THE POWER OF THREE AT SEA: INDIA’S TRILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS IN ACTION

KEY WORDS: TRILATERALS, CRITICAL MINERALS, INDIA-FRANCE, SUBMARINE CABLES.

Trilaterals represent a pragmatic diplomatic relationship designed to overcome the inherent limitations of both, purely bilateral engagements (which often have limited reach and scope) and unwieldy multilateral forums (which are frequently hampered by slow decision-making and outcomes that reflect the lowest common denominator).  By creating a flexible, yet potent, middle ground for collective action; trilaterals are optimised for efficiency and effectiveness in specific contexts where broader cooperation is difficult or insufficient.  The operationalisation of the India-France-United Arab Emirates (IFU) and India-France-Australia (IFA) trilaterals in the maritime domain demonstrate a pragmatic approach toward enhancing regional security through focused cooperation.  These partnerships leverage existing bilateral strengths to address contemporary challenges, from traditional threats to emerging concerns like critical infrastructure protection and climate change.

This article offers a focused examination of India’s maritime trilateral cooperation with France through two key groupings: the India-France-UAE trilateral and the India-France Australia one.  Concentrating exclusively on the maritime domain, the analysis explores how each trilateral promotes combined naval exercises, maritime domain awareness and information-sharing, as well as defence technology cooperation and co-production.  The India-France-UAE trilateral is further assessed in the context of strategic collaboration on critical raw minerals essential for maritime and defence applications, while the India-France-Australia trilateral is examined with particular emphasis on the protection of undersea infrastructure, especially submarine cables.  By situating these trilaterals within the broader Indo-Pacific landscape, the article underscores their growing relevance in shaping regional maritime security.  It concludes by identifying the key challenges confronting these frameworks and proposes a set of recommendations to strengthen and operationalise trilateral maritime cooperation.

 

India-France-UAE Trilateral

The India-France-UAE trilateral cooperation was formally launched with a joint statement in February 2023, following ministerial talks in September 2022.  It represents a significant step towards a more integrated security architecture in the Indian Ocean.  This partnership is rooted in shared strategic interests, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, and builds upon strong bilateral ties between India and France, and India and the UAE.[1]  For France, the UAE’s strategic location serves as a crucial staging post for military operations between mainland France and the broader Indo-Pacific, reinforcing its comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy.[2]   Additionally, France’s major overseas base is located in Abu Dhabi (part of a larger French military presence known as Camp de la Paix) and serves as foothold for France in the northwest Indian Ocean.[3]  The trilateral’s agenda extends beyond traditional defence, encompassing technology, energy, and environmental cooperation.[4]

Combined Maritime Exercises.  Combined maritime exercises are a cornerstone of the India-France-UAE trilateral, they serve to enhance interoperability and collective response capabilities.  The first-ever trilateral Maritime Partnership Exercise (MPX) was conducted off the Gulf of Oman in June 2023.[5]   This two-day exercise involved a wide spectrum of naval operations, including surface warfare with tactical firing and missile engagement drills, close-quarter manoeuvres, advanced air defence exercises featuring French Rafale and UAE Dash 8 MPA aircraft, and helicopter cross-landing operations.[6]   The exercise also included drills for replenishment at sea and the cross-embarkation of personnel, facilitating the exchange of best practices.  Participating surface combatants included INS Tarkash and the French Ship Surcouf, both with integral helicopters, along with French Rafale aircraft and UAE Navy Maritime Patrol Aircraft.[7]   This maiden exercise significantly strengthened maritime ties through the demonstration of a collective commitment to address both, traditional and non-traditional threats, thereby ensuring the safety of mercantile trade and freedom of navigation on the high seas.   Beyond maritime drills, the trilateral has also expanded to include air combat exercises.  The air combat exercise DESERT KNIGHT was launched in January 2024 over the Arabian Sea, further bolstering trilateral defence cooperation and enhancing interoperability among the three air forces in complex combat scenarios.   The Indian Air Force contributed Sukhoi-30MKIs, Jaguars, and Il-78 mid-air refuellers, alongside Airborne Early-Warning and Control (AEW&C) systems. French Rafale jets and UAE F-16s participated from the Al Dhafra airbase in the UAE.[8]

