FOUR YEARS OF ANTI-PIRACY MISSION: CHINESE NAVY’S SHOWCASE ACHIEVEMENT

The Chinese Navy celebrated the fourth anniversary of its ongoing anti-piracy escort mission and patrols in the Gulf of Aden and waters off the Somali coast on December 26, 2012 with great fanfare and wide publicity. The three Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) Naval Fleets held open day activities over two days from December 25, 2012, onboard some of the ships which have participated in the escort missions. The ships, in particular the Qingdao, Guangzhou and Shenzhen guided missile destroyers and the Zhoushan guided missile frigate proceeded to the ports of the cities after which they are named, and were made open to public. The Chinese media reported the event with great zeal and estimated that more than by 8,000 people from all sections of the society visited these ships.

It was exactly on this day in 2008 that the first ever Chinese naval escort taskforce sailed from Sanya naval facility of Hainan province towards those waters, about 4,400 nautical miles away. The task force comprising Wuhan and Haikou missile destroyers and the Weishan Hu replenishment ship recorded their names in the modern Chinese ‘Defense Forces’ history by embarking on this path-breaking endeavour and remained on task for more than three months till mid-April 2009. This inaugural Chinese naval foray into the distant North Arabian Sea was duly backed up by the ‘Military Operations Other Than War’ (MOOTW) articulation, which appeared for the first time in  the Chinese  ‘National Defense White Paper of 2008’ released soon after, on January 20, 2009.

The PLA Navy possibly, has the reasons to celebrate this achievement; having maintained an uninterrupted and successful deployment of three warships till date. The 13^th task force comprising two frigates (Huangshan and Hengyang) and the Qinghaihu replenishment ship, is presently on task since mid-November 2012. Given their propensity of highlighting even minor details related to their achievements, the Chinese let it be known that a total of 34 warships, 28 helicopters and 10,000-odd personnel had participated in these missions till date.      To term their continuous presence despite the visible tyranny of distance as ‘meaningful’ would definitely be an understatement; particularly when Beijing claims that its naval task forces have cumulatively accomplished more than 500-plus escort missions for 5,000-odd Chinese and foreign merchant ships, and successfully rescued/salvaged over 60 ships.

Comprehensive gains for the PLA Navy

It is posited that ‘meaningfulness’ of this PLA naval endeavour should be seen in much wider context than mere escorting of merchant ships. The global community would do well to  keep sight of the fact that the PLA Navy had very limited experience of operating in ‘Distant seas’ – as the Chinese Defense White Paper of 2008 termed it – prior to China having embarked on this mission. Their exposure to operations in a multi-national maritime environment, like that prevalent in the Gulf of Aden area, was even more minimal. With that kind of ‘take-off’ level, the advantages that accrued to the PLA Navy from this mission, have simply been tremendous.

Three of these gains readily come to mind. Firstly, the PLA Navy has been able to practically enhance the effectiveness of its frontline ships in the non-traditional maritime security operations by imbibing the best practices followed by other countries operating in the area. Secondly, the PLA Navy has consistently tested and showcased the capabilities of its latest indigenous ships and integral equipment to the world at large and has signaled by implication, its willingness to operate synergistically with the ships of US, NATO, EU and other countries. Third and the most important aspect has been the priceless experience gained by a large number of naval personnel engaged in various roles as part of these missions. The sturdy ‘sea legs’ acquired over long duration ‘out of area’ maritime deployment; jointmanship learnt by operating with multinational forces; and repeated and intensive exposure to deck based helicopter operations and ‘special forces tasks’ are some of the specific takeaways.

China has in addition, undertaken many maritime and diplomatic activities which are either associated with or complement the presence of its ships in the Gulf of Aden. The PLA Navy ships while on deployment have continually and consistently visited ports in Oman, UAE, Yemen and Djibouti, either for operational turnaround, rest and recreation or to escape bad weather. These ships have increased their inter-operability by jointly operating with other countries’ ships, conducting joint exercises, and exchanging visits of Task Force Commanders and other personnel. For instance, the Chinese task forces’ Commanders have regularly been hosting/calling-on their respective counterparts from the NATO, EU and Combined Task Force 151 at sea.

