2025 WHITE PAPER ON CHINA’S NATIONAL SECURITY: VIEWING ‘HOLISTIC SECURITY’ THROUGH THE CHINESE PRISM

The Chinese State Council issued a White Paper entitled “China’s National Security in the New Era” on 12 May 2025.   Although the full text of the White Paper is available only in Mandarin, an abstract in English has been officially released.[1]  This abstract offers a summarised Chinese interpretation of the all-encompassing concept of “national security” in the contemporary period, and the chosen pathways towards its realisation.   However, it is always a good scholarly practice to peruse the whole document rather than rely solely upon an abstract, so as to ensure that vital details and finer nuances, so necessary for precise and meaningful analysis, are not missed out.     While the official English language version of the ‘White Paper’ is still awaited, Dr Andrew Erickson, a renown US-based China scholar has, in the meanwhile, published an English-translated version — with of course, a cautionary alert highlighting the very rough nature of the translated draft.[2]

This paper, which seeks to provide an analysis of the ‘Whie Paper’ is based on the English-translated version by Dr Erickson.   Thus, the author’s assessments and inferences, based on this English-translated version, may suffer minor deviations from the issues that the Chinese probably intend to convey in the original document.

Main Issues of Conceptual Salience

The White Paper, formatted in six sections has — for the first time ever — articulated a grandiose concept of ‘big security’— a clumsy-sounding expression that suffers from infirmities of translation rather than from any lack of sophistication in conceptualisation.  It might be better understood as ‘comprehensive’ (or ‘holistic’) security.  Even so, it appears to be excessively broad in its embrace of an exceptionally large number of elements of national development in its of addressal of national security.[3]  This unabashedly expansive ‘securitisation’ of very nearly the entirety of national development is evident in the following underlying messages that are implicit in the contents of each section:

• The changing world is in disorder, and China injects certainty and stability therein.
• China’s holistic approach to national security seeks political security first, with the absolute leadership of Communist Party of China (CPC) — hereinafter referred to as ‘the Party’ — in the implementation of all national security tasks.
• Maintain the Party’s rule and preserve the existing socialist system while supporting long-term progression of Chinese modernisation, ensuring territorial integrity and safeguarding maritime rights and interests.
• Inextricably link the national security with national development with mutually contributory roles for effective progression of the other.
• Promote the ‘Global Security Initiative’, supposedly borne out of ‘Chinese wisdom’ as an alternative construct to existing global security mechanisms.
• Modernise the national security organisation and capabilities through extensive reforms.

The concept of ‘big security’ (‘comprehensive’ security) encompassed in the 2025 White Paper goes way beyond the common understanding of ‘holistic security’, the constituents of which are generally classified in traditional and non-traditional terms.   While traditional security threats are said to arise from State-on-State dynamics, non-traditional ones often relate to the activities of non-State malevolent actors, with or without the support of State actors.  However, this white Paper encompasses and privileges a number of widely varying domains that include “… politics, military, territory, economy, finance, culture, society, science and technology, network, food, ecology, resources, nuclear, overseas interests, space, deep-sea, polar regions, biology, artificial intelligence, and data”,[4] and still leaves scope for the addition of many other fields.   Importantly, the securitisation of all elements of national development generates an important strategic vulnerability because, as the eminently quotable American economist, Thomas Sowell, has put it, “if a word means everything, it also means nothing”.

An even more obvious strategic vulnerability is the fawning obsequiousness — an increasingly common feature in autocracies and dictatorships — that the White Paper showers upon President Xi Jinping.  Thus, the 2025 White Paper posits that “China’s holistic approach to national security is … an important component of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era…”[5]  Even when the White Paper attempts to cloak at least a fig leaf of institutional identity around itself, it fails quite spectacularly, as witnessed in the unambiguous acknowledgement that the CPC Central Committee — with President and Party General Secretary, Xi Jinping, at its core (emphasis added)— had proposed this creative approach to national security in the ‘new era’, and that the ‘Party’ would exercise absolute leadership in the execution of the entire national security effort.

‘New Era’ – Harbinger of Resurgent China

Further, the term ‘New Era’ — included in the title of the White Paper — finds a great deal of prominence as the baseline time period, during which the conceptualisation of national security has been undertaken, the execution of relevant reforms, restructuring, and reorganisation are being rolled out, and innovative measures for future are being contemplated.   In fact, this ‘New Era’, has notionally been implied as having commenced with President Xi Jinping taking over as the General Secretary of the CPC in November 2012.[6]  The current White Paper generally corroborates this assumption by stating that upon “entering the new era, on April 15, 2014, at the first plenary meeting of the Central National Security Commission, General Secretary Xi Jinping creatively proposed the comprehensive national security concept.”[7]

Chinese officialdom appears to be quite enamoured with this term, with ‘New Era’ finding ‘title space’ in many Chinese white papers which have been issued on widely divergent themes since 2019.[8]  Table 1 below lists all such white papers — including the current one — along with their titles and dates of promulgation.