MDA and Information Sharing.  Information-sharing is a critical pillar of the IFU trilateral, aimed at enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and enabling coordinated responses to threats.  The initial trilateral meeting of focal points in July 2022 discussed maritime security and explored potential areas for cooperation, including information exchange.[9]  This commitment was further solidified in the 7^th India-France Maritime Cooperation Dialogue, held in January 2025, where both nations agreed to strengthen existing mechanisms for information-exchange.[10]

Key mechanisms for information-sharing include exchange between India’s Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram, the Regional Coordination Operations Centre (RCOC) in Seychelles, and the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar.[11]   This network facilitates real-time information-exchange, strengthening Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) across the Indian Ocean Region.[12]  The partners also agreed to develop a joint assessment of maritime security threats, encompassing illicit activities such as piracy, armed robbery, maritime terrorism, contraband smuggling, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF), and maritime cyber-security threats.[13]   This collaborative approach to threat assessment and information-sharing is vital for developing coordinated surveillance and response mechanisms to ensure maritime safety and stability.

Technology Transfer and Co-production.  Technology-transfer and co-production are central to the India-France-UAE trilateral’s long-term vision, which aims to enhance defence manufacturing capabilities and promote self-reliance among partners.  Cooperation through joint development and coordination across semiconductors, battery technologies, data processing, renewable energy components, and the defence and aerospace sectors, stand at the heart of this trilateral.[14]  Critical minerals are intrinsic to this agenda, driving demand for advanced defence applications such as enhanced precision features, laser guidance, missile propulsion, and stealth capabilities.[15]

India and France have a longstanding defence industrial partnership, exemplified by the progress in constructing Scorpene submarines in India, with a focus on integrating India’s indigenously developed Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system.[16]  Discussions are also underway for incorporating the Integrated Combat System (ICS) into future submarines.  Collaboration extends to missile systems, helicopter engines, and jet engines, with France’s Safran Group working closely with Indian defence entities on codeveloping critical aerospace technologies to boost India’s self-reliance.  France has also included India as an observer in the Eurodrone MALE[17] programme.[18]  The launch of FRIND-X (France-India Defence Startup Excellence) in Paris further fosters innovation by connecting startups, investors, and defence agencies.[19]

The trilateral also focuses on critical minerals, recognising their importance for data centres, defence manufacturing, and transition technologies.[20]  Each nation brings complementary strengths: India with rare-earth deposits and R&D capabilities, France with advanced R&D in data-centres and defence, and the UAE with expertise in smart grids and AI integration.   Collaborative initiatives include establishing recycling infrastructure, sharing expertise in processing (e.g., India’s copper and manganese, France’s hafnium), investing in alternative materials to reduce rare-earth usage, and exploring technology patents.[21]  The trilateral also aims to promote capacity-building, capability-enhancement, and value-addition from mine-to-market, particularly in partnership with African countries, by exploring alternative financing models to counter existing dependencies.[22]  This comprehensive approach to coproduction and technology-transfer is designed to build resilient supply chains and enhance strategic capabilities across multiple sectors.

 

India-France-Australia Trilateral

The India-France-Australia trilateral dialogue, initiated via videoconference on 09 September 2020, marked a significant step in strengthening cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.[23]  Co-chaired at the Foreign Secretary level, the dialogue focused on geostrategic challenges; strategies for a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific; and prospects for cooperation, particularly in the maritime sector and in global commons such as climate and biodiversity.[24]  This trilateral builds on existing robust bilateral relationships, with India and France being strategic partners since 1998, and India’s ties with Australia elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2020.[25]  While the dialogue was placed in abeyance following the AUKUS announcement, it resumed in September 2022, reaffirming a shared commitment to a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.[26]  The third Focal Points Meeting in June of 2024 further solidified cooperation across sectors such as maritime safety and security, marine and environmental cooperation, and multilateral engagement.[27]

