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ASEAN Perspective on Challenges and Opportunities of Partnerships across the Seas

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ASEAN will form on December 31, 2015, the ASEAN Community, which will try to integrate 10 very heterogeneous countries into "one family". On one hand, historical developments and security concerns led to a rather nationalistic position of the individual countries, and on the other, developments related to "non-traditional security" (NTS) issues are forcing a rethinking of hard-line positions in favour of a regional maritime approach. Whilst in many political and academic circles the term "regional resilience" is regularly used, the understanding ranges from the interpretation that this is a new Chinese wording for justifying the increase of the military and maritime power of the country, via the claim that the "new" security approaches are just emerging after the end of the Cold War, to the differentiating theory debate about different political approaches to international relations and the NTS issues. This article explores the historical development of NTS threats and then addresses some risks for the ASEAN Community 2015 as well as providing answers to the ASEAN 2015

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three-pillar strategy of the ASEAN Political–Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). The article will explore a strategic approach rather than operational issues to address certain challenges within this strategy, and will discuss some maritime implications.

Historical Regionalism Developments

Some scholars and officials claim that the "non-traditional security" (NTS) approach was mainly developed after the Cold War. However, this is a rather Western perspective as historically, the end of the Cold War and of the global bipolarity was not as dominant as in Europe. When the Berlin Wall came down on November 9, 1989, it was mainly a media spectacle, without the realisation of the real and substantial changes in Europe which later culminated in the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. In Asia, these developments did not have immediate tectonic consequences like in Europe. Nevertheless, there was a long-term dynamic distribution of global power which was closely connected with a greater interdependence of states and the emerging non-state actors (despite the United States' dream of a unipolar world).

Analysing the international system, two main trends can be evaluated related to the "power management" of nations. First, the trend of political and economic regionalisation, which had started during the Cold War era, is still ongoing, though to a lesser extent in Europe. In Asia, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is well established and is working in the domain of economics and trade to strengthen a South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA); the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, 1967)[1] with its several sub-organisations is an internationally recognised regional grouping in politics, economics and security. Only East Asia still struggles with the competition amongst the big three – the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea – all of which are dialogue partners of ASEAN and members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). But this indirect regionalism is unlikely to be flanked by a regional East Asia grouping. On the super-regional level, one can find APEC; the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC[2]); the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), an expansion of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEP, 2006[3]); and the newly formed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB; established in October 2014[4]). Due to the media and political leadership of the United States, the TPP is considered to be US-led, whilst the AIIB is obviously a

Chinese endeavour with the aim to emerge as an alternative to the World Bank. Analysing the Asian approach towards regionalism, the approach looks different from the European one in being slower and more carefully orchestrated. Distrust of each other, mistrust of external influences (in the background of a strong nationalistic influence), cultural differences and a general uneasiness towards formalised agreements and structures are main reasons for this trust deficit.

Second, whilst there is an increasing dominance of economic goals, there are limitations in the political field. This "demilitarises" the (security) political thinking by establishing a stronger economic focus. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, many political analysts thought that the future would bring a global reorientation away from the dominating geopolitical aspects to a more geoeconomic point of view. In fact, today the once-dominating geopolitical view regarding security policy is complemented with geoeconomic, geoecological and geocultural aspects, including far-reaching issues like globalisation, megapolisation and El Niño.

Due to the increasing dominance of economic aspects in international relations, countries are getting more involved with the "centres of gravity" being India and the People's Republic of China, alongside Japan. In 1993, the former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew predicted "In the next twenty years the economic centre of gravity of the world is going to shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific as the combined GNP [gross national product] of East Asia outweighs that of the United States and the [then] 12 members of the European Community combined".[5] He forecasted this despite the fact that there was a major financial crisis in 1997 in the region. Meanwhile the trend of globalisation seems to have picked up, and interdependencies and internationalisation are the order of the day. Further, there was an ascendency of market-oriented economies, because the planned economy-oriented systems were less successful in the past. Today, despite some re-emergence of old ideas, the nationalistic tendencies in the Asian region are in general softening as a result of international economic interdependencies, and there is a willingness to consider broader cooperation including a growing maritime component.

