LONG RANGE IDENTIFICATION AND TRACKING (LRIT) by Cdr BK Verma*

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Date : 02-03-2009

www.maritimeindia.org

Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT)

                                                                                     Cdr. B. K. Verma*

In the post cold war era threats to maritime trade seem more likely to emerge from regional instability, piracy and non-state players than through conventional wars. Disruption in any of the critical routes due these threats or any accident would directly impact the world economics and thereby the geostrategic equations. The recent incidents of piracy in the Aden corridor are just an apt indicator. Globalization of the world economy and the interdependence of nations thereof, on foreign trade, have ensured that the security of global maritime trade remains as critical. Maritime terrorism, illegal arms and drug trafficking, piracy etc thus continues to remain the scourge of many nations. 

In an effort to enhance maritime safety, International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2000 adopted a new requirement to provide identification at sea. The requirement was to carry onboard ships an Automatic Identification System (AIS), capable of providing its positional and identification information to other ships and to coastal authorities automatically1 . This requirement was made compulsory through a revised new Chapter V of SOLAS. The AIS is mandatory for all ships above 300 GRT engaged on international voyages as also cargo ships above 500 GRT not engaged on international voyages. It is applicable to all passenger ships, irrespective of size. The requirement became effective by 31 Dec 04 required ships to maintain AIS in operation at all times except where international agreements, rules or standards provided for the protection of navigational information. The enabling of AIS, a V/UHF range system (approx 30-50 Nm), immensely improved the visibility and identification of ships at sea. 

Taking this further, the US and other countries deliberated on means of enhancing maritime security at the IMO. These measures were discussed during the development of the special measures to enhance maritime security during the 2002 SOLAS Conference at the IMO. The mandatory security measures, adopted in Dec 02, included a number of amendments to the 1974 SOLAS.2 One such amendment pertained to the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.3 Ship and Port Facility security is a risk management activity wherein the action could be to eliminate the source of the threat, being the most effective course, or the risk reduction approach to lessen possibilities to the lowest practicable. The ISPS Code provided a standardized, consistent framework for managing risk and permitting the meaningful exchange and evaluation of information between Contracting Governments, companies, port facilities, and ships. The comprehensive security regime for international shipping entered into force on 1 July 2004. The Conference also adopted Resolution 3, for ‘further work by the IMO pertaining to Enhancement of Maritime Security’ and Resolution 10 for ‘Early Implementation of Long Range Ship’s Identification and Tracking (LRIT). 

international voyages and mobile offshore drilling units. The system envisaged automatic transmission of position data by ships every 6 hours, as a structured message for subsequent dissemination to contracting nations. Thus whilst LRIT position updates were not continuous, the transmission were to be made to the designated Data Centre and not directly to port or coastal state. The users would receive information through their nominated Data Centre via a system of International Data Exchange(IDE) and previously mandated Data Distribution Plan (DDP). Thus, a nation could specify the frequency of reports and ranges desired as also prescribe if it wanted to deny the data to any country. Further, SAR services of contracting government were envisaged to receive free LRIT info in relation to search and rescue of persons in distress at sea. Though the proposal for LRIT implementation was taken up for discussion at IMO on a number of occasions, consensus could not be achieved on two issues. The first was concerning access of LRIT information irrespective of location and second, the tracking distance or period that should be established. Concerns were also aired about the vulnerability of shipping data held with the Data Centers. 

During deliberations, the US proposed 2000 Nm from coast as the control area for tracking movement of ships. This was consistent with its policy of Advanced Notice of Arrival (ANOA) of 96hrs for an average speed of 20 kts. However, a large number of members, including China, recommended 200 NM, as provisioned in UNCLOS for ensuring the freedom of navigation. It may be understood that though the UNCLOS authorizes national jurisdiction up to 200 NM, it does not actually forbid any tracking of vessels beyond this limit. The LRIT information envisages to only include the ship’s identity, her location and the port it is proceeding. It may be remembered that warships are not required to comply with the LRIT stipulations. The following factors could dictate the limit for tracking distance from a coastal state:- 

- The geographical location of the country and her proximity to other nations.
- Areas of sea interest. 

- Proximity to shipping lanes and choke points.

- Threat perceptions.

- Response time including organizational setup and response capabilities in terms of ship borne and airborne surveillance resources.

- Cost implications.

In Indian context, the choke points that envelop our strategic area of interest are Bab el Mandeb (1300 NM) and Strait of Hormuz (950 NM) to the West, Cape of Good Hope to the South and the Malacca Strait (1313 NM) to the East. In addition very busy sea lanes pass close to the mainland which sees heavy traffic density as depicted in Figure 2. On an average, approximately 1200 ships are present each day within 1000 NM of the Indian coast. Further the International Maritime Bureau, Kuala Lumpur recognizes Malacca strait and the Somalia Coast as hot spots on the piracy and maritime terrorism map which poses additional security concerns. It would be essential to have real time data on all vessels entering our area of interest through these choke points. As the density of traffic through these choke points into our area of interest is very high, a credible reaction time is required to evaluate threat perceptions and validation. Thus it was prudent to source positional report to upto 1000 NM from our coastline. 

In subsequent deliberations at IMO, the council mandated that SOLAS Contracting Governments will be entitled to receive information about ships navigating within a distance not exceeding 1000 NM off their coast. It appeared that in light of divergent views held, the 81st session resorted to a midway measure of adopting 1000 NM limit. However it did meet our concerns as highlighted previously. The regulation foresaw a phased-in implementation schedