In examining the evolving trajectory of Japan’s energy stakes in the Indian Ocean, This article seeks to address the seminal question of whether, in face of the gradual decline in Japan’s oil imports and the corresponding rise of non-fossil fuel sources, Japan’s maritime interest in the Indian Ocean will decrease and, if so, what impact this might have upon the formulation and execution India’s own maritime geostrategies within this western segment of the Indo-Pacific.
The attack on a Japanese-owned oil tanker, the Kokuka Courageous, in the Strait of Hormuz in June 2019 remains fresh in the minds of Japanese policymakers. As stated by Foreign Press Secretary Takeshi Osuga, “Japan takes the attacks on the ship operated by a Japanese shipping company Kokuka Sangyo, near the Strait of Hormuz on June 13th seriously as a significant incident that threatens Japan’s peace and prosperity. Japan firmly condemns such attacks, which threaten the safety of ships. Japan will continue to make efforts to gather information and secure the safety of navigation while closely coordinating with related countries.”[1] However, this is not the first time Japan has prioritised the security of its energy supplies. The 1973 oil crisis, triggered by the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) raising oil prices and restricting supply, significantly impacted Japan’s oil imports, leading to an economic contraction and a shift toward energy policy diversification.[2] Later, the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 caused severe damage in the northeastern coast of Japan area, with the massive tsunami it triggered leading to even greater devastation.[3] At the time, eleven reactors across four nuclear power plants in the region were operational, all of which shut down automatically when the earthquake struck. As a consequence of the disaster, thermal power generation increased, leading to a rise in Japan’s dependence on fossil fuels by FY2019.[4] Yet, there is no gainsaying the fact that Japan has been seeking to reduce its dependence on oil imports that must traverse the Indian Ocean.
Indian Ocean: Global Energy Highway
The Indian Ocean (better thought-of as the western segment of the Indo-Pacific) has long been a crucial trade arena, serving as a vital link from the shores of eastern Africa to those of the Americas. It has facilitated global maritime trade, cultural exchanges, and enabled the movement of goods, people, and ideas across continents. The Indian Ocean (IO)— and the States that lie along its vast rim, as also those that are nestled as island States within this maritime expanse— is critical to global trade and economic prosperity. More than 75 per cent of the world’s maritime trade moves along the busy international shipping lanes (ISLs) that crisscross this western segment of the Indo-Pacific.[5] Every year, over 145,000 ships navigate these waters, carrying 66 per cent of the world’s oil, 33 per cent of global bulk cargo, and 50 per cent of global container shipments.[6] Insofar as energy-flows are concerned these are, for the most part, oriented along a west-to-east axis. In the west, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf serve as a particularly critical maritime corridors for this flow of energy, the vast bulk of which comprises crude oil. Prior to the shipping disruption caused by the Houthi attacks on international shipping, over 22,000 ships annually negotiated the narrow Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and thence to the Arabian Sea. Notably, oil flows through both the Suez Canal 8.8 million barrels per day, and through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, accounting for approximately 8.6 million barrels per day of the world’s seaborne oil as of 2023. Likewise, the Strait of Malacca remains one of the region’s most significant chokepoints, with over 90,000 ships passing through it each year. In 2023, approximately 23.7 million barrels of total global seaborne oil transited each day through this vital passage, further accentuating the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of this flow of petroleum-based energy.
In 2023, oil-flows through the Strait of Hormuz averaged 20.9 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption.[7] According to the US Energy Agency (EIA), 83 million b/d of the crude oil and condensate that moved through the Strait of Hormuz went to Asian markets in 2023. Figure 2 shows that China (5.0 million b/d), India (1.9 million b/d), Japan (1.7 million b/d), and South Korea (1.7 million b/d) were the major destinations for crude oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for 69 million b/d of all Hormuz crude oil and condensate flows in 2023.[8] China is the highest among the four, followed by India, Japan, and South Korea. While this data is from 2023, Figure 3 reflects a broader trend over the past five years, during which Japan’s oil flows have been steadily declining. Notably, China’s imports have been consistently increasing, whereas India’s have remained relatively stable.
These figures also show that China is steadily deepening its engagement with the Gulf region, particularly with the six member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. While the foundation of China’s ties with these countries was built on oil and gas exports from these sources into China, Beijing’s cooperation with the GCC has since expanded into a broad range of sectors, including infrastructure, finance, telecommunications, space exploration, renewable and nuclear energy, and even arms manufacturing. In contrast, Japan appears to be gradually scaling back its energy imports from the region. This shift may reflect growing concerns around energy security, as well as an attempt to reduce strategic vulnerabilities.
However, to better understand Japan’s shift in fossil fuel imports, it is important to look at it through a broader lens. As seen in Figure 4, which traces the trend over the last five decades, Japan— being insufficient in natural resources— has long been considering ways to reduce its dependence on fossil fuel imports. This has translated into a steady transition towards non-fossil fuel sources, with a national target of achieving 59 per cent non-fossil fuel power generation by 2030.[9]
Japan is a country with a low energy self-sufficiency ratio— just 12.1% in FY2019— which is significantly lower than that of other OECD countries.[10] The main reason for this is that Japan is deficient in natural energy resources and depends heavily on imports, especially fossil fuels like oil. A large portion of Japan’s oil imports come from West Asian countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar. Geography dictates the passage of these imports through the Indian Ocean. Within the West Asian subregion, two critical maritime chokepoints— the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb— serve as vital passages for a significant share of the world’s oil trade, including that of Japan. The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, while the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb links the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. These routes are essential for transporting oil to East Asia.
According to the Japan Maritime Public Relations Center (Shipping Now, 2019–2020), the most important sea routes used to import Japan’s energy resources are the Indian Ocean route (which connects Japan via the East and South China Seas and the Strait of Malacca to the Indian subcontinent, West Asia, eastern Africa, and Europe), and the Pacific route (which connects Japan to North America, Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific Islands, and South America).[11] However, Japan has been quietly reducing its dependence on oil, particularly from the West Asian subregion— which also means that Japan may gradually reduce its strategic reliance on the Indian Ocean route. As Japan accelerates its domestic transition toward renewable energy, diversifies its energy suppliers beyond the West Asian region, and invests in cleaner technologies and LNG infrastructure closer to home, the rationale for maintaining an extensive maritime presence in the Indian Ocean purely for energy security could possibly diminish. This shift does not imply a withdrawal of Japan from the Indian Ocean but, rather, a recalibration of Japan’s priorities, with security interests becoming increasingly multilateral and less tethered to traditional energy concerns.
Corresponding Rise of Non-Fossil Fuel Sources
Japan is actively increasing its use of renewable energy sources, including solar, wind, hydropower, geothermal, and biomass and, as shown in Figure 4, between 2019 and 2022, the share of renewable generation in Japan grew from 4.4 per cent to nearly 10 per cent. The country has set ambitious targets for reducing its reliance on fossil fuels and increasing the share of non-fossil fuel sources in its energy mix. The Japanese government aims to achieve 36-38 per cent renewable energy in its national power mix by 2030. As part of this broader vision, Japan is actively promoting a Green Transformation (GX) strategy— not only to fulfil its Paris Agreement commitments and enhance energy independence in developing countries, but also to support the international expansion of Japanese companies.[12] Under its Official Development Assistance (ODA), GX has been identified as a key priority, with public funding mechanisms such as those administered by JICA being mobilised to support this initiative.[13]
A central pillar of Japan’s GX strategy is its international development vision, most notably the formation of the Asia Zero Emissions Community (AZEC). This regional platform aims to achieve decarbonization while supporting the sustainable growth of fast-developing Asian economies. Currently, over 350 cooperation projects are underway between Japanese stakeholders and eleven AZEC partner countries— Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, and Japan itself.[14] These projects include innovative initiatives such as the construction of a green hydrogen plant in Malaysia and the production of sustainable aviation fuel from Indonesia’s non-standard coconuts.
India, meanwhile, has demonstrated strong leadership of its own in its endeavours toward a global clean energy transition. With a target of achieving 500 GW of non-fossil fuel-based energy capacity by 2030, India is positioning itself as a frontrunner in the global green energy race. As a major economic power and a significant greenhouse gas emitter, India understands the critical need to balance climate responsibility with sustainable development. Notably, India has also been the largest recipient of Japanese ODA loans since 2003, underscoring the depth of economic cooperation between the two countries. However, despite these shared goals and a strong Indo-Pacific partnership, India is not currently a member of the AZEC framework. This reveals a significant gap in Japan’s and India’s climate and energy collaboration. Given their mutual ambitions for decarbonisation, regional stability, and economic leadership, this disconnect raises questions about missed opportunities for synergising their efforts. Strengthening cooperation in green energy, under initiatives such as the AZEC, could pave the way for a more comprehensive and aligned India-Japan partnership in the Indo-Pacific.