Combined Maritime Exercises.  Of similar consequence, combined maritime exercises are integral to operationalising the IFA trilateral.  Although the primary trilateral exercises are still evolving, India and Australia have significantly increased bilateral defence engagements, tripling them in the past decade.  This includes Australia joining India’s annual Exercise MALABAR (with Japan and the United States) in 2017 and hosting it for the first time three years later.[28]  India also participated in Exercise TALISMAN SABRE for the first time in 2025[29] ((albeit this was limited to personnel alone rather than platforms).

A key multinational exercise involving both India and Australia, led by France, is Exercise LA PEROUSE.  The fifth iteration of LA PEROUSE, held off the coast of Indonesia between 20 and 24 January 2025, involved 13 ships and over 30 aircraft from as many as nine Indo-Pacific nations, including Australia, France, and India.  Conducted by the French Carrier Strike Group (CSG) led by the FNS Charles de Gaulle nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the exercise focused on strengthening maritime safety, developing interoperability, and enhancing the ability to act collectively in maritime crises.[30]  Missions included boarding operations, air-based search-and-rescue procedures, and training in the use of IORIS (Indian Ocean Region Information Sharing) — an EU-developed web-based communication and coordination system for information-exchange.[31]

Information-Sharing.  Information-sharing is a crucial component of the India-France-Australia trilateral.  The trilateral dialogue has consistently emphasised enhancing information-exchange and combined surveillance efforts.[32]  Since 2020, Australia and India have cooperated on bilateral MDA by deploying patrol aircraft to each other’s territories on eleven separate occasions.[33]  The partners aim for a near-constant coverage of the Indian Ocean through trilateral MDA cooperation, enabling a truly shared common operational picture of the maritime neighbourhood.  A trilateral information-sharing workshop on MDA has been held at India’s IFC-IOR, where both France and Australia have assigned liaison officers.[34]  This mechanism, along with potential information-sharing between humanitarian and disaster relief agencies, is vital to address shared security concerns, particularly in the northeastern Indian Ocean (Bay of Bengal).[35]  The trilateral also seeks to develop collaborative strategies to address non-traditional security threats, including IUUF, piracy, and transnational crime, through enhanced information-sharing and operational coordination.[36]

 

Technology Transfer and Co-production.  Technology transfer and co-development are emerging areas of focus for the India-France-Australia trilateral, particularly in terms of capacity-building and capability-enhancement for maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.  While the direct co-production initiatives within this specific trilateral are less explicitly detailed than the India-France bilateral, the broader strategic alignment emphasises leveraging complementary technologies to address shared challenges.

One significant area of cooperation is the protection of critical subsea communication cables.[37]  These cables form the backbone of modern communications, carrying over 95 per cent of international data across the Indo-Pacific — yet, they are vulnerable to natural hazards, negligence, and intentional acts of disruption.[38]  Australia, France, and India possess unique and complementary capabilities in this domain; France has adopted a Seabed Warfare Strategy and its companies such as Alcatel Submarine Networks and Orange Marine are major players in cable supply and repair.  Likewise, Australia has developed impressive regulatory frameworks for undersea cable protection and cybersecurity.[39] For its part, India’s strategic location and skilled workforce makes it an attractive regional hub for cable-laying and repairs.[40]  The trilateral could explore opportunities for a regional cable-laying and repair hub in South India, work with the International Cable Protection Committee on security standards, and facilitate information-sharing on suspected cable attacks.[41]  Further, there is potential for a co-branded project wherein Australia leads efforts in the Pacific, and India and France lead in the Indian Ocean.[42]

Beyond cables, the trilateral can foster innovation through joint start-up funds in collaboration with the private sector, and explore collaboration in marine biotechnology.[43]  The three countries also need to collaboratively address norms for technology governance and data transfer, especially at international forums such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).[44]  While direct defence co-production projects within the trilateral are not as prominent as in the India-France bilateral (which involves Scorpène submarines, missiles, helicopters, jet engines, and the FRIND-X platform),[45] the emphasis needs to be on leveraging combined technological strengths to reduce maritime security risks in order to build regional capacities for resilience.