       Table 1: White Papers issued by China with term ‘New Era’ in title (2019 till date)

Source: The State Council of People’s Republic of China

Major Foreign Policy Reassertions

Beijing’s absolutely uncompromising stance on Taiwan comes across quite clearly in the White Paper’s assertion that “Taiwan is a province of China and has no basis, reason or right to participate in the United Nations and other international organizations…”, and that “China will never allow any person, any organization, any political party, at any time, in any form, to separate any piece of Chinese territory from China”.

The White Paper has also highlighted the role of so-called ‘external forces’ and ‘some countries’   in “deliberately playing the Taiwan card” and creating trouble in the Taiwan Strait, South and East China Seas, Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang.  While the Chinese ire on these issues is mainly directed towards the US, the fact that Tibet has been mentioned also appears to suggest that India is very much a part of their risk assessment calculus, even though no country has been named within this allegation.

China has also sought to promote the earlier launched ‘Global security Initiative’ of 2023[9] as a panacea for all global problems through this White Paper, by suggesting that this initiative “addresses the urgent need of the international community to uphold world peace and prevent conflicts”, and that it has garnered the support and appreciation of as many as 119 countries and organisations.

The White Paper also claims support of the ‘Global South’ in strengthening the global security governance system by invoking the marginalised interests of that grouping in the current world order.   In this context, the White Paper also highlights its accomplishment of having arrived at “a consensus on building a community with shared future” with 17 neighbouring countries — with Pakistan and Indonesia being particularly mentioned.

In its quest to be counted as a veritable superpower, Beijing seeks to position itself as an ‘honest broker’ between various disputants at the global stage.  The following assertions in the White Paper are clearly indicative of what might well be considered to be diplomatic overreach:

• Be a peace builder in the Middle East; promote reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
• Enhance the ability of African countries to maintain peace independently.
• Support Latin American and Caribbean countries in opposing external interference to the maintenance of their own peace and stability.
• Assist Pacific Island countries (PIC) in coping with marine disasters and rising sea levels.
• Play an important role in preventing the Ukrainian conflict from escalating into nuclear war.
• Facilitate reconciliation amongst Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank.
• Actively mediate peace in northern Myanmar and support political reconciliation there.

Policy Indicators of Interest to India

A country-specific scan of the White Paper— particularly with respect to India, the Indian neighbourhood, likeminded countries in partnership with India, and multilateral groupings in which India is an active member— reveals quite interesting insights.   The associated context within which these countries/grouping are mentioned, does offer broad pointers into the likely Chinese foreign policy inclination towards them.  A list of such countries/groupings along with the associated context is placed at Table 2 for easy assimilation.

Table 2: Countries/Groupings mentioned in Chinese White Paper 2025 with Context

Source: Compiled by the Author from White Paper ‘China’s National Security in the New Era’

It is quite apparent from Table 2 that while the US and NATO have been positioned in a negative context, the settings related to India and Australia largely come across as neutral.  However, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, SCO, BRICS and ASEAN have been decidedly framed in a positive context— and along expected lines.   While Taiwan has, understandably, been mentioned 12 times in the Chinese White Paper in the context of the recent reunification narrative consistently being peddled through Chinese official documents and media, it is surprising that Japan (as a country) and the QUAD (as a grouping) do not find any mention in any context.

Comparison with the 2019 Defence White Paper

The last Chinese Defence White Paper, entitled “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, was released in 2019.   So, defence and security analysts and China watchers across the world have been awaiting the release of the next edition with a palpable sense of anticipation for more than half a decade.   In this context, the periodicity of earlier editions of is noteworthy.   The first such White Paper was released in 1998, with follow-on editions being published every two years until 2010.  The next three editions were published in 2013, 2015 and 2019, with a gap of three, two, and four years, respectively.   Such random— and sometimes extended— gaps between the release of successive Defence White Papers were largely attributed to the ongoing large-scale reforms within the Chinese defence establishment— including in the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

It was therefore presumed by the international security community that the 2025 edition — released after six years— would be the latest in a continuum of thematically related Defence White Papers.  However, that presumption has not been validated by this White Paper, which is focused upon security rather than merely defence.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, a perusal of both White Papers reveals little or no commonality of the central theme.  Thus, while the 2019 White Paper provided a detailed insight into the reorganised Chinese defence structure and offered fairly specific information about the resultant post-reform PLA hierarchy, the 2025 White Paper has looked at national security— that too, from a very broad conceptual prism— with military-based security forming just one relatively minor subset of the ‘big (‘comprehensive’) national security’ definition articulated therein.[10]

In fact, despite the PLA being one of the foremost instruments of national power — as, indeed, are the armed forces (or defence forces) of any country— it and its affiliated aspects are covered in just one paragraph under the sub-heading “Build a Strong Military Defense Barrier” in the sixth and last part of the 2025 White Paper, and feature nowhere else in the entire document.   Obviously vital topics such as the CMC leadership, joint-combat systems-management, capacity-building and capability enhancement that address both traditional security areas and new ones as well, cross-Service and local reforms, the optimisation of the defence industrial base, and the incorporation of science and technology in national defence, among others, are simply enumerated as such in that single paragraph.   In sharp contrast, these are the very topics that formed the bulk of the 2019 White Paper and had been explained in greater detail therein.

It would, therefore, not be totally out of place to argue that the 2025 White Paper is not a continuation of the earlier series of Chinese ‘Defence White Papers’.   By extension, it can also be inferred that the 2025 ‘National Security White Paper’ is a unique document of its kind, and that a comparison of the two White Papers is akin to ‘comparing apples with oranges’.

Concluding Thoughts

The 2025 ‘National Security White Paper’ has specifically singled out the ‘Asia-Pacific’ within which ‘severe challenges to regional stability inherently exist.   The use of the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ to largely describe the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region— which has progressively found greater visibility, near-ubiquitous usage and wide acceptability— remains consistent with the Chinese official stance and media narrative.  However, it is nevertheless interesting to note the mention of the term “Indo-Pacific” in this White Paper, even though the context of its usage is to express China’s opposition to the “… division of the region under the Indo-Pacific strategy”.[11]  However, no clarity has been offered with regard to ‘which’ region and ‘whose’ Indo-Pacific strategy.

In the inherently unstable ‘Asia-Pacific’ region, as China calls it, vital security issues of international import, such as the protection of Chinese overseas interests (citizens, organisations and institutions), and the safeguarding of maritime rights and interests, were expected to find greater salience.   That said, these important security matters are mentioned quite routinely alongside numerous other national-level concerns such as agriculture (where soyabean import dependency is, of course, an extremely significant security issue— albeit one that usually escapes the attention of hard-security analysts; mineral resources, human fertility and demographics (another area of very serious concern); public health; amongst many others.   This sort of narrative in the 2025 White Paper thus appears to broadly conform to CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Work Report presented during the 20^th Session of the National Party Congress (NPC).[12]  On closer investigation, it also appears that all the national development aspirations across a wide-spectrum as mentioned in the exhaustive 13^th Five-year Plan (2016-2020) promulgated by the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),[13] have been largely securitised, summarised, and linked to the ‘big (‘comprehensive’) security’ paradigm in the 2025 White Paper.

The 2025 White Paper has adopted the broadest possible view of national security, virtually subsuming every aspect of national development into the framework of national security.  The imperative of ensuring national security has, in fact, been metaphorically described as building “a new indestructible great wall”, so that it can provide across-the-board guarantee to national development.   On the flip side, the White Paper also posits that an unfinished or stagnant development process will certainly lead to national insecurity.

It is, of course, readily conceded that close correlation between economic development and security is a universally accepted reality— with an economic powerhouse deemed to be relatively more secure against threats and risks than one that is merely  military-centric.   In that sense, the 2025 Chinese White Paper has simply repeated this truism, albeit with grandiosely expressed linkages between these two imperatives.   Consequently, this latest Chinese ‘National Security White Paper’ of 2025 can certainly be characterised as a ‘comprehensive security’ redux, albeit one viewed through a Chinese prism.

****** 

About the Author:

Captain Kamlesh K Agnihotri, IN (Retd) is a Senior Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi.   His research concentrates on the manner in which the maritime ‘hard security’ geostrategies of India are impacted by those of China, Pakistan, Russia, and Turkey.   He also delves into holistic maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and their associated geopolitical dynamics.  Views expressed in this article are personal.   He can be reached at kkumaragni@gmail.com

Endnotes:

[1] The State Council of The People’s Republic of China, “Abstract of white paper on China’s national security in new era”, 12 May 2025, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202505/12/content_WS6821a354c6d0868f4e8f279a.html

[2] Andrew S. Erickson, “New White Paper: “China’s National Security in the New Era”, 12 May 2025, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2025/05/new-white-paper-chinas-national-security-in-the-new-era/

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid

[5] The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China releases white paper on national security”, 12 May 2025, http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2025-05/12/content_117870467.html

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Full text of the report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” 25 October 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ zxxx_662805/202210/t20221025_10791908.html

[7] White Paper, “China’s National Security in the New Era”, as translated by Andrew Erickson. See Note 2 ibid.

[8] The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper

[9] Xinhua, “Full text: The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper”, 21 February 2023, https://english.news.cn/20230221/75375646823e4060832c760e00a1ec19/c.html

[10] Note 5 ibid.

[11] The Author makes this assertion based on the presumption that the term ’Indo-Pacific’ is the correct translation of the relevant Chinese characters used in the original Chinese version of the 2025 ‘National Security White Paper’. The English- translated version of the White Paper published by Andrew Erickson has been used in this case. Note 2 ibid.

[12] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Full text of the report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, ibid.

[13] National Development and Reform Commission, “13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of People’s Republic of China (2016–2020)”, December 2016, https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_ 8232/201612/P020191101481868235378.pdf.