READING CHINA’S DEFENCE WHITE PAPERS - EXORCISING BIAS, FOILING DISINFORMATION
Date : 26-08-2019
Author:
Rana Divyank Chaudhary
China remains an inexhaustible font of ‘breaking
news’ in contemporary international politics. Reporting and analysing each
document originating from Beijing is an exercise in perpetuity and there is a
veritable race to put forth unique analyses of the ‘fine-print’ in the Chinese
Communist Party’s official propaganda and pronouncements. While ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and acts
of terrorism engender the conviction that humanity’s violent instincts have not
receded in any significant measure, China’s periodic posturing entices another
part of our consciousness — one that harbours suspicion and engenders alarm and
apprehension. Even as reportage about
the death and destruction caused by conflicts between organised human interests
brings sorrow, lament, and cynicism about the prospects of peace in our times, paying
heed to China’s pronouncements rests on the bottom-line that the calamity to
end all calamities might well be the one involving this country, which
incorporates within it, more than one-fifth of humanity and, as such, will assuredly
impact everyone else’s vital interests in drastic, albeit varying, proportions. It is important to register these cognitive factors
that loom large in our analysis of China because of two primary reasons:
The first reason
relates to China’s opting to communicate its intentions to the world. The publication of China’s White Papers in
English or other foreign languages arises out of necessity and prudence, as without
these English-language versions, the message being put out by Beijing (in
Mandarin) is liable to be misunderstood or interpreted without context by
foreign translators. However, in the
particular case of Defence White Papers, these are also ready tools for
disinformation, remoulding unfavourable perceptions, creating confusion, and proffering
‘insights’ to those on the outside, looking in.
Of course, China is not alone in this and it would be hasty to attribute
hostile intentions without first acknowledging that all nations, without
exception, practice this craft. Not only
does the Communist Party of China (CPC) generate such documents in order to
create a convincing portrayal of the Chinese government’s stated goals,
intentions, plans, capacities, and capabilities, but it also does so in order
to erect an edifice (facade?) of the Chinese State that is palatable to outside
observers. In other words, these
documents use internationally comprehensible and conventionally accepted
phraseology to make catchy references to the international system, inter-State power
politics, China’s national interests, sovereign rights, internal conflicts,
security strategy, and so on. They carry
recognisable encoded hints and suggestions that are ‘meant’ to be decoded and
interpreted as originally intended.
For instance,
consistent references have been made in all of China’s Defence White Papers to US
hegemony in the world; China’s peaceful intentions and commitment to not
seeking hegemony; and “active defence” as the “strategic guidance for China’s
national defence. This consistency does
not, however, make for any real predictability in terms of China’s
behaviour. For instance, it would be
foolish to extrapolate from the “active defence” doctrine to conclude that
China would not attack an adversary pre-emptively, especially, if it makes
strategic sense to future Chinese planners who will certainly have the tactical
means available should they want to use them.
The irony of China “exercising its national sovereignty” to
militarise islands and reefs in the South China Sea and then promising to “firmly
uphold” freedom-of-navigation, is not lost upon the international community.
The second
reason why it is so important to pay attention to why and how we read Chinese
official documents is that the analysts’ own cognitive biases further
exacerbate the problems, diminishing the accuracy of both, interpretation and prediction. For instance, an inordinate amount of
attention is paid to the number of times a particular word, phrase or term
occurs in a given White Paper, despite the fact that this does not really add value
to analysis. For instance, “the US”,
“India”, and “Pakistan” appear 24, 16, and 12 times in the 2019 White Paper. Knowing the history and the current state of
China’s relations with these countries, it would be patently wrong to use these
numerical values as the basis upon which to rank their importance to China. Another hobbling factor is the ‘framing
effect’, which results from the manner in which certain information is
presented, either without context or in an unrelated context. This can cause or enable an analyst to ignore
what has been omitted and over-emphasise such portions as are available and have
been neatly, albeit incorrectly contextualised.
This also causes one to erroneously miss connections between the
presented information and its original context.
For instance, the reference to the People’s Liberation Army “taking
effective measures to create favourable conditions for the peaceful resolution
of the Donglang (Doklam) standoff” has probably been inserted solely for consumption
by Indian analysts. It is intended to be
seen within India as a signal that the standoff is not over (at least as far as
China is concerned) while simultaneously appearing to offer an olive branch against
the backdrop of India’s ostensible “re-calibration” in its China-policy.
The foregoing
arguments are neither intended to assert that China’s Defence White Papers are
inconsequential documents nor that their truth-value is entirely questionable. They do, indeed, indicate China’s
acknowledgment of the normative trend towards greater transparency in
publishing, in howsoever limited extent, official doctrines on matters which
could potentially escalate into conflicts.
However, one must appreciate that for a political system which was extremely
impenetrable until a decade ago, publishing comprehensive documents detailing
the government’s outlook represents a very significant challenge. Beijing-based planners are hardly likely to
be unaware that the outside world would, per force, be a major factor in
China’s formulation of its strategic response to real or potential external
challenges. As a consequence, it is
extremely unlikely that the exercise of publication of these White Papers is being
carried out without their having been vetted at the highest levels of Chinese
government and approvals for their publication would have been accorded by the
most powerful organs of the State.
This article seeks
to provide a caution to Indian analysts and China-watchers by underscoring at
least some of the several infirmities that currently dominate the strategic and
analytical discourse, particularly in India.
Succeeding Commentaries will highlight, in greater detail, specific
issues in the 2019 Defence White Paper pertaining to China’s maritime interests
and capabilities.
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*Rana
Divyank Chaudhary is an Associate Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation
(NMF), New Delhi. The views expressed in the article, are his own and do not
reflect the position of the NMF. He can be reached at associatefellow3.nmf@gmail.com
.
Department:Experts View