https://www.ogc.org/The vagaries of climatic conditions and increased occurrence of natural hazards have brought into focus the importance of ensuring resilient societies. Since infrastructure has become a key component to the proper functioning of modern societies, inherent within the concept of resilient societies is resilient infrastructure. This becomes more significant in the context of ‘critical’ infrastructure. Underpinning global communications, undersea communication cable systems have garnered much attention globally, most recently in the context of ensuring greater ‘resilience’ and security.[1]
Realising the importance of telecommunications infrastructure, especially for facilitating interactions between first responders and disaster management agencies during disaster-response and recovery, the Department of Telecommunications, Government of India, in conjunction with the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), launched a report assessing the disaster risk and resilience of India’s telecommunications sector (“DoT-CDRI Telecom Assessment”).[2] Undersea cables and fibre-optic cable landing stations have been identified in this report to be a part of the “national backbone (core) network” which provides “first mile connectivity” within the national telecommunications network.[3] Further, submarine cables and cable landing stations have been identified as the “weakest elements” of the telecommunications network, particularly vulnerable to coastal erosion, floods, cyclones, and earthquakes.[4] Therefore, ensuring the resilience of the first mile connectivity is critical in ensuring the resilience of the telecom network as a whole.
Consequently, this paper seeks to develop a framework within which disaster-resilience of undersea communication cable infrastructure can be systematically assessed and addressed. While the previous paper by the authors identifies the disaster, i.e., the potential natural hazards that may threaten the functioning of the cable landing infrastructure, this paper seeks to understand how ‘resilience’ of cable landing infrastructure may be assessed and consequently enhanced. It begins by offering an understanding of the term resilience, especially in the context of submarine cable landing infrastructure. It then identifies frameworks developed to assess and apply these concepts and finally develops a more detailed and specific framework for cable landing infrastructure.
Understanding Resilience
Resilience, especially climate-resilience in the context of critical infrastructure has been referred to as “as “the ability of a building, structure and its component parts to minimise loss of functionality and recovery time without being damaged to an extent that is disproportionate to the intensity of a number of current and scientifically predicted future extreme climatic conditions”.[5] This includes the ability of a system to (a) reduce the chances of a shock, (b) absorb the shock if it does occur, and (c) restore operations quickly after a shock.[6] Thus, in the case of critical infrastructure, climate-resilience is measured in terms of continued system performance in the face of disruptions caused due to climate hazards. Similar formulations of this concept have been made across available across open-domain literature and require systems to have the strength to (a) anticipate (and hence avoid) hazards, (b) resist (and hence absorb) the hazards, (c) reconfigure (and hence adapt) to the hazards, and (d) restore functioning after any disruptive event.[7] This has given rise to the “R4 framework of resilience of critical infrastructure”, which includes[8]:-
- Robustness: strength or ability of the infrastructure elements or systems to withstand a given level of stress without suffering from loss of function. This is a characteristic of the engineering approach, i.e., hard protective structures that rely on the strength of individual elements of the system to withstand disruptive events.[9] Functionality is, therefore, ensured by the strength of individual elements to remain unaffected. Robustness is often a function of the design of the infrastructure.
- Redundancy: existence of elements or systems that may be used as substitutes i.e., assuming functions in event of loss of functionality. This includes measures such as spare capacity, multiple pathways, replaceable parts, and buffer stocks of requisite supplies.[10]
- Resourcefulness: capacity and capability of system operators to identify problems, establish priorities, and mobilise resources following an event. This is the human resources component in the ensuring of resilience of the infrastructure system. Resourcefulness becomes particularly important in preparing for disruptive events, i.e., creating redundancies and when redundancies need to be manually activated during disruptive events.
- Rapidity: capacity to restore functionality in a timely manner in order to contain losses and avoid disruptions. This introduces a temporal element to the matrix, requiring that functionality is not only restored but is done so in a “timely” manner. This component is particularly important with respect to ‘critical’ infrastructure, where longer downtimes have greater and wider consequences. It must, however, be noted that the rapidity in restoration of performance is invariably a function of the first three characteristics. A robust system is likely to endure less damage. Any damage that does occur could be absorbed by the redundancies within the system which can be activated by a trained and knowledgeable operator. Deficiencies in any of these components is likely to add to the restoration time of the system.
