CHINESE DILEMMA OVER RESURGENCE OF SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE

The South China Sea and the issues of sovereign rights therein between China and Vietnam have again surfaced since the May 26, 2011 incident when the Chinese maritime patrol ships ventured into the Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and cut off the exploration cables of a Vietnamese seismic survey ship ‘Binh Minh 02’ engaged in oil exploration, about 120 nautical miles (NM) off the Vietnamese coast.  The Vietnamese foreign ministry promptly protested the Chinese action within its EEZ and sought compensation for the damages caused. Barely five days later, another incident occurred wherein two vessels believed to belong to China, tried to come too close to another Vietnamese chartered vessel, ‘Viking 2’ which was engaged in seismic exploration in the Vietnamese EEZ, but were headed off  by timely intervention from a Vietnamese naval ship. Since the same vessel was harassed two days earlier too, the Vietnamese naval ships were keeping close watch over Viking 2 and hence managed to prevent the occurrence of another incident.

Turbulence of Recent Past

The eruption of the latent tension in the South China Sea after a relative calm of about six months was expected because of the underlying and long-standing dispute over the Paracel and Spratly group of Islands and their adjacent waters.  The complexity of the issue involving multiple parties staking claims precluded any likelihood of immediate initiation of a process to resolve the problem. These parties have varied perceptions of their territorial claims and limits of their associated maritime zones and also interpret the rights and obligations of coastal states and outsiders in these zones differently.  Though everyone concerned welcomed the temporary softening of the Chinese stance for the time being, given that the South China Sea issue has been deeply ingrained in the Chinese psyche, it was evident that China would sooner than later, raise this matter with renewed vigour and greater resolve.

However, one did not expect the recurrence so soon after China beat some sort of a tactical retreat towards the end of 2010, after nearly one full year of hectic brinkmanship, both, physically on the location and politically. This game in the western Pacific involved many players including the US, Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Vietnam. The first indications of this softening were perceptible when during the visit of the US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates to China in December 2010, only two issues of ‘core interest’ were mentioned by his Chinese counterpart. Later, the ‘South China Sea’ was very conspicuous by its absence, from the joint Presidential statement issued during the state visit of President Hu Jintao to the US in January 2011. The December 2010 meeting of the China-ASEAN joint working group on the implementation of the ‘2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties’ and another meeting in March 2011 in Indonesia, did indicate a change in the Chinese stance, from hardened ‘core interest’ position to that of negotiation and engagement.

The issue would have continued to remain somewhat calm, but for the Vietnamese decision to finally stand up to the restrictive Chinese activities in enforcement of their so called “…sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters….” The Chinese Government had submitted a map of the limits of its claim in the region to the United Nations on May 7, 2009, in response to the Vietnamese submission of its limits of the continental Shelf on the same day. China and Vietnam have thereafter been periodically communicating with the UN about the validity of their claims while refuting those of the other party. The last set of communications with the UN was exchanged as late as in May this year, wherein both the parties have taken pretty intractable positions, calling the Paracel and the Spratly Island groups as integral part of their respective territories.

The limits of the Chinese claim virtually enclosed the entire South China Sea, leaving very little maritime area near Vietnam and Philippines. China also started undertaking commensurate maritime measures to enforce its claim. The harassment of the US Navy survey ship ‘Impeccable’ in the South China Sea in March 2009 occurred as a pre-cursor to the Chinese official submission of its claim in May 2009. Thereafter sporadic incidents have been occurring because China started dispatching its maritime patrol ships to sanitise areas around the Paracel Islands.  China also imposed a general fishing ban in the South China Sea with effect from May 16, 2009 with a stated aim of protecting the sustainability of marine life in that area and sent eight fisheries patrol ships to monitor about 128,000 square kilometres of area. Vietnamese maritime agencies have been constantly trying to push back hordes of Chinese fishing boats from their maritime zones, without any great degree of success. They in fact alleges that some of these boats come as close as 25-30 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast and when chased by the Vietnamese patrol vessels, jettison certain items while retreating, which may cause damage to the pursuing ships.

Current Standoff

Vietnam can be said to have been preparing the pitch for forcing the issue of legitimate sovereign rights in its EEZ since the past one year. It hosted an international conference on South China Sea in Hanoi in November 2009, wherein more than 40 experts from all around the globe deliberated in detail upon the theme of cooperative endeavour towards regional security. It was recognised by the delegates that the South China Sea remained an area that could cause regional instability because of conflicting territorial claims and overlapping maritime zones (see map), all further compounded by development aspirations and security concerns of the disputants.  In addition, wider recognition of the South China Sea’s significance for the world at large which has stakes in international navigation, maritime safety, natural resource exploitation, environmental protection, and legal effectiveness of the UNCLOS in the area, was also brought to the fore.