Conclusion
Japan’s energy realignment is neither subtle nor incidental. While it continues to emphasise stability and security in the Indo-Pacific, its quiet disengagement from traditional energy corridors tells a different story— one of calculated withdrawal and strategic repositioning. Japan’s energy policy is a careful balancing act that prioritises security, economic resilience, and long-term sustainability. While Tokyo reaffirms its commitment to stability in the Indo-Pacific, its quiet but deliberate shift away from traditional energy corridors suggests a strategic recalibration. This is not a hasty reaction to global disruptions but a well-calculated move to insulate itself from external vulnerabilities. Japan maintains oil reserves equivalent to approximately 230 days of domestic demand to safeguard its energy supply disruptions, while steadily diversifying its import sources.[15] Officially, it continues to build strong ties with West Asian oil-producing nations, yet the underlying reality is that Japan is working to reduce its exposure to a region that remains susceptible to instability.[16] The risks of price volatility and supply disruptions remain ever-present concerns, reinforcing the need for a more diversified energy portfolio. Japan’s policies reflect this shift. By 2030, the share of coal in electricity generation is set to decline from 31 per cent to 19 per cent, while petroleum-based generation will shrink from 4 per cent to just 2 per cent.[17] The government’s focus on expanding renewables, reviving nuclear energy, and investing in carbon capture and low-carbon hydrogen technologies demonstrates a broader commitment to energy independence and decarbonisation. Obviously, crude oil is not the only import that Japan is concerned about. There are other commodities as well and several of these demand Tokyo’s continued focus upon the Indian Ocean. India itself plays an important role in sharpening this focus. For instance, over the past five years, India’s exports to Japan have increased at an annualised rate of 0.046 per cent, from US$ 5.61 bn in 2018 to US$ 5.62 bn in 2023.[18] The main products that India exported to Japan were: (a) diamonds worth US$ 380 million, (b) aluminium worth US$ 366 mn, and (c) seafood (crustaceans) worth US$ 281 million. For its part, Japan’s exports to India in 2023 were worth US$ 18.2 bn, with the main commodities being refined copper (worth US$ 1.87 bn), precious metal compounds (worth US$ 1.4 bn), and motor vehicles, parts and accessories (worth US$ 862 million). It may be concluded that the IOR will continue to be central to Japan’s economic and strategic interests, serving as a vital conduit not just for energy but also for food, technology inputs, and industrial resilience.
The next part of this study will examine Japan’s tanker traffic originating from the Persian Gulf and the broader West Asian littoral. This will help further illuminate both, the continuity and the recalibration of Japan’s maritime imperatives in an era of energy transformation.
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About the Author:
Ms Aashima Kapoor is a Research Associate at the National Maritime Foundation. Her research focuses on the manner in which the maritime geostrategies of India are impacted by those of Japan. In addition to her research expertise, she is proficient in the Japanese language. She can be reached at ea2.nmf@gmail.com
Endnotes:
[1]Attacks on the ship operated by a Japanese shipping company near the Strait of Hormuz
(Statement by Foreign Press Secretary Takeshi Osuga), “Press Releases”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002478.html.
[2]Masaru YOSHITOMI, “The Recent Japan Economy: The oil Crises and The Transition to Medium Growth Path, https://www.ide.go.jp/library/English/Publish/Periodicals/De/pdf/76_04_01.pdf
[3]On This Day: 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami, “National Centers for Environmental Information”, 11 March 2021,
[4]“Fukishima Daiichi Accident”, World Nuclear Association, 29 April 2024, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-daiichi-accident#:~:text=Eleven%20reactors%20at%20four%20nuclear,decay%20heat%20to%20the%20sea.
[5] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Defence, “Raksha Mantri Inaugurates Information Fusion Centre — Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR)”, 22 December 2018 https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1557074#
[6]Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan, “Imperatives of India’s Seaborne Trade”, NMF, Internship, Autumn 2024
[7]World Oil Transit Chokepoints, Strait of Hormuz, ”US Energy Information Administration” (EIA) Website, 25 June 2024, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints
[8]ibid
[9] “Japan 2021 Energy Policy Review”, IEA, https://www.iea.org/reports/japan-2021
[10]“Japan Strengthening Its Presence in the International Community”, Diplomatic Blue Book, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2022/en_html/chapter3/c030305.html
[11] “日本の海運 SHIPPING NOW”, Page 4, Japan Maritime Public Relation Centre,
https://www.kaijipr.or.jp/assets/pdf/shipping_now/introduction2024.pdf
[12] Pillar 2:Addressing Challenges in an Indo-Pacific Way, New Plan for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japanhttps://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100482250.pdf
[13] ibid
[14]AZEC: Asia’s Various Pathways to Net Zero Co-Created by Japan, KIZUNA, JAPANGOV, The Government of Japan 16 February 2024, https://www.japan.go.jp/kizuna/2024/02/asias_various_pathways_to_net_zero.html#:~:text=The%20Asia%20Zero%20Emission%20Community,tailored%20to%20each%20country’s%20circumstances
[15]Ben Cahill, Jane Nakano, and Kunro Irié, “How Japan Thinks about Energy Security”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 May 2024,
[16]“Japan Still Dependent on Fossil Fuels and Middle East”, nippon.com,
https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00318/
[17]Today in Energy, “Japan’s energy policies aim to reduce use of fossil fuels in the electricity generation”, EIA https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61945
[18] India and Japan latest trends data, OEC, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/ind/partner/jpn
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