Warships of different task forces have also been ‘showing flag’ in various IOR littorals including India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Malaysia, while proceeding to or returning from anti-piracy missions. The PLA Navy’s post deployment arena has progressively expanded, as its escort mission has endured with time. Ships of the 11^th task force in fact, crossed the Suez into the Mediterranean and ventured into the Black sea for the first time ever, making maiden visits to Ukrainian, Bulgarian and Romanian ports. These ships subsequently docked at Istanbul and the Israeli port of Haifa, thus remaining in a potentially volatile area – on account of ongoing Syrian turmoil and Israel-Lebanon stand-off – for close to a month in July-August 2012. The warships of the homeward bound 12^th task force have reached out even farther, by routing themselves via Australia. The emergent pattern even on perfunctory analysis resembles a wheel, with the hub at the Gulf of Aden and the spokes fanning out in all directions of the Globe. In the same context, the following additional activities of the PLA Navy also bear a mention:-

• PLA Navy hospital ship ‘Peace Ark’ which sailed across the Indian Ocean on ‘Mission Harmony’ during September-November 2010 and visited Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles and Bangladesh, operated in the Gulf of Aden for few days with the sixth task force.
• Similarly, PLA Navy training ship Zheng He, while transiting through the Gulf of Aden as part of its ‘round the world’ training mission also effected a rendezvous with the Yantai frigate of the 11^th task force on May 17, 2012 and they operated together for a day.
• Diversion of Xuzhou frigate from the anti-piracy task to the Libyan coast in end February 2011 to assist in the withdrawal of Chinese citizens from the crisis struck Libya – the first role of this kind for the PLA Navy – is well documented.
• The ‘Ma’anshan’ frigate participated in the Pakistan initiated multilateral maritime exercise ‘Aman 2011’ in March 2011 prior to joining the 8^th task force in the Gulf of Aden.

Limitations and Challenges

It is not to say that everything related to this Chinese maiden venture has been smooth sailing. Many a debate has arisen, within and without, with regard to different facets of this ongoing mission. The most vocal internal debate about whether China should look for permanent military bases abroad so as to facilitate its overseas activities like the anti-piracy mission was finally put to rest with an official denial of any such plan by Beijing. Some countries whose warships are participating in the anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, were quite concerned when China in 2010, sought to alter the existing order by proposing to divide and fix the patrol areas of individual ships. Of greater concern to some others, was the prospect of China becoming the co-leader of certain steering mechanism/s in place, thus getting hold of requisite leverage to affect the changes it desired.

The operational efficiency of the PLA Navy as well as its will to act decisively during mission related crisis situations was also under scrutiny; particularly so when the hijacking episode of a Chinese freighter Dexinhai by Somali pirates that occurred in October 2009, virtually ‘under their nose’. The ship was hijacked about 700 nautical miles (NM) from Somalia and arrived off Somali coast after presumably sailing for 72 hours. The Chinese Task Force which was reportedly 1080 NM from the hijack site could have comfortably intercepted the hijacked vessel in 45-54 hours, even if it had proceeded at moderate speed of 20-24 knots. However, the Chinese ships did not pursue this obvious course of action for reasons best known to them. The fact that the ship was released two months later by payment of around 3.5-4 million US Dollar ransom and then escorted till the Sri Lankan coastline by one of the PLA Navy ships, is of no great consequence though the Chinese media reported it as a rescue act by the PLA Navy.

Conclusion

The above limitations and challenges notwithstanding, there is absolutely no doubting the fact that the ongoing anti-piracy mission has accorded the PLA Navy a unique and ‘never before’ opportunity to operationally test and showcase the frontline units of all three Fleets and provide hands-on work-up to the bulk of its manpower on distant area operations, in a theatre which it did not have to create. While these are visible dividends of past four years of sustained effort, the biggest gainers have perhaps, been the internal logistical, administrative and infrastructural set-ups of the PLA, Navy in particular, which have progressively evolved into well coordinated mechanisms for supporting the pre, post and actual deployment activities of the successive task forces.

If China decided to participate in the anti-piracy mission as part of securing its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) on which its growing economy is so dependent; the manifestations, consequences and implications of its naval presence under that role are far wider. Thus it would not be out of place to suggest that the current deployment meets the ‘need for a growing power to increasingly find larger operating space and strive for presence in all global hotspots, so as to be able to influence events in favour of its own national interest’, to a certain extent. By that supposition, the Chinese Navy is here to stay for a long time to come – piracy or no piracy.

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About the Author:

Commander Kamlesh K Agnihotri is a Research Fellow with the China Cell of the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Indian Navy or the National Maritime Foundation. The author can be reached at kkagnihotri@maritimeindia.org