 

Challenges and Future Trajectories

Despite the inherent advantages and strategic imperative driving trilateral cooperation, these frameworks are not without their challenges.  The India-France-Australia trilateral, for instance, experienced a substantial period of inactivity following the announcement of the AUKUS security partnership in 2021, highlighting how broader geopolitical realignments can impact specific minilateral initiatives.[46]  While the dialogue has since resumed, such instances underscore the need for careful diplomatic navigation in order to maintain cohesion and promote trust.

The competitive nature of State behaviour, even amongst partners, can influence the depth and scope of cooperation.[47]  For example, while France’s freedom of action on IUUF is constrained by European Commission prerogatives, it has the ability to act independently only on maritime law enforcement — necessitating a nuanced approach to trilateral efforts in this area.[48]

Operationalising complex initiatives across three distinct national systems also presents practical hurdles related to capacity, capability, coordination, and technical interoperability.  Issues such as uneven levels of expertise in dealing with maritime cyberattacks across partners, or the sheer scale of MDA needs (e.g., the presence of several hundred Chinese vessels in certain maritime segments), highlight the vast requirements that even focused trilaterals must address.[49]  Further, the risk of minilaterals being perceived as exclusive or confrontational, particularly in the context of major power competition, can lead to half-hearted participation or limit their scale and efficacy.  Ensuring that these partnerships are seen as contributing to broader regional stability and inclusivity, rather than solely as containment strategies, remains a diplomatic balancing act.

 

Way Ahead.  The future trajectories of the IFU and the IFA trilaterals point towards deeper integration and expanded scope, driven by the persistent and evolving maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific.  These partnerships are poised to become increasingly action-oriented, leveraging their combined strengths to address a comprehensive range of threats.

For the India-France-UAE trilateral:

• A key area of future focus could be the continued development of a robust critical minerals’ ecosystem. This includes the systematic creation of recycling infrastructure, sharing of expertise in processing, investment in alternative materials to reduce rare-earth usage, and the collaborative development of technology patents that could become new currencies in future climate negotiations.[50]
• The trilateral will also likely expand its capacity-building and capability-enhancement efforts, particularly in partnering with African countries to foster sustainable cooperation in the critical minerals’ ecosystem, learning from past mistakes of the hydrocarbon economy and exploring viable alternative financing models. The application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) models in mining processes and equipment to offset ecological costs also presents a significant opportunity.[51]
• The India-France-UAE trilateral should consider pushing for the integration of the Port of Marseille into the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as a key EU gateway. For India, this would strengthen access to European markets through a stable French-administered entry point, reducing the overdependence on northern ports and the instability in Aegean sea.  For the UAE, this would position Emirati ports as central transshipment hubs linking South Asia to Europe, leveraging existing logistics infrastructure to expand trade and influence along the corridor.

 

For the India-France-Australia trilateral:

• Given the infrequency of formal dialogues between the three partners, Track One-point-Five informal workshops could provide actionable recommendations to policymakers. Such workshops would feed into the existing trilateral architecture on issues such as maritime security and surveillance, operational and technical interoperability, seabed infrastructure protection, regional maritime governance, amongst others.  Revival of the India-France-Australia trilateral on maritime issues could even take a leaf out of the successful Australia-India-Indonesia one.
• Enhanced cooperation on the protection of critical seabed infrastructure and undersea communication cables will remain a priority, potentially leading to co-branded initiatives for cable laying and repair hubs. Additionally, this trilateral could establish dedicated task force focusing on safeguarding submarine cables via joint monitoring and patrols, harmonising regulatory frameworks (legal and operational standards), investing collectively in the research and development of resilient cable technologies, and collaborative crisis management (including rapid response mechanisms and simulation exercises).
• The trilateral must leverage the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to lead coordinated action on maritime security, marine environmental protection, and climate resilience by incorporating each country of the trilateral into the seven maritime lines-of-thrust (spokes/pillars) of the IPOI. For instance, India could take the lead in terms of maritime security, Australia could do the same in terms of marine ecology, and France could lead in disaster risk-reduction.  This would allow such projects to be undertaken jointly under the framework of IORA while simultaneously providing substance to the IPOI.  Likewise, funding joint initiatives on blue carbon mapping, clean port infrastructure, and anti-IUUF operations through IORA’s seed funds and IPOI networks would also be beneficial.

