness from Indian history can reframe the sea as a strategic medium that requires to be utilised in our modern times to establish power and secure revenue. There is, therefore, considerable value in contemporary India firmly rejecting forces that seek to confine maritime thinking to the “periphery of geography”. It is important to bear in mind that the maritime domain — comprising bustling port cities, supplementing shipbuilding facilities, along with fairly robust and interconnected mercantile networks — was historically recognised as a strategic enabler of imperial integration and transregional influence. It remains so even today despite the fact that the ‘empire’ has evolved into a ‘republic’.
In the current article, the same analytical trajectory upon which the first part was launched, is extended and applied to another well-respected ancient Indian polity — the Chola Empire. The Chola Empire presents a compelling case to yet again rethink how the ancient and successive medieval states operationalised and integrated instruments of power. Although the DIME framework— involving Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic aspects — is widely, albeit incorrectly, believed to be a product of contemporary strategic discourse, and one that is exclusively of American origin at that, its component elements can be seen to have shaped Chola statecraft, as much as they did for the earlier Mauryan one. However seductive, the DIME framework has all the infirmities of any excessively simplified acronym. If one were, instead, to examine the “Strategic Culture Theory” as articulated by Alastair Iain Johnston, who emphasised the relationship between culture and strategy, one is likely to possess a more flexible and broader theoretical scaffold upon which to construct a quintessentially Indian maritime argument that demonstrates both historical coherence and contemporary relevance.
The Chola economic order was essentially underpinned by a sophisticated commercial infrastructure rooted in coastal trade, guild networks, and temple patronage. Merchant guilds, such as the “Five Hundred Lords of Ayyavole” and the “Manigramam” or ‘Jewel-Village’, did not merely operate under state sanction; they functioned as strategic extensions of state power.[2]
Viewed through the broader lens of human history — and simultaneously informed by a nuanced understanding of water as both a transformative element and a subject worth demanding its own historiography[3] — the Cholas emerge as a polity intimately familiar with the maritime domain. From their modest yet profoundly ambitious beginnings in the Kaveri Delta to the apex of their naval enterprise, exemplified by the Srivijaya campaigns, the Chola Empire drew deeply from a vast reservoir of maritime knowledge and its application to the strategic space. Observations from the work of numerous historians lend credibility to the fact that Tamil merchant settlements across Southeast Asia facilitated the twin goals of commercial expansion and ideological dissemination. These communities were often granted extraterritorial privileges, establishing temple complexes and cultural enclaves that reinforced Chola authority abroad.[4]
Kanesetti, in his work entitled “Lords of the Earth and Sea”, provides a factual description supplemented by the vivid anecdotal format of writing, detailing an encounter between a “Chola Samudran” (Seafaring Chola) named Samudran and the Emperor of China (Song Zhenzong) in September of 1015.[5] This was an acquaintance that flourished into companionship, and lasted for several years, until the death, in China, of the merchant-ambassador representing the Cholas, following a bout of illness. Importantly, under the orders of the emperor himself, he was buried with all the respect appropriate for a Chinese official of equal stature. Merchant guilds such as the “Five Hundred Lords of Ayyavole” and “Manigrammam” are well identified and recognised s in Chinese records and literature, as are other those of foreign trading powers — of which Kadaram (present day Kedah, Malaysia) is prominent. In fact the Kadaram competition appears to have lain heavy on Samundran’s mind right until his passing. The application of appropriate instruments of power is evident in this anecdote, as Kanisetti puts it:
“It had been three years since he left Cholamandalam, having received a title from Emperor Rajaraja. In 1012, at Nagapattinam port, Samudran and fifty-one others– senior traders, court officials – had boarded ships owned by members of the Five Hundred and Jewel-Village merchant corporations. They were part of the annual trading fleet destined for the eastern countries, laden with treasures and sojourners…
