SOUTH KOREA POISED TO COMMIT TO THE US’S STRAIT OF HORMUZ MARITIME COALITION
Date : 22-08-2019
Author: Alexander M.
Hynd*
Date: 22 August 2019
The South Korean naval destroyer
ROKS Gang Gam Chan departed Peninsula waters on August 13, 2019, as part of a
regular deployment of the Cheonghae Unit task force, which has, since 2009,
played a stellar role in safeguarding international shipping from the threat of
piracy off the coast of Somalia. By the
end of its month-long voyage to begin its deployment in the region, however, it
appears likely that the 4,400-ton warship will have a new mission — as part of
a US-led naval coalition in the Strait of Hormuz.
A downward spiral in relations between Washington and Tehran since
2018 has succeeded
in firmly reestablishing the Strait of Hormuz as a critically important
maritime security flashpoint. Around
20% of global
oil supplies pass through the narrow waterway, which runs between the coasts of
Iran and Oman. Following Iranian threats to close the strait, the Trump administration has pressed Seoul and other US partners to send naval assets to
the area, with mixed
results.
South Korea now looks poised to be amongst the first to contribute to the
initiative, with one senior ruling party official being quoted (anonymously) in
local media as stating, “We have decided to send troops to the Strait
of Hormuz by expanding the operational area of the Cheonghae Unit, which is
already active in the Gulf of Aden.”
Three main factors have played a part in Seoul’s apparent willingness to
take part in this US-led maritime security initiative.
First, South Korea remains bound to its longstanding alliance with the
US, and has a history of contributing to Washington’s military campaigns
in an attempt to boost the two States’ bilateral relationship. During recent visits to Seoul, US National
Security Advisor, John
Bolton, and US
Secretary of Defense, Mark
Esper, both
reportedly raised the issue with their counterparts, applying additional
diplomatic pressure on the US’s junior partner. South Korea is also believed to have linked
its participation with a contentious dispute over cost-sharing for the stationing of US troops
in South Korea, with one Moon-administration official calling a South Korean naval deployment in the Strait of
Hormuz a “bargaining chip” in upcoming negotiations. Meanwhile, at a domestic level, the
left-leaning Moon-administration is also sensitive to conservative critiques that it is not sufficiently committed to upholding
the US alliance, a political vulnerability that the ruling party will be keen
to minimise ahead of looming elections in 2020.
Second, contributing to the US’s Strait-of-Hormuz-coalition provides the
South Korean State with an opportunity to play an expanding role in maintaining
international order, in line with its self-identified status as a ‘middle power’. The South Korean Navy, in particular, has been
rapidly developing its capabilities since the mid-1990s, with a blue-water
naval strategy that seeks
to respond to changes in the South’s strategic environment, including the
vulnerability of its international shipping trade routes. This extends to the Strait of Hormuz, through which
an estimated 80% of Seoul’s crude-oil imports pass. In July 2019, Defence Ministry Deputy
Spokesperson, Ro Jae-cheon, pointed to this as potential justification for
joining the US coalition, arguing that “It is obvious that we have to protect our
ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz, isn’t it?”
Third, the Navy’s Cheonghae Unit provides a convenient vessel through
which to facilitate South Korean participation in the initiative. The unit’s existing deployment in the Gulf of
Aden places it comparatively close to the Strait of Hormuz, and it has prior
experience of being used in diverse missions from Libya to the Gulf
of Guinea. Moreover, if troop numbers involved in the
deployment are not increased beyond the current levels of around 300, the Moon-administration
would not need to seek further approval from South Korea’s National
Assembly in order to expand the mission set to the Strait of Hormuz.
Despite these strong incentives for Seoul to participate in the US’
maritime coalition, there has been pushback to the proposal. Some commentators have blamed the US for escalating tensions with Iran, and
suggested that the presence of the South Korean Navy could further inflame
tensions. Further, the undetected crossing
of a North Korean fishing vessel into South Korean waters in June exposed local vulnerabilities in the South’s maritime-security
operations. Any repeat of such incidents
could once again aggravate debate over the wisdom of Seoul’s desire to project sea
power internationally while maintaining focus on its defense of peninsula
waters.
Iran, which conducts a large amount of trade with South Korea, has also voiced its
opposition to the possibility of Seoul’s involvement in the coalition. Iranian
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Seyyed Abbas Mousavi pointed to “amicable economic ties” between Seoul
and Tehran as a strong disincentive to South Korean participation, warning that
“If South Korea joins a coalition organized against Iran, we won’t take that
as a positive signal.”
For now, alliance concerns and a desire to enhance the South’s
international status appear likely to have trumped Seoul’s fears of maritime
overreach and angering Iran. Certainly,
a limited deployment in the form of the Cheonghae Unit is currently viewed as
more of an opportunity than a risk. Yet,
the danger remains that any major maritime provocation from the North could
lead to controversy — if an expanded role for the South’s naval forces is
perceived to have focused on the Strait of Hormuz to the detriment of Peninsula
security.
********************************
*Alexander M. Hynd is
Korea Chapter President at the Center for International Maritime Security
(CIMSEC), Washington D.C. He works as a security analyst in Seoul, South Korea.
The views expressed are his own, and do not reflect the position of his
employers or the NMF. He can be reached at alexandermhynd@gmail.com
Department:Experts View