Transformation of Regional Security Strategies

Contrary to some Western perceptions, Southeast Asia recognised the growing importance of and the need for comprehensive security approaches and concepts in the national defense doctrines since the late 1960s. In the following years, almost all

countries abandoned the unilateral military security approach, which dominated the political thinking in the Cold War era for decades. Today, classical forms of influence as well as new non-traditional security aspects and non-state actors are often perceived as having an equal impact on national and regional security. The evidence of this approach can be found as early as 1968, when the so-called "national resilience" concept came into existence in Indonesia. This emerged from the modification of the concept of non-aligned movement (NAM), as during that period Indonesia projected itself as acting in the tradition of Nehru's ideas and the Bandung spirit. Called "Ketahanan Nasional" in the Indonesian language, this concept comprises a broad security and development approach, including some connotations for the maritime sector. The 1968 draft by the Indonesian Command and General Staff College (LEMHANNAS) highlighted eight parameters relevant to a state's security policy. These are the "Natural Reality of the state" comprising geographical position, wealth of mineral resources and human resources, and the "Social Reality of the state" consisting of the ideological framework, economy, social and cultural conditions, defense issues and security policy order of a society. These eight domains manifest the security as well as the development capability of a country. Yet these are two sides of the same coin, as they are not only supportive but also a source of vulnerability for the country and its people.[6]

In this concept, national ideas and objectives as well as traditional values assume an important role in defining policy. Challenges to these objectives exist both in the domestic and the international contexts. Therefore, the "Ketahanan national" possesses domestic and foreign policy components in order to stabilise the entire state, to maintain and to improve the credibility as well as the international reputation which is closely correlated with national strength and the resulting foreign policy opportunities. On September 29, 1982, this concept was legalised in order to render possible political and military reactions to threats posed to Indonesia. A central element of the "national resilience" is the cultural component with a nation-building and a state-supporting function. For the people of Asian countries, which were colonies or were threatened by the colonial powers, it strengthens their national identity and is essential for the internal stability of the countries and the region. On the basis of "national resilience", the traditional value systems can usually be maintained without resulting in nationalistic extremes. This applies not only to Indonesia, which had first defined the concept, but also to the ASEAN countries that have adopted this concept as an objective of their regional cooperation with the term "regional resilience", which was later substantiated

in the introduction of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) pillar of the ASEAN Community 2015.

Hence, Asia can claim that the introduction of a comprehensive security approach into the field of international relations is based on an Asian way of thinking, as the Western way started much later: the 1970s reports of the "Club of Rome"; in the 1980s the Independent Commission on International Development Issues chaired by Willy Brandt issuing the so-called "North–South Report", addressing not only traditional security issues like peace and war, but also issues like how to overcome world hunger, mass misery and alarming disparities between the living conditions of rich and poor[7]; and in the 1980s the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (chaired by Olof Palme) authoring the "Common Security" report, which encouraged alternative ways of thinking about peace and security, by acknowledging that common security requires that people live in dignity and peace, have enough to eat and are able to find work, and live in a world without poverty. Finally, a chapter of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) "Human Development Report 1994″ highlighted the need for "Redefining security: The Human Dimension"[8] and defined the terms "human security" and NTS while listing seven components of human security, viz. economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. This definition was a global breakthrough for the NTS issue in political thinking. After that, scholars as well as policy makers followed this approach to examine modern security challenges.

Traditional Security Issues and Related Maritime Implications for ASEAN

In the actual ASEAN context (as derived from analyses of current Defense White Papers and related interviews) the traditional security issues are as follows:

1. Diplomacy is still the most important method of generating, stabilising and building peaceful relations amongst nations. Diplomacy follows traditional ways of interacting in the international system, like bilateral agreements, bi- and multilateral conference diplomacy, and individual contacts. In this context, it is worthwhile to mention that in Asia informal or non-regulated meetings are often more successful than time-scheduled fixed sessions as they create a better atmosphere to address and reduce the conflict potential or to resolve conflicts. ASEAN countries create these kinds of

semi-formalised structures, which later crystallise as established arrangements and may include countries from outside the region if ASEAN policy makers see value in the addition (e.g. India, EU and others are ASEAN dialogue partners). Examples of these kinds of informal-turned-formal arrangements are the annually gatherings of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM, established in 1967), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994) and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM, 2006). The ARF and the ADMM are models for preventive diplomacy. They also mark the formal efforts by the almost 50-year-old regional grouping to stabilise the shift of focus from political and economic issues into the security domain. In 2007, this approach was cemented with a blueprint for the formal establishment of the APSC as the first pillar of the ASEAN Community 2015.[9] In recent history, the ASEAN diplomatic channels have proven successful in establishing an efficient regional maritime-based disaster relief cooperation (e.g. Tsunami 2004, Haiyan 2013) formalised by the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER, 2009). However, a lack of diplomatic channels limits actions which are related to domestic problems, especially as the ASEAN countries follow a strict "non-interference" policy towards internal problems of member states. These examples reveal the traditional and closely knit relations between security and diplomacy in the ASEAN context, which is mirrored by the establishment of the APSC which merges political and security policy methodologies into one main pillar of the ASEAN Community. This approach also has inherent opportunities for maritime cooperation beyond the regional geographical borders.[10]

2. Economics and security are increasingly intertwined. As a result, geoeconomic factors seem to gain more importance in the international context than the classical geopolitical approach does. With an increasing international interdependence, the economy–security nexus can be seen in ASEAN in the national and regional levels, and the economic interdependence seems to have a stabilising influence on the Asia Pacific region by reducing local and intraregional conflict. Moreover, economic development is closely related to the security of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) as no country (even landlocked ones) can live without supplies from the sea. In this context, freedom of navigation is an important goal for all regional organisations and global actors. Furthermore, the globalisation of finance, markets and production has a positive impact on the Asia Pacific security environment, leading to a kind of soft regionalism in the Asia Pacific. This is based on the economic interdependence, which was improved

by the APEC and the second pillar of the ASEAN Community, the AEC. All in all, the interdependence between economics and security in the ASEAN region is closer than that during the Cold War era. This is widely believed to lead to a more stable international system in the entire Asia Pacific region.

3. The military policy of a country is mainly based on the evaluation and interpretation of constitutional conditions, the definition of national interests and the identification of national, regional or global threats towards these interests. However, these policies are subject to change. Until the end of the 1980s, for instance, military strategies in ASEAN countries were dominated by the fight against internal insurgencies and a military buildup to show strength to the neighbouring countries. This domestic focus is gradually decreasing, but it has not yet been eliminated as the military is one of the traditional ways of power projection and sometimes elites try to keep the military forces close to the decision makers in power. However, the need to speed up international recognition and reputation has led many countries to contribute troops to international (United Nations, UN) missions (e.g. Singapore and Thailand to the antipiracy mission near Somalia from 2010 onwards). Another urgent need is international coordinated disaster relief missions like during the tsunami in 2004, which involved large numbers of military personnel and a large amount of effort. These developments clearly indicate a shift in the perception of the role and missions of armed forces in the region, as most ASEAN countries do not consider a direct military threat from any of their direct neighbours, except the claimants in the South China Sea. Hence, new missions such as the so-called Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) have been incorporated in naval planning to evolve new military strategies and have been approved by the respective political decision makers. However, there is an increasing concern related to arms proliferation. Despite being slowed down for more than a decade due to the 1997 financial crisis, a significant (mostly maritime) military buildup in the Asia Pacific region can be observed. But this should not be overemphasised, because for the time being there are, at least in East and Southeast Asia, no real signs of an arms race as the current procurements are driven by the availability of funds as well as the need for modernisation/replacement of old weapon systems. Taking various aspects into account, military policy remains an important form of influencing national security concepts but it has lost the overall dominance in the threat perception of the ASEAN region, thus opening up opportunities for other countries to cooperate on maritime issues.

NTS Challenges and Related Maritime Implications for the ASEAN Community

Many pundits perceive NTS challenges as rather peripheral, with the classical security issues at the core. These lines, though, are blurring and some NTS issues are influencing national and regional policy making. Some major NTS issues are addressed in the following paragraphs, while others such as drug trafficking/organised crime, education, science and the facilities for research, human rights, information, information technology and mass media, religion/religious fanaticism and transborder diseases[11] are not discussed.

The danger of creating climate refugees or migrants is of growing concern in the Asian region. Consequently, mechanisms of national and regional resource management are urgently needed for conflict prevention in the fast-growing ASEAN economies and beyond. Although the connection between ecology and security has not yet reached a crucial level, this is becoming increasingly significant and this factor needs to be addressed in the respective national and regional security concepts. In the ASEAN Community process, Sunchindah[12] points out that in some areas connections to the AEC pillar are existent, but the nexus to the APSC pillar is rather weak and requires strengthening – e.g. surveillance of oil spills at sea is already a part of the MOOTW for certain armed forces in the region. These kinds of weaknesses need to be addressed with cross-pillar approaches and implementation ideas in order to avoid "single-pillar policy" approaches.

Energy security covers broad issues including claiming, exploring, extracting and shipping of gas, oil or other fossil fuels. From the national and regional strategic perspective, energy security aims for the wellbeing of citizens and stabilising growth for economic development. However, a publicly almost-overlooked point is the safety and security of the related shipping routes. Here, ASEAN is limited in its own options and urgently needs to consider closer ties with India and the littoral states in the Persian Gulf to ensure the constant flow of oil and gas, which is essential for the economic development of the ASEAN community.

Migration has emerged as a major NTS issue as the intranational as well as the international movement of people causes different security challenges. In the last decade, the flow of illegal migrants (e.g. Rohingya boat people crisis, 2015) is increasing and uncontrolled. As the recent illegal migrations in the Mediterranean and in the ASEAN show, the number of migrants coming via waterways is growing and national

navies and maritime law enforcement agencies have to prepare for these challenges. This is relevant, because in many countries the legal framework is still not sufficient to cope with large numbers of illegal migrants, and therefore the maritime law enforcement agencies in many countries are incapable of handling such challenges. ASEAN members should therefore enforce a sound policy in the framework of APSC and ASCC which addresses these issues and would support the integration of migrants in their new societies which enables them to protect their human rights.[13] This policy should also consider a close cooperation with ASEAN neighbouring regions and countries as seaborne refugees will pass through international waters.

Natural disaster as an NTS issue came into thenpublic limelight during the tsunami of 2004, which from a strategic perspective was until now the biggest ad hoc combined rescue mission undertaken by the military. Medical, naval and air force units from more than 15 countries, involving more than 100 warships and more than 200 air force planes and helicopters in different theatres (e.g. operation Sea Wave in India or the US-supported operations along the Indonesian and Thai coastlines) were deployed. Because of the vast theatre and the large distances involved, this massive support was staggered in time. Therefore, some considered that the US was slow in responding, while the help from India was judged fast and decisive. Besides the limits of support, the US also used the relief operations to revitalise an old "soft" strategic concept of sending troops for goodwill and humanitarian aid (e.g. hospital ships) around the region in order to improve the perception. As a result of 2004, preparedness for helping in natural disasters is always an underlining point of ASEAN military thinking and of MOOTW. The main lessons which one learnt based on national, regional and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) evaluations are that international contributions sometimes are limited, the interoperability of rescue-related military and civilian forces needs to be improved, and combined and joint training needs to be enhanced. As natural disasters strike without notice, the readiness of armed forces must be on the highest level, which proves difficult to maintain for a long period of time. Against this backdrop, the effort of including ASEAN in the regional disaster risk management sets an example for other regional organisations. The AADMER (signed in 2005 and enforced in 2009) is a proactive regional framework for cooperation, coordination, technical assistance and resource mobilisation in all aspects of disaster management, and is the first legally binding Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA)-related instrument in the world.[14] In order to make the theoretical political approach operational, work plans were created and implemented, like the Standard Operating

Procedures for Regional Standby Arrangement and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP, 2009)[15] flanked by a series of joint exercises (ASEAN Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise [ARDEX] 2005, 2006, 2007. 2008, 2009, 2010, 2013). Observers certify that this ASEAN initiative and the implemented operational structures are effective and efficient, even though smaller things still need to be adapted and improved.

Security of the SLOCs is crucial in the Asia Pacific region. Piracy, for instance, has always been found in Asian waters, but the rising number of incidents during the last few years in the Malacca Straits and Indonesian waters gives reason for renewed concern. Therefore, neighbouring states adjunct to the mains SLOCs like Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have an added responsibility for securing them. Maritime modernisation programmes and the increase in national maritime law enforcement agencies are contributing to the efforts of littoral governments to enhance free and safe passage at sea. Since 2001, the US has increased its military engagement in several areas, from stationing littoral combat ships (LCS) in Singapore to the improvement of US–Vietnamese relations, despite the ongoing South China Sea conflicts. India has also increased the maritime presence with improving relations and bilateral exercises with Vietnam. Additionally, there are threats to merchant ships resulting from internal and regional conflict potentials, e.g. from the Spratly, Paracel and other islets in the South China Sea. In general, the Asian SLOCs are vital for most of the neighbouring countries as well as for the major trading nations like the EU, India, Japan, the People's Republic of China, and the US. Therefore, their security is a major concern for all nations and their importance will be steadily amplified with the increasing globalisation of trade and infrastructure. In this context, ASEAN is in a delicate situation as it has a split perspective on the South China Sea issue, as some countries are active claimants while others are bystanders and fence sitters, which makes it difficult to draft joint statements agreeable to all. The best measure for the peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts amongst them is an increased dialogue and combating transnational crime and terrorism as it is based on the assumption that cooperation in areas of common interest could limit the possibility of war and armed conflicts amongst sovereign nations.[16]

The events in September 2001 and the following attacks – 2002 (Bali), 2004 (Madrid), 2005 (London) – showed clearly that even "classical" terrorism, in which the terrorists used bombs and firearms, has transformed into a new form, endangering more people in countries that never thought about the possibility of being involved in this kind of "war". Additionally, the US-led "War on Terrorism" forced many

countries to rethink their national and military strategies related to the terrorism. In the expert analyses, however, it is predicted that the new "radical Islamic terrorism will be even more difficult to defeat than the political and national terrorism of the 1960s through the 1980s".[17] This forecast came true, when the so-called "Islamic State"[18] or "Daesh" established its Caliphate in 2014. While the main battlefield for and against "Daesh" is the Middle East, the organisation has received a permanent flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). From ASEAN countries the combined number could have reached, at least, about 1000 people (ca. 500 Indonesians), according to various reports presented at the Human Development Forum Foundation (HDFF)'s Chairman Circle on March 24, 2015, by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) experts. For ASEAN members – all are also UN members – there is the UN member states' obligation to address FTFs as per United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 2170 (August, 2014) and 2178 (September, 2014). These resolutions call on UN member states to take national measures to prevent fighters from travelling from their soil to join the groups; develop comprehensive policies to address the FTF-related threats; improve international cooperation by sharing information on criminal investigations, interdictions and prosecutions; and make the most of existing UN counterterrorism bodies, amongst other things. Nevertheless, there are legal and judicial challenges, such as the lack of legal tools and the different levels of capacity (resources and skills) amongst individual ASEAN member states that can hinder ASEAN's efforts to address FTF-related threats efficiently and effectively.[19]

Conclusion

The emerging NTS issues expand the operational environment for foreign and security policy decision-making processes of the ASEAN nations, which for a long time were dominated in many countries by external (perceived) threats or internal insurgencies. However, not only the policy makers, but also the operational departments in the military – including their respective medical services – as well as the civilian law enforcement agencies have to take new developments into consideration whilst formulating new strategies and/or the definition of national interests during the formulation of national policies. Operational planning, human resources and equipment also have to be adapted to the new challenges in order to overcome the challenges. Ideally, as interoperability is almost a must for any kind of operation in the abovementioned context, the new approaches towards security have to be in a regional context with

some options "outside the geographical box", and should include as many countries as possible on different operational levels to address the new NTS threats.

The ASEAN Community with its three-pillar approach is farsighted, and well designed and structured. It is now up to the political decision makers to make this community effective and efficient. As ASEAN Community integration is a process, modifications will have to be undertaken along the way. This will increase the regional stability or, in ASEAN terminology, the "regional resilience". But there is also the possibility of emerging destabilising factors, such as international geoeconomic conflicts and domestic problems of the respective countries. Therefore, ASEAN experts and analysts as well as the political elite are using comprehensive security approaches for threat analysis. These concepts are more suitable to increase regional peace and stability, as compared to the former nearly unilateral military approach during the Cold War. At the moment, almost all ASEAN security experts are taking into consideration risk potentials such as economic protectionism, the consequences of arms proliferation, the security of the SLOCs, terrorism and migration, because in the short-term and middle-term analysis major military conflicts are not very likely, despite the existent and in some areas increasing (maritime) military developments. Against this backdrop, (maritime) cooperation possibilities for countries outside of ASEAN are increasing and will be welcomed by ASEAN decision makers.

Notes

1. The ASEAN Community 2015 is comprised of three pillars, namely the ASEAN Political–Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Each pillar has its own Blueprint, and, together with the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Strategic Framework and IAI Work Plan Phase II (2009–2015), they form the "Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015." http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview (accessed August 29, 2015). ASEAN Secretariat Resources http://www.asean.org/resources/publications/asean-publications/item/roadmap-for-an-asean-community-2009-2015
2. BIMSTEC members: Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, all 1997; Nepal, Bhutan in 2004.
3. TPSEP signatory states: Brunei–Darussalam, Chile, Singapore and New Zealand.
4. Gunleik Groven, "Chinese Ramblings". http://china.gunleik.com/?page_id=352 (accessed August 29, 2015).

5. See: Paula Stern, "US Economic Policy in Asia at a Crossroads: The Challenge Facing the New Clinton Administration," in *CSIS: US–Thai Leadership Council, Conference Report, Bangkok, March 6–8, 1993*, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] 1993), p. 37.
6. See: Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, ed. *Vademekum Seskoad* (Bandung, Indonesia: Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, 1987), p. 100ff. Further reading: Margaret Sprout and H. Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," in *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, ed. James N. Rosenau (The Free Press, New York, 1969), p. 41ff.
7. See: The Independent Commission on International Development Issues, *North–South: A Programme for Survival* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1980).
8. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1994, Chapter 2. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf (accessed July 18, 2015).
9. ASEAN Secretariat Resources "ASEAN Political Security Community" (2009) http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community related pdf file under: http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-18.pdf (accessed 29 August 2015)
10. APSC demands "promote ASEAN Maritime Cooperation" in point A.2.5 of the APSC Blueprint. ASEAN Secretariat Resources "ASEAN Political Security Community" (2009) http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community related pdf file under: http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-18.pdf (accessed 29 August 2015)
11. Due to the complexity of NTS and its repercussions to the ASEAN 2015 process, the Human Development Forum Foundation (HDFF, www.hdff.org) a registered Thai foundation run with the support of The Asia Foundation since 2013, has put out a quarterly Chairman Circle under the headline "ASEAN 2015 – Challenges and Opportunities" covering the main NTS issues. Related papers and presentations are available on the website or can be requested via info@hdff.org.
12. Dr. Apichai Sunchindah, mid-term evaluator of the ASCC at HDFF's Chairman Circle on March 25, 2014, in Bangkok
13. These recommendations were discussed and developed during the August 6, 2013, HDFF Chairman's Circle in Bangkok with the participation of Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, former ASEAN Secretary General.
14. ASEAN Secretariat. "The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response." http://www.asean.org/resources/publications/asean-publications/item/asean-agreement-on-disaster-

management-and-emergency-response-aadmer-work-programme-2010-2015-4th-reprint (accessed July 19, 2015).

15. ASEAN Secretariat. "Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP)." July 26, 2005. http://www.scribd.com/doc/112149284/Standard-Operating-Procedure-for-Regional-Standby-Arrangements-and-Coordination-of-Joint-Disaster-Relief-and-Emergency-Response-Operations-SASOP (accessed July 19, 2015).
16. Several experts during HDFF's Chairman Circles on November 25, 2014, and on March 24, 2015.
17. See: "NATO's Role in Confronting International Terrorism", Atlantic Council Policy Paper (June 2004), p. 2ff. Richard A. Clarke & Barry R. McCaffrey. The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington.
18. The unprecedented media violence of the Islamic State or Daeshwith is condemned also by many Muslim scholars which is why it is in this paper placed under terrorism, not under religious fanaticism.
19. Here are some of the recommendations given by UNODC and other experts during HDFF's Chairman Circle on March 24, 2015:
    - ASEAN members should develop a comprehensive counter-narrative strategy to fight against the spread of Daesh extremism values in Southeast Asia. To this end, governments and civil society need to collaborate to develop a form of communication using social media to reach young people as they are mostly the target of the Daesh recruitment;
    - ASEAN members should develop common policies as well as legal tools and mechanisms to eradicate the Daesh and affiliates in the region. Developing regional policies and synchronising ASEAN members' national policies are important so that all relevant agencies can be on the same page in facing serious Daesh threats;
    - ASEAN members need to prepare for the return of the Daesh FTF by developing related tracking, prevention and rehabilitation programmes.