Both trilaterals are expected to continue building on their respective bilateral foundations, expanding combined training exercises and technology exchanges to enhance operational and technical interoperability.  The increasing comfort of India with minilateral formats suggests a sustained commitment to these agile partnerships as a means of projecting influence and securing interests in a multipolar Indo-Pacific.

 

Conclusion

The operationalisation of the IFU and IFA trilaterals in the maritime domain represents a strategic and pragmatic adaptation to the complex and evolving security landscape of the Indo-Pacific.  These minilateral frameworks clearly offer distinct advantages over broader multilateral initiatives, primarily their enhanced agility, focused objectives and rapid capacity to build upon bilateral relationship.  This allows for greater synergy, efficient decision-making and targeted responses to specific threats and problems across diverse geographic areas.  Looking ahead, these trilaterals will obviously depend upon sustained political will, consistent resource allocation, and a proactive approach to addressing emerging challenges.  Deepening technology transfer and co-production, expanding the scope and complexity of combined exercises, and strengthening information-sharing networks will be critical.  These partnerships are not merely reactive measures but proactive instruments of statecraft, enabling India, France, Australia and the UAE to collective shape the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific.

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About the Author

Ms Saaz Lahiri is a Research Associate at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF).  She holds a Bachelor’s degree in ‘History and International Relations’, and a Post Graduate Diploma in ‘International Relations’ from Ashoka University.  Her research focuses upon the manner in which India’s maritime strategies interface and interact with those of the European Union (EU).  She can be reached at eu4.nmf@gmail.com

Endnotes:

[1] Yuma Takahashi, “Why France is Focusing on the UAE in its Indo-Pacific Strategy — An Energy and Resource Diplomacy Perspective.” International Information Network Analysis (IINA), Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 12 June 2025. https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/takahashi_06.html

[2] Yuma Takahashi, “Why France is Focusing on the UAE…”

[3] “Camp de La Praix (Peace Camp)”, Airforce-Technology.com, 16 August 2010. https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/campdelapaixpeacecam/

[4] Observer Research Foundation, “France-India-UAE Trilateral: India’s Minilateral Engagements Ticks Up,” 16 February 2023.  https://www.orfonline.org/research/france-india-uae-trilateral

[5] Press Information Bureau (PIB), Government of India. “India-France-Australia Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue.” Ministry of Defence (MoD) Press Release, 04 May 2021. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1930811

[6] PIB, MoD Press Release “India-France-Australia Joint Statement.”

[7] PIB, MoD Press Release “India-France-Australia Joint Statement.”

[8] Swarajya Staff, “India, France, UAE Strengthen Defense Cooperation With ‘Desert Knight’ Air Combat Exercise over Arabian Sea”, Swarajya, 12 December 2024.  https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/india-france-uae-strengthen-defense-cooperation-with-desert-knight-air-combat-exercise-over-arabian-sea

[9] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs Press Release, “Meeting of Focal Points of India, France and UAE.”, 28 July 2022.  https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/35562/Meeting_of_Focal_Points_of_India_France_and_UAE

[10] Embassy of France in India Press Release, “7^th India-France Maritime Cooperation Dialogue – Joint Declaration.” 14 January 2025. https://in.ambafrance.org/7th-India-France-Maritime-Cooperation-Dialogue-Joint-Declaration

[11] Embassy of France in India, “7^th India-France Maritime Cooperation Dialogue – Joint Declaration.”