Therefore, ensuring resilience requires infrastructure system owners to ensure the product, the people, and the processes are geared towards resilience. Indeed, the concept of ‘resilience’ is unique mostly due to the inclusion of the latter two concepts. Not only must the physical structure of the infrastructure system be capable to withstand a hazardous event, but the system operators also must have the requisite knowledge and training to ensure that adaptive and restorative efforts are undertaken in a rapid manner. Thus, there is also a role of the requisite processes being in place (e.g., Standard Operating Procedures) that can guide operators in preparing-for and taking appropriate action.
The idea of resilience requires a different approach than does conventional risk management.[11] Conventional risk management techniques are predicated on the basis that hazards can be identified, estimated, and hence prevented. It undertakes an analysis either deterministically (consequence-analysis of specific hazards) or probabilistically (consequence-analysis of all hazards including probability of occurrence and severity) that may affect the system.[12] The concept of resilience, on the other hand, is more useful for a decision-making scenario characterised by deep uncertainty. Not only is the impact of climate change unpredictable, even more uncertain is the way this will evolve over a period of time. Different emission scenarios will significantly alter the frequency and intensity with which extreme weather events and natural hazards manifest themselves. Therefore, the temporal element, too becomes an important consideration.[13] Long-term impacts from climate change need to be factored into the resilience matrix, especially for the duration of the life cycle of the project. Therefore, it is important for cable-system owners to plan for both, short-term and long-term contingencies. Moreover, climate-resilience requires possessing the ability to withstand slow-onset events as well as unpredictable rapid-onset ones.[14] Therefore, a “resilience framework’” is probably the most appropriate one with which to approach the assessment of disaster-resilience undersea communication cable infrastructure.
Fig 1: Risk Assessment and Resilience Framework for Critical Infrastructure
Source: Nikhil Kumar et al., “A Novel Framework for Risk Assessment and Resilience of Critical Infrastructure Towards Climate Change
Figure 1 below breaks down the R4 framework into sub-processes that may contribute to each of the four prongs of the framework.[15] It also highlights that building critical infrastructure resilience is a multi-stakeholder process. In addition to the infrastructure operator, governmental and non-governmental organisations are critical to ensuring that the entire network remains resilient. This is because the ambit of infrastructure operators is limited to their particular asset or system, while governmental policies and standards can facilitate the implementation of standards / protocols / practices across systems.
Rather intuitively, all the four metrics of resilience requires advance planning to anticipate the threats and create the requisite physical and operational structures to enable the system to absorb and adapt the impact, as also to restore functionality in a timely manner. This, therefore, requires an understanding of threats to the undersea cable communications system. These are encapsulated in the idea of “risk”. Risk assessment, too, is identified in Figure 1 as the first step to building resilience.
It must be noted, however, that while this framework is generic and is potentially applicable across infrastructures, the DoT-CDRI Assessment Report developed a “Disaster Risk and Resilience Assessment Framework” (DRRAF) seemingly tailored to the telecommunication sector. While retaining both elements of risk and resilience, a structural difference in DRRAF is treating risk and resilience as two interactive yet distinct layers instead of integrating risk assessment as the first step in achieving resilience. On the other hand, a potential advantage of the DRRAF approach is the detail and structure it affords to the risk assessment process. Additionally, it may allow for the possibility to more easily adapt to changing circumstances. However, the core concept of risk and its primacy in the resilience process remains constant.
Disaster-Risk
The concept of “risk” is defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as the “potential for adverse consequences for human or ecological systems, recognising the diversity of values and objectives associated with such systems”.[16] Contextualised to natural hazards, “disaster-risk” is expressed as the “likelihood of loss of life, injury or destruction and damage from a disaster in a given period of time”.[17] Disaster-risk is a function of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability.[18]
Hazard: Likelihood and intensity of the potentially destructive natural phenomenon.[19] The nature and frequency of the hazard can give rise to an ‘intensive’ risk (categorised by high-intensity, low-frequency events) and ‘extensive’ risk (categorised by low-intensity, high-frequency events).[20] Identifying and tracking hazard occurrences and developments is the first step in understanding disaster-risk. Climate-change particularly affects this variable in the risk matrix by increasing the unpredictability, intensity, and frequency of weather-related phenomena.
Exposure: This denotes valuable places, assets, people, and infrastructure, which are exposed to the hazard.[21]
Vulnerability: This refers to the ‘susceptibility’ of an individual, community, asset, or system to the impacts of the hazards.[22] In the context of assets and systems, the more susceptible to loss and damage a particular asset, the more vulnerable it is. Varying levels of vulnerabilities account for the differences with certain assets withstanding high intensity hazards while certain assets suffering severe losses from low-intensity events too.