He was merchant first, diplomat second: the ‘Chola’ embassy was his business as much as the court’s. The tiny Tamil merchant diaspora, scattered across ports, included his friends, partners and relations… Samudran scattered the pearls at Zhenzong’s feet, descended backwards, bowed again. Then he declaimed, in polished Tamil infused with Sanskrit, as the water of an ablution was scented with flowers. He read aloud the letter that Emperor Rajaraja had given him, while Chinese scribes and translators scribbled…”[6]
This fusion of mercantile ambition and local governance resulted in commercially motivated imperialism, where economic and symbolic capital were mutually reinforcing and significantly empowering. This was the very model adopted some five hundred years later by a variety of European “East India Companies”, and indeed, continues to be faithfully copied to this very day. Thus, Rajaraja Chola’s military campaign against Srivijaya serves as a historically reliable reference point to explore the symbiotic relationship between flag and trade. While the strategic foresight displayed in this particular naval expedition remains notably advanced and innovative, it represents a moment in history when navigational expertise, transoceanic influence, and maritime networks were firmly established and exploited for the furtherance of state power. This, indeed, is the symbiosis that contemporary India is groping towards as it seeks to move from an inward leaning economy to an outward leaning one. The country’s path forward would be far better illuminated were New Delhi’s elite to study and internalise the fascinating strategic-level overtones of this Chola expedition. In this strategically critical movement, forthright trade policies, diplomatic recognition, and signalling of regional status, all coalesced into a singular ideal of imperial integration that effectively blurred the lines between the dichotomies of state and society — or even power and piety.
It is reiterated that New Delhi could and must learn much from these indigenous examples of the application of the entire DIME framework, without requiring recourse solely to Western literature. Since the expression “New Delhi” actually disambiguates to a group of political, bureaucratic, and military individuals drawn from different points across the Indian space, whose exact composition shifts, kaleidoscope-like, into patterns that vary widely over time, the lessons of history — whether Mauryan or Chola or others — can only be internalised through a process of creating, sustaining, and strengthening “maritime consciousness” amongst the broad societal segments of India’s polity from which these elites will eventually emerge. That the country is unable to establish this “maritime consciousness, not only in the nine coastal states and four union territories of contemporary India but in its politically significant hinterland as well, is the single largest obstacle hindering the ability to internalise and utilise the Chola experience. Here, a very substantial apportioning of blame must lie firmly at the door of India’s institutions established for the training of elite civilian bureaucrats; and even more opprobrium must rest at the door of the country’s military training establishments. Both of these pay only occasional “politically correct” lip service to these indigenous examples of DIME, while slavishly studying only Western-approved ones. These articles are, in that sense, a small act of defiance of this Western imposition of thought upon the collective mind of these Indian elites.
Various experts have provided explanations that justified the cause and purpose of the naval expeditions of the Cholas. Scholars such as Tansen Sen and K V Ramesh have proposed a direct link with the trade situation of the eleventh century.[7] Sen’s work primarily highlights two major naval expeditions launched by Rajendra against Srivijaya in 1017 and 1025, both of which, he feels, were primarily driven by Srivijayan interference in direct trade between southern India and Song China.[8] There is little doubt that these campaigns marked a crucial shift of regional maritime dynamics (primarily propelled by trade), highlighting the juncture at which the Chola intent to establish dominance over key trade routes and access lucrative Chinese markets superseded prevalent diplomatic mechanisms. In fact, Sen’s study underscores the significance of these military actions as part of an overarching pattern of competition among Indian Ocean kingdoms and polities to control regional commerce. It not only situates Rajendra Chola’s campaigns within the broader geopolitical environment but also sheds light on the manner in which maritime trade was increasingly being acknowledged as the principal factor in determining economic prosperity and political influence. It is pertinent to note that such tendencies were developing amongst ancient polities — not all of which necessarily qualify as thalassocracies.