[12] India News Network, “India-France Maritime Partnership Exercise: Showcasing Robust Military Cooperation for Stability in Indian Ocean Region” 11 January 2025.  https://www.indianewsnetwork.com/en/20250111/india-france-maritime-partnership-exercise-showcasing-robust-military-cooperation-for-stability-in-indian-ocean-reg

[13] Shivani Sharma, “India and France to Jointly Assess Maritime Threats in Indian Ocean Region”, India Today, 21 January 2025. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-and-france-to-jointly-assess-maritime-threats-in-indian-ocean-region-2667770-2025-01-21

[14] Cauvery Ganapathy, “Addressing the Critical Minerals Conundrum: Pathways for the India-France-UAE Trilateral”, Expert Speak, Observer Research Foundation, 11 May 2025. https://orfme.org/expert-speak/addressing-the-critical-minerals-conundrum-pathways-for-the-india-france-uae-trilateral

[15] Cauvery Ganapathy, “Addressing the Critical Minerals Conundrum.”

[16] Shivani Sharma, “India and France to Jointly Assess Maritime Threats in Indian Ocean Region.”

[17] The Eurodrone programme also known as the Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (MALE RPAS) is a combined initiative by Germany, France, Italy and Spain with Airbus Defence and Space as the prime contractor.  Companies such as Dassault Aviation and Leonardo are key industrial partners.

[18] “India Observer Nation of Eurodrone Programme: Defence Technology.” ETVBharat, 22 January 2025. https://www.etvbharat.com/en/!opinion/india-observer-nation-of-eurodrone-programme-defence-technology-enn25012205495

[19] “Launch of FRIND-X 2024.” iDEX-DIO, 05 December 2024.  https://indoeuropean.eu/paris-hosted-the-launch-of-the-france-india-defence-startup-excellence-project-frind-x-2024/

[20] Cauvery Ganapathy. “Addressing the Critical Minerals Conundrum.”

[21] “Order and Disorder in the Indo-Pacific: Trilateral Policy Perspectives from Japan, India and France.” CSEP Blog, 20 February 2024. https://csep.org/blog/order-and-disorder-in-the-indo-pacific-trilateral-on-policy-perspectives-from-japan-india-and-france/

[22] Cauvery Ganapathy. “Addressing the Critical Minerals Conundrum.”

[23] Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Rise of the Minilaterals: Examining the India-France-Australia Trilateral”, The Diplomat, 17 September 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/rise-of-the-minilaterals-examining-the-india-france-australia-trilateral/

[24] Embassy of France in Australia Press Release, “The Indo-Pacific: 1^st Trilateral Dialogue between France, India and Australia”, 09 September 2020. https://au.ambafrance.org/The-Indo-Pacific-1st-Trilateral-Dialogue-between-France-India-and-Australia.

[25] Yuma Takahashi. “Why France is Focusing on the UAE in its Indo‑Pacific Strategy.”

[26] David Brewster, Rory Medcalf, Darshana Baruah and Antoine Bondaz, “Options for Australia, France and India Trilateral Cooperation”, National Security College, Australian National University, Policy Options Paper No 29, June 2024. https://nsc.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/2024-06/NSC_POP_Options%20for%20AUS%2C%20FRA%2C%20IND_No.29_V4_FINAL_web.pdf

[27] India News Network. “At 3rd Focal Points Meeting, India, France, and Australia reaffirm Commitment to a Free, Open and Inclusive Indo-Pacific”, 20 June 2024.  https://www.indianewsnetwork.com/en/20240620/at-3rd-focal-points-meeting-india-france-australia-reaffirm-commitment-to-free-open-inclusive-indo-pacific

[28] Royal Australian Navy, “Exercise Malabar”, Royal Australian Navy – Navy Activities: Exercises. https://www.navy.gov.au/navy-activities/exercises/exercise-malabar

[29] Australian Government, Department of Defence, Address by Peter Khalil to the Australia-India Institute Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue, 24 June 2025. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/speeches/2025-06-24/address-australian-india-institute-trilateral-maritime-security-dialogue