Vulnerability vs Resilience. The concepts of vulnerability and resilience are interlinked, with literature painting a relationship between them that ranges from their being antonyms, to being subsets of one another, to being parts of an overlapping framework.[23] What is common in these frameworks is the treatment of each of the two concepts as distinct from the other. In essence, vulnerability refers to the existing weaknesses or limitations either in the design, location, materials, or operational processes of an infrastructural system. Inadequate design standards, poor construction quality, hazard-prone locations and lack of adequate funding mechanisms for repairs and maintenance will make assets more vulnerable. Naturally, these factors will affect the ‘robustness’ of the asset/infrastructure and have a bearing on its resilience, too. However, the concept of resilience is a more dynamic and proactive concept and seeks to focus upon processes that can enable resistance, continuity, and quick recovery. Resilience is, therefore, a more process-oriented approach.
Systemic Risks. Systemic risk, i.e., risk emanating from critical interdependencies not only within a system but also between systems and sectors, has evolved as a more dynamic approach to risk assessment and management.[24] Vulnerabilities within a particular system may have compounding or cascading effects across systems and even sectors. Therefore, an understanding of these interdependencies and associated cascading risks is extremely important for a holistic risk-assessment and effective resilience mechanisms.
Disaster-Resilience Framework of Submarine Cable Landing Infrastructure
Identifying key components and key assets constitute the first step in assessing vulnerability and potential resilience mechanisms. This paper is limited to offering an understanding of the vulnerability and resilience of shore-based landing infrastructure associated with submarine cable systems. Even within shore-based landing infrastructure, the focus of this paper is on the resilience of the physical infrastructure. It does not include within its scope the resilience of human, social, cultural, economic, political, and environmental components of submarine communication cable systems. There will be a profound economic, political, and social impact upon societies on the disruption of provision of internet services, which would clearly require an independent study.
Submarine Cable Landing Infrastructure may be divided into three main components:
- The Beach Manhole (BMH). Since the BMH serves as the landing point of the cables, it often is the first point of vulnerability in the system especially from threats originating from the sea. Key parts of the beach manhole are:
- Internal Manhole
- Reinforced Concrete Structure providing manhole furniture. The purpose of this reinforced concrete housing is to enable access to the cable and manhole for repair and maintenance.
- The Cable Landing Station (CLS). The CLS constitutes the most important component of the cable landing infrastructure. Functioning as the node of the entire system, the cable landing station is a critical component to the function of not only individual cables, but the entire cable system or even multiple cable systems. The primary key assets of a CLS are:[25]
(a) Equipment Room. The Equipment Room houses, inter alia, the Submarine Line Terminal Equipment, the Power Feed Equipment, and Optical Interconnectors, and is the most critical component of the CLS. Proper functioning of the Equipment Room is critical for the proper functioning of the CLS. Assets in the equipment room will be regarded as “critical” if gauged in terms of impact of damage, and cost/time taken for repairs.
(b) Battery Room. This room— usually situated adjacent to the equipment room—contains the batteries (both lithium-ion and lead-acid) that provide DC power to the assets in the Equipment Room.
(c) Network Operations Centre. Functioning as the coordination and management node of the CLS, the Network Operations Centre ensures operational control over the CLS and the cable system.
(d) Power Room. The Power Room in the CLS as the name suggest is the point where AC power is received within the CLS. It is the point at which the CLS is connected to the local electricity grid and power for the CLS, and its auxiliary equipment is received here.
(e) Back-Up Diesel Generators. To mitigate against variable power supply, CLS have their own captive back-up diesel generators that can ensure continued electricity even if power is not available from the main grid.
- The Terrestrial Cables from the BMH to the CLS. Frequently, CLS are not located right at the beach due to space availability and safety concerns. Therefore, buried cables connect the BMH to the CLS. Exposed cables on the surface and any competing civil works undertaken during disaster recovery operations are the primary vulnerabilities in this segment.
