‘KUNLUNSHAN’ IN THE GULF OF ADEN – PLA NAVY CHANGES OPERATIONAL TACK?

The PLA Navy’s first indigenous Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ship of Yuzhao class named ‘Kunlunshan’ arrived in the Gulf of Aden on Jul 13, 2010 for its maiden overseas deployment.  The ship, along with another destroyer ‘Lanzhou’ forms part of the sixth anti-piracy task force off Somalia.  Since the commencement of the anti-piracy mission in December 2008, the Chinese Navy has continuously maintained three ships on patrol duties and has turned around its ships six times.  Each set of task force has had a deployment period of about three months.

The 18000-ton Kunlunshan LPD, the largest combat ship of the PLA Navy, is capable of carrying two Z8 (Super Frelon) helicopters and four high speed heavy lift hovercraft.  These hovercrafts are reportedly capable of carrying more than 100 tons of load and up to 140 troops.  The ship is also equipped with two LCVPs (Landing Craft Vehicle/Personnel) to perform a dual role viz. as ship’s boats and also as rapid manoeuver troop carriers.

Till now the latest and the best indigenously built destroyers and frigates of the PLA Navy were deployed for the anti-piracy mission, at about 4500 nautical miles (nm) from the Chinese mainland.  The accompanying table gives a fair idea about the type of ships deployed by the PLA Navy since it commenced its first overseas operational deployment about eighteen months ago. Some of the ships even incorporate the latest stealth features.

However, the abrupt shift in the deployment pattern of PLA Navy platforms for anti-piracy mission – from frontline destroyers and frigates to the LPD – definitely signals a ‘change of tack’ as far as its tactical operational strategy for the mission is concerned.  Clearly, there appears to be a serious rethink within the PLA Navy to deploy a force which is more suited for the task at hand.  There has been an ongoing debate amongst maritime security specialists about the wisdom of deploying the best maritime assets armed with ‘State of the art’ weaponry, sensors and systems for a low level, non-traditional, maritime security operation like an anti-piracy mission. In fact, the deployment of such ships amounts to capability overkill, while the limitations with regard to the availability of relevant resources like helicopters and additional fast craft embarked on them still remains.

Certain characteristics of the landing ships, like the greater endurance, lesser frequency of logistic replenishment, availability of fast attack boats, hovercraft and most importantly – that of multi role helicopters – makes them the ideal platforms for conducting such missions. These ships can also accommodate a large contingent of Special Forces and their gear, as the primary role of the LPD involves the transportation of landing troops along with heavy equipment like vehicles, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), tanks and guns. Such ships can also become excellent command centers because of available space and supporting communication infrastructure, sensors, data links and satellite-based systems. Additionally, their capacity to logistically and operationally support other ships to a certain extent also makes them modest ‘force multipliers’ in such operations. It is therefore not surprising that a report prepared for the US Congress by the ‘Congressional Research Service’ in June 2010, actually lists anti-piracy operations as one of the suitable roles for the LPDs. In fact, when the US Navy formed the anti-piracy task force CTF 151, USS San Antonio (LPD 17) was designated as the Flag Ship of the Task Force. This was followed by another landing ship, USS Boxer (LHD 4).

The PLA Navy must have surely observed the effectiveness of the US and EU LPDs during operations in the Gulf of Aden over the last year and a half, and may have decided to follow suit. Three advantages seem to accrue out of this move.  Firstly, the PLA Navy will be able to practically experience the effectiveness or otherwise of its own LPD operations in the non-traditional maritime security operations by imbibing the best practices followed by other countries operating similar ships. Secondly, the PLA Navy will be able to showcase the capabilities of its indigenous landing ship and its integral equipment to the world at large and may implicitly signal a tacit willingness to operate synergistically with the other ships of similar kind operated by the US, NATO and EU forces.

Thirdly and most importantly, by widening the range of participating ships in this mission, the PLA Navy will be able to provide much needed respite to its most potent surface fleet from the intensive and prolonged tasking of the secondary type. It can be noted from table 1 above that virtually each of the Luyang I and II class destroyers (two each) and Jiangkai I and II class frigates (two and four respectively) have already completed one deployment of more than three months away from their coast. It is considered that such secondary tasking will ultimately result in compromising the operational readiness for their primary role of war fighting mainly on account of avoidable wear and tear, limited engine running hours, crew fatigue and lack of combat training. A possible repetition of this cycle for the same frontline ships will further exacerbate the problem.

It is not known as to how long the PLA Navy is likely to maintain a three ship anti-piracy task force in the Gulf of Aden, but the deployment of its only LPD for the first time ever must have been a result of extensive deliberations on the limitations of operating ships at the end of such a long tether. One can therefore expect to see comparatively older ships of the PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean in the near future, if Beijing plans to maintain the current scale of deployment. Success or otherwise of these older ships in the Gulf of Aden would actually prove to be the real acid test for  the PLA Navy with regard to the  sustainability of its presence in the Indian Ocean Region.

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About the Author:

Commander Kamlesh Kumar Agnihotri is a Research Fellow with the China Cell of the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Indian Navy or the National Maritime Foundation. The author can be reached at kkagnihotri@maritimeindia.org