The Chola interventions in Srivijaya can be cited as one of the few premodern examples of sustained transoceanic warfare. While the “character” of war changes significantly through the advancement of time and technology, these changes manifest themselves far more vividly at the levels of tactics and operational art. Strategy per se is largely impervious to temporal and especially technological changes, for the “nature” of war remains as unchanging as the nature of the human beings who wage it. Thus, there is much that contemporary Indian strategists could learn from these Chola campaigns by viewing them through the lens of military strategy— and grand strategy as well. The expeditions, while being coercive in nature, also carried remarkable symbolic weight. While modern seapower theorists, conditioned by Western inroads into the Indian mind, might be tempted to interpret these campaigns merely as coercive attempts to dominate common waters, a culturally immersed reading reveals a far more nuanced objective — a planned and systematic counter to Srivijaya’s disruptive trade monopoly and the assertion of Chola primacy within the regional order.[9] Strangely, in this regard, Kanesetti explicitly states that it was not Rajendra Chola’s ambition to create an overseas Chola empire. To him, it was more of an allied effort led by Tamil merchant corporations that sought to establish widespread global networks.[10]
In conclusion, it is arguably true that the Chola maritime enterprise might not always align neatly and uniformly with modern Western-driven theories and constructs. Yet, its peculiar achievements pose dichotomies that challenge Western-condition structures and analytical thinking amongst Indian strategists. For instance, the Chola polity was a medieval one yet bears all the hallmarks of a modern strategic community. Likewise, from a contemporary perspective, it might well be argued that the Cholas lacked a standing navy and a unified doctrine to that end. Yet, it is sobering to realise that neither did Britain until some three hundred years later, when King Henry VIII of England established his “Navy Board” in 1546. Why then, do Indian strategists and scholars find it comfortable to dismiss the former even as they shower strategic adulation upon the latter?
Even at a very simplistic level, a study of the Cholas would compel contemporary Indian analysts to move beyond Eurocentric frameworks and acknowledge the indigenous roots of seapower in South Asian political culture. Of course, all such comparative studies warrant caution, as examples drawn from ancient Indian maritime campaigns can hardly be taken as being able, in and of themselves, to entirely replace modern Western-constructed frameworks or contemporary theory. Any such attempt runs the serious risk of disillusionment and misdated comparisons at best. Nevertheless, viewing strategy through an indigenous and culturally-rooted analytical lens is likely yield a change of mindset amongst Indian elites — who constitute the most important group that needs, most urgently, to imbibe maritime consciousness.
The following three recommendations suggest the initial steps towards development in this direction:
- Institutionalising Indigenous Maritime Strategic Culture through Education and Research
The Government of India must establish dedicated “centres of maritime studies” under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, supplemented by ministries (or subordinate divisions) involved in actively enhancing maritime consciousness such as the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Ports, Shipping, and Waterways. Such centres should be located within (or co-located with) established maritime-oriented thinktanks across India, which would then conduct appropriately sponsored research focused on the respective region’s maritime history and unique maritime tradition. This network of thinktanks would serve as hubs for interdisciplinary research into India’s ancient and early medieval maritime traditions, including subject areas involving the study of strategic legacies of polities such as the Cholas, Kalingans, and Mauryans. Its mandate should include the systematic recovery of epigraphic and textual records, critical reinterpretation of inscriptions to detail maritime undertones if necessary, and the integration of these findings into wider education. Subsequently, in close collaboration with military and diplomatic institutions such as the Indian Naval Academy, the Naval War College, the Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign Service, the National Maritime Foundation, among others, these centres would promote a systematic inculcation of relevant research-backed observations into their respective educational endeavours. This would allow for a paradigmatic shift away from exclusive reliance on Eurocentric or American frameworks and re-anchor maritime strategy to a certain continuum of thought and memory peculiar to the Indian Ocean (or even Indo-Pacific) world.
- Integrating the Chola Maritime Legacy into Indian Ocean Diplomacy
India’s contemporary diplomacy would benefit considerably from the symbolic and historical depth offered by the Chola legacy. Initiatives should include the development of maritime heritage corridors and twinning programmes between port cities in Tamil Nadu and relevant Southeast Asian nations. Embedding the Chola narrative within diplomatic messaging would not only affirm India’s historical role as a connector of civilisations but also serve to differentiate Indian influence from that of other, more belligerent actors, which project a “middle-kingdom” outlook of disdain towards countries of the region, even in contemporary times. This culturally anchored diplomatic approach would enable India to project itself not merely as a rising power, but as a returning one, reclaiming its place in a historically familiar maritime geography.
- Mandating Maritime Studies within the National Curriculum
A maritime turn in Indian strategic education must begin at the foundational level. In the wake of the National Education Policy (NEP), the Ministry of Education needs to mandate the systematic inclusion of maritime history, trade, and strategic thought within school and university curricula. Drawing from India’s rich, yet underutilised maritime past, from the Kalingan merchants and Mauryan ports to the Chola naval expeditions, such a curricular intervention would cultivate early familiarity with the sea as a domain of power, identity, and exchange. At the secondary level, formal history syllabi should introduce students to India’s oceanic engagements, while at the tertiary level, universities should be encouraged to offer specialised interdisciplinary courses that bridge maritime archaeology, international relations, and strategic studies. Given the sheer volume of applicants seeking to clear the civil services exam in the country, the UPSC needs to be prompted to include maritime studies as an optional subject for the “Mains” level of civil services examinations. The inclusion of such content would not only address the prevailing sea blindness in Indian education at the root but would also foster a sense of maritime consciousness within the strategic community of the future. In the long term, this educational shift may generate a more coherent identity for India, one that includes India’s maritime expanse within its spatial and temporal imagination, including when referring to the country’s cartographic identity or when envisioning and describing its territorial integrity.
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About the Author:
Ms Priyasha Dixit is a Research Associate at the National Maritime Foundation. Her area of focus is the enhancement of maritime consciousness in India— a theme that incorporates multiple issues of seminal importance including, inter alia, India’s maritime (seafaring) history (incorporating ancient Indian knowledge systems), the maritime history of the Indian Ocean, India’s maritime heritage and its underwater cultural heritage, as also the MAUSAM initiative of the Government of India. She may be contacted at indopac8nmf@gmail.com.
Endnotes:
[1] Only relatively as the frameworks posed in this series of articles impose rather “modern” standards.
[2] Anirush Kanisetti, “Lords of Earth and Sea: A History of the Chola Empire”,
[3] An idea detailed in the book authored by Dr Radhika Seshan, entitled “Empires of the Sea: A Human History of the Indian Ocean World (Pan Macmillan Publishing India Pvt Ltd, 2024).”
[4] Anirudh Kanisetti, “Lords of Earth and Sea: A History of the Chola Empire”
See Also: Hermann Kulke et al., Nagapattinam to Suvarnadwipa: Reflections on the Chola Naval Expeditions to Southeast Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 2009)
[5] Anirudh Kanisetti, “Lords of Earth and Sea: A History of the Chola Empire”.
[6] Anirudh Kanisetti, Lords of Earth and Sea: A History of the Chola Empire, 110-120.
[7] Hermann Kulke, K Kesavapany, and Vijay Sakhuja, eds., “Nagapattinam to Suvarnadwipa: Reflections on the Chola Naval Expeditions to Southeast Asia” (New Delhi: Manohar, 2009), 2-3.
[8] Tansen Sen, “The Military Campaigns of Rajendra Chola and the Chola–Srivijaya–China Triangle,” in Nagapattinam to Suvarnadwipa: Reflections on the Chola Naval Expeditions to Southeast Asia, eds. Hermann Kulke et al. (New Delhi: Manohar, 2009), 292–315.
[9] Tansen Sen, “The Military Campaigns of Rajendra Chola and the Chola–Srivijaya–China Triangle,” 292-315.
[10] Anirudh Kanisetti, Lords of Earth and Sea: A History of the Chola Empire, 173-180.
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