Table 1 creates a disaster-resilience framework by applying the “R4 framework” to the context of submarine cable landing infrastructure. Moreover, the framework also incorporates certain elements of the Design-Manage-Evolve paradigm developed within the Integrated Disaster Resilience Framework.[26] Since vulnerability assessment is critical to the ‘Robustness’ function within the R4 mechanism, the table first identifies how certain factors affect the vulnerability of key components and assets. This falls within the ‘Design’ paradigm of the framework as it identifies factors that need to be considered while planning and designing the cable landing infrastructure. The ‘Robustness’ and ‘Redundancy’ components are more effectively addressed within the design stage and have hence been included within that paradigm. ‘Resourcefulness’ and ‘Rapidity’ are attributes that can be better attained by the ‘Operational and Governance’ mechanisms put in place both at the governmental/policy level and the operator’s processes. Finally, interconnected sectors are identified to account for systemic risks.
The ‘Resilience Framework’ identifies individual components within each segment of the cables, identifies factors which affect their vulnerability, and how their robustness and redundancy may be enhanced using design considerations. Thereafter, measures to increase resourcefulness and rapidity through operations and management tools have also been identified.
| Design | ||||
| Segment | Factors affecting Vulnerability | Enhancing Robustness | Redundancy Measures | |
| Cable Landing Station (CLS) Building | Structural Stability of Building
(1) Age of Building (2) Standards used |
Structural Audit to be undertaken and weak sections to be reinforced
Specific Indian Building Codes to be evolved for coastal and near-coastal critical infrastructure |
Disaster Recovery CLS as part of single cable system.
A disaster recovery CLS allows for the control of the entire operations of the cable system from an alternative CLS in the system. |
|
| Distance from shore | Indirect Measure – a minimum distance, of 3 kms from the coastline needs to be specified for locating the CLS.
This provides for sufficient protection from tsunami run-ups, and extreme wind speeds. |
|||
| Relief/Mean elevation | Subject to economic and technical feasibility, the CLS should be located at a height above sea level factoring in the projected combination of storm surges, sea level rise and tsunami run-ups.
Cyclone/ Tsunami barriers to be erected. |
|||
| Equipment Room | Location within CLS | Cement concrete room preferably on the first/second floor, with all six sides isolated from direct impact of wind and rain | Developing interconnections with other landing stations for continued data transmission. | |
| Water Ingress Routes | Entry and exit of cables must be through cable glands and these glands must be sealed for water-proofness.
Entry and Exit doors must be rubber-lined and have watertight integrity.
Flood sensors should be installed on the floor to detect any ingress of water. |
|||
| Equipment Consoles | Equipment consoles should be clear of the floor and must be mounted on shock and vibration mounts.
Cables inside the equipment room should be laid out — below the ceiling and above the equipment — on cable trays which must be supported on load hangars.
Fire and smoke detection sensors must be installed with automatic fire fighting and suppression systems also installed. |
|||
| Power Supply to CLS | Primary Power Supply | Physical barriers or nature-based solutions like plantation of densely growing trees to reduce direct impact.
Robustness of the primary power supply is integrated with the robustness of the power generation, distribution, and transmission sector marking a key example of systemic risks. |
Liaise with electricity distribution company for an alternate power supply.
Minimum two DG sets with both being independently capable of meeting the power requirements of the CLs and should have continuous duty rating. These DG sets should be connected to the power switchboard with provision for automatic/manual changeover.
An alternate switchboard may be planned.
Adequate stock of diesel to be maintained especially for CLS in island locations
|
|
| Back-Up Power Supply | Diesel Generator (DG) sets to be in a weather-proof enclosure, preferably on the first floor or minimum 10 feet above ground level. | |||
| Location of Switchboard, Power Receiver and Back-up Power Supply | Should be in a weather-proof enclosure, preferably on the first floor or minimum 10 feet above ground level. | |||
| Diesel Supply Availability | Supply should be in sealed oil drums and located in a weather-proof enclosure close to the DG sets with ease of supply from the drums to the ready-use tank of the DG sets with the help of gravity/manual pump/aerodynamically operated/electric motor driven pump. | |||
| Beach Manholes | Total Number | More than one BMH is usually a consequence of in-built redundancy within the system due to two pathways for the submarine cable | A cable splitter to be used to connect with minimum two BMHs. | |
| Cyclone/Tsunami barrier walls or retaining walls
Nature-based solutions like plantation of mangroves etc. |
||||
| Sediment Deposition | Cyclone/Tsunami barrier walls | |||
| Protective Measures | Sealed Manhole covers | |||
| Terrestrial Component to CLS | Total Number | Minimum two independent cables | Each BMH should have two independent terrestrial cables each following a different path to the CLS | |
| Cable Burial Depth | Protective sheathing, conduits | |||
| Exposed Cables
Damage due to physical impact (e, g., earth-moving equipment, road accidents etc.) |
Protective sheathing, metal/cement concrete conduit | |||
| Competing Civil Works
Earth-moving equipment, digging activities of other public/private agencies during disaster recovery operations |
Easy availability of mapped locations of cables/pipes and other subterranean utilities to enable improved planning and coordination between public authorities/private agencies.