See also:

Boris Pradhan, “India to Join Australia, Japan and the Unites States for the First time in Talisman Sabre 2025 Military Drill.” Business Standard, 30 April 2025. https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/talisman-sabre-2025-india-to-join-australia-military-exercise-for-first-time-us-japan-china-125043000540_1.html

[30] Australian Government, Department of Defence News Release, “Strengthening Indo-Pacific Maritime Safety”, 03 February 2025. https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2025-02-03/strengthening-indo-pacific-maritime-safety

[31] Embassy of France in India Press Release, “Multinational Exercise LA PEROUSE 25”. https://in.ambafrance.org/Multinational-exercise-LA-PEROUSE-25-20434

[32] Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs Press Release, “India-France-Australia Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue, 04 May 2021”, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33845/IndiaFranceAustralia_Joint_Statement_on_the_occasion_of_the_Trilateral_Ministerial_Dialogue_May_04_2021

[33] Australian Government, Department of Defence, Address by Peter Khalil to the Australia-India Institute Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue…”

[34] Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Media Release, “India-France-Australia Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue”, 05 June 2024. https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/india-france-australia-joint-statement-occasion-trilateral-ministerial-dialogue

[35] University of Melbourne, Australia India Institute, Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue 2025 Brief, April 2025. https://aii.unimelb.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Trilateral-Maritime-Security-Dialogue-2025-Brief-1.pdf

[36] Ibid

[37] Ibid

[38] David Brewster et al, “Options for Australia, France and India Trilateral Cooperation”.

[39] Jessie Jacob, “Let’s Take a Close Look at How we Protect our Undersea Cables”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 14 March 2024.  https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/lets-take-a-close-look-at-how-we-protect-our-undersea-cables/

[40]Soham Agarwal, “Seabed Warfare Strategy of France: Lessons for India.” National Maritime Foundation website, 16 August 2024.  https://maritimeindia.org/seabed-warfare-strategy-of-france-lessons-for-india/

See also:

Soham Agarwal, “Underwater Domain Awareness for and by Submarine Communication Cables.” National Maritime Foundation website, 03 March 2025. http://maritimeindia.org/underwater-domain-awareness-for-and-by-submarine-communication-cables/

See also:

Soham Agarwal, “Enhancing Capacity of and Capabilities in Repair of Submarine Communication Cables through International Cooperation.” National Maritime Foundation website, 14 May 2024. https://maritimeindia.org/enhancing-capacity-of-and-capabilities-in-repair-of-submarine-communication-cables-through-international-cooperation/

See also:

David Brewster et al, “Options for Australia, France and India Trilateral Cooperation”.

[41] David Brewster et al, “Options for Australia, France and India Trilateral Cooperation”.

[42] “How Australia and India can collaborate in the western Indian Ocean.” Perth USAsia Centre. https://perthusasia.edu.au/research-insights/how-australia-and-india-can-collaborate-in-the-western-indian-ocean/

[43] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “India-France-Australia 1.5 Trilateral Dialogue” Event, April 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/events/2021/04/india-france-australia-15-trilateral-dialogue

[44] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “India-France-Australia 1.5 Trilateral Dialogue.”

[45] Shivani Sharma, “India and France to Jointly Assess Maritime Threats in Indian Ocean Region.”

[46] Australia India Institute, “Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue 2025 Brief”.

[47] David Brewster (ed), “The Limits to Maritime Security Collaboration in the Indo-Pacific Region”, Indo-Pacific Maritime Security: Challenges and Cooperation, National Security College, Australian National University, 2016. https://ro.uow.edu.au/ndownloader/files/50562441

[48] Ibid

[49] Prasanth Parameswaran, “Southeast Asia Maritime Security and Indo-Pacific Strategic Competition,” Wilson Centre, 13 March 2025. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/southeast-asia-maritime-security-and-indo-pacific-strategic-competition

[50] Cauvery Ganapathy. “Addressing the Critical Minerals Conundrum.”

[51] Ibid