Vietnam, as the Chair of the ARF, also hosted an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 2010, where it managed to garner positive endorsement of a majority of participating states over the vexed problem in the South China Sea. In fact, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton went on to assert that the US has a “national interest in the freedom of navigation and open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea”. The US inclination to mediate informally to help China and the ASEAN nations formulate a legally binding ‘Code of Conduct’ was also indicated by the US Ambassador to Philippines in October 2010.

With the perceived backing of the US interest in the South China Sea as suggested by the above US actions – even though not directly in support to Vietnam’s cause – the Vietnamese leadership may have found this to be the opportune moment to exercise their rightful position in the area.  Hanoi announced its intention to conduct a live fire maritime exercise in its EEZ after a series of maritime incidents involving Vietnamese survey vessels and the Chinese patrol boats and vessels, commencing May 26, 2011. The exercise conducted on June 13, 2011, though well away from the disputed islands and comparatively nearer to the Vietnamese coast, nevertheless lay in the overlapping claims of the two countries’ maritime zones.

China’s Dilemma

China has all along been maintaining that the South China Sea dispute can be and should be handled bilaterally and that there is no scope for external intervention. This stand was clearly brought out during the July 2010 ARF meeting when the Chinese Foreign Minister advised the US not to internationalize a bilateral issue between China and the individual ASEAN nations. The same position was reiterated by the Chinese Minister for National Defense, Liang Guanglie in the June 2011 Shangri La Dialogue wherein he insisted that the overall security situation in the region remained stable and that “China and the ASEAN members agreed on the principle of resolving the territorial and maritime rights dispute through bilateral consultations and negotiations between the sovereign states directly involved”.  A June 2011 article in a Chinese military newspaper stressed that China opposed interference by any ‘unrelated’ country in the issue of the South China Sea and suggested that any move by such countries to play up disputes, sharpen contradictions or intentionally internationalize the disputes will only make the situation worse.

In response to the Vietnamese maritime exercise, the Chinese foreign office announced that China will not resort to the use of force or threat of force, though cautioning ‘those involved’ against such actions that could exacerbate the situation. However, Vietnam has been steadfastly calling for international involvement. The Vietnamese foreign ministry exhorted the global community by stating that “Maintaining peace, stability, security, and maritime safety in the Eastern Sea (Vietnamese nomenclature for the South China Sea) is in the common interest of the countries inside and outside the region” and that “Every effort by the international community in maintaining peace and stability in the area would be welcome.”

The dilemma for China is whether to adopt a hardline approach towards the assertive Vietnamese stance or offer a more measured response bordering on a softer option. The Chinese leadership must be fiercely debating whether Vietnam read too much into the ‘tactical retreat of sorts’ in December 2010/January 2011, and whether such a course of action will benefit their interests this time around. They must be pondering over the possibility that letting Vietnam get away with its forward posturing would cause Philippines also to join in, since it is also a party to the dispute.  Philippines has reiterated its own claim on April 5, 2011 over parts of the Spratly islands (Kalayaan islands as per its nomenclature) and adjacent waters, contesting the Chinese position.

On the other hand, China has experienced throughout 2010 that a hardline posture tends to bring unwarranted global attention to a regional issue, over which it wants no external interference. The involvement of the US in the region and its ‘freedom of the Seas’ posture in favour of the standpoint of the other parties to the dispute, is something China would like to prevent altogether. The placatory statements apart, China has been leaving no opportunity to deny the South China Sea littorals, their legitimate rights in their own maritime zones. A Chinese Maritime Safety Agency vessel, Haixun31 sailed for Singapore from Guangzhou on June 15, 2011, the first time that such a ship is being showcased abroad. The ship will transit the very same waters which are currently in the news. It is noteworthy that this ship and others of the same type are at the forefront of the Chinese enforcement apparatus of their claimed maritime zones in the South China Sea. The unstated message could not have been clearer.

Notwithstanding the above, in the emerging scenario of uncertainty, it appears that China will indeed have to resort to a challenging tight rope walk, in order to be able to subdue the current stand-off as far as possible, on terms favourable to its interests, while at the same time strive to present a semblance of benevolence and measured dignity that behoves a ‘responsible emerging power’ of global consequence.

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About the Author:

Commander Kamlesh Kumar Agnihotri is a Research Fellow with the China Cell of the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed in the article are solely his own and do not reflect the views of the Indian Navy or the Foundation. The Author can be reached at kkagnihotri@maritimeindia.org