Improved planning between public authorities and private agencies with respect to digging permits |
|||
| Resourcefulness and Rapidity – Operations and Governance | ||||
| Availability of Personnel | While the CLS should be continually staffed by technically competent personnel. On receipt of Adverse Weather Event (AWE) warning, augmentation with suitably competent personnel should be done.
Living accommodation for key personnel should be preferably arranged within the CLS premises or in close proximity. |
|||
| Training of Personnel and Disaster Drills | Theoretical and practical training to be imparted to all personnel for operation and maintenance of CLS equipment in emergencies.
Planned and surprise disaster drills should be practised in normal and off-working hours (preferably silent hours during the night) |
|||
| Early Warning Systems | CLS should be directly informed about likely AWEs by the National/State Disaster Management authorities | |||
| Disaster SOPs | Standard Operating Procedures for AWE scenarios/contingencies should be written down, practised/exercised at regular intervals and the SOPs should be revised by incorporating solutions to observed shortcomings during the exercise | |||
| Inter-agency Co-ordination | Can be improved by regular periodic meetings, nominating suitably empowered single points-of-contacts and exchanging contact information including personal mobile numbers. | |||
| Policy Measures | A comprehensive single policy on BMHs, terrestrial cables and CLSs needs to be formulated including do’s and don’ts with respect to location, routing, structural stability, physical safety etc. | |||
| Incident Reporting | Mandatory reporting of all AWEs by public and private operators in a standard format including the actions taken, shortfalls observed, and lessons learnt. These should be widely disseminated to all CLS operators. | |||
| Data Collection | Mandatory reporting of important data at regular periodic intervals in a prescribed format to a central data repository | |||
| Financial and Insurance Mechanisms | Allocated budget for undertaking periodic risk assessments and implementing resilience mechanisms for adaptive management. Innovative insurance mechanisms to be devised to cater for AWEs and their consequences. | |||
| Interconnected Sectors | ||||
| Power | AWEs are likely to severely degrade main power distribution and transmission systems, therefore local back-ups (DG sets, Battery storage systems etc) should be catered for minimum continuous seven days operation | |||
| Transportation | Public transportation systems are likely to be severely affected in AWEs, hence transportation for key personnel to reach the CLS should be planned | |||
| Table 1: Resilience Framework for Cable Landing Infrastructure
Source: Prepared by Authors |
||||
The framework developed may be utilised to assess the resilience of brownfield or greenfield projects. The factors developed for each landing station is a culmination of the observations made by authors during their field visits to cable landing stations in India as part of their ongoing CDRI Fellowship Programme of 2024-25. The final application of this framework to cable landing stations in India, particularly those in Kochi, Chennai, Sri Vijaya Puram (erstwhile Port Blair), and Swaraj Dweep (erstwhile Havelock Island) of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, will be presented in a subsequent paper.
******
About the Authors:
Mr Soham Agarwal, a Delhi-based lawyer, holds a Bachelor of Law (Honours) degree from the University of Nottingham, UK. He is currently an Associate Fellow with the Public International Maritime Law Cluster of the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. His research, which is focused upon issues relevant to the seabed, maritime infrastructure, and seabed warfare, is rapidly gaining international traction. He is currently also a CDRI Fellow of the Fourth Cohort. He may be contacted at law10.nmf@gmail.com
Commodore Debesh Lahiri, a marine engineer by profession, has retired from active service in the Indian Navy and after a three-year stint as a Senior Fellow and Executive Director of the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi, is presently an Advisor to the National Centre of Excellence for Green Ports and Shipping (NCoEGPS) a co-action centre between the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways (MoPSW) and The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI). He is a regular speaker at webinars, seminars, workshops, and conferences in India and abroad. He has authored or co-authored several book chapters, technical project reports, and well-researched articles, and was a member of the Expert Advisory Group on Blue Economy to the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MoEF and CC) during India’s presidency of the G20. His areas of research-interest include India’s transition to a ‘Blue’ economy in the face of climate change; disaster-resilience; marine pollution; Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF); shipbuilding, ship-repair and ship-recycling; green ports, green shipping, amongst a host of others. He can be reached at debesh.lahiri@teri.res.in or debeshlahiri@gmail.com
Endnotes:
[1] United Nations General Assembly. “Oceans and the Law of the Sea.” A/RES/66/231, adopted April 05, 2012 https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_66_231.pdf
Also See: Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, “The New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World”, September 26, 2024 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/new-york-joint-statement-security-and-resilience-undersea-cables-globally-digitalized-world
[2] PWC, National and Sub-national Disaster Risk and Resilience Assessment and Roadmap for Telecommunications Sector, India, (New Delhi: Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, 2025) https://www.cdri.world/upload/pages/1823666979417817_202502101045telecomreport.pdf
[3] Ibid p13, 25
[4] Ibid, p57
[5] Global Resiliency Dialogue, “Delivering Climate Responsive Resilient Building Codes and Standards”, November, 2021 https://www.iccsafe.org/wp-content/uploads/Delivering_Resilient_Building_Codes_and_Standards.pdf
[6] Michel Burneau et al., “A Framework to Quantitatively Assess and Enhance the Seismic Resilience of Communities”, Earthquake Spectra, Volume 19, No. 4, p733–752, November 2003. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epdf/10.1193/1.1623497
[7] AM Madni and S Jackson, “Towards a Conceptual Framework for Resilience Engineering”, IEEE Engineering Management Review, 39, p181-191 (2011)
[8] Kathleen Tierney and Michel Bruneau, “Conceptualising and Measuring Resilience: A Key to Disaster Loss Reduction, TR News (Transportation Research Board, 2007) https://trid.trb.org/View/813539
[9] Stephen Tyler and Marcus Moench, “A Framework For Urban Climate Resilience”, Climate and Development, Vol 4, No 4, October 2012, p311-326 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/17565529.2012.745389?src=getftr&utm_source=sciencedirect_contenthosting&getft_integrator=sciencedirect_contenthosting
[10] Ibid
[11] Louisa Marie Shakou et al. “Developing an Innovative Framework for Enhancing the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure to Climate Change”, Safety Science Vol 118, p364-378 October 2019.
[12] Ibid
[13] Louisa Marie Shakou et al. “Developing an Innovative Framework for Enhancing the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure to Climate Change”
[14] Nikhil Kumar et al., “A Novel Framework for Risk Assessment and Resilience of Critical Infrastructure Towards Climate Change”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Volume 165, April 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120532
[15] Ibid
[16] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2022), pp. 3–33 https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_SummaryVolume.pdf
[17] UNISDR, Making Development Sustainable: The Future of Disaster Risk Management. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), 2015) https://www.undrr.org/publication/global-assessment-report-disaster-risk-reduction-2015
[18] Ibid
[19] A L Simpson et al, “Understanding risk in an evolving world: emerging best practices in natural disaster risk assessment”, Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, (2014. Washington DC, The World Bank) https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/Understanding_Risk-Web_Version-rev_1.8.0.pdf
[20] “Intensive and Extensive Risk”, PreventionWeb, UNDRR, last accessed July 11, 2025 https://www.preventionweb.net/understanding-disaster-risk/key-concepts/intensive-extensive-risk
[21] A L Simpson et al, “Understanding risk in an evolving world: emerging best practices in natural disaster risk assessment.”
[22] United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), The Sendai Framework Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction, “Vulnerability”. (2017), Accessed 28 May 2025. https://www.undrr.org/terminology/vulnerability.
[23] Chih-Hsuan Hung et al, “Linking the interplay of resilience, vulnerability, and adaptation to long-term changes in metropolitan spaces for climate-related disaster risk management”, Climate Risk Management Vol 44, 2024. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212096324000354
[24] Arunabh Mitra, Chime Youdon, Pradeep Chauhan, Rajib Shaw, “Systemic risk capability assessment methodology: A new approach for evaluating inter-connected risks in seaport ecosystems”, Progress in Disaster Science 22, (April 2024)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590061724000152#bb0145
[25] Protective Security Division, US Department of Homeland Security, “Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities Infrastructure Category: Cable Landing Stations”, January 15, 2004, https://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-UCL-CV.pdf
[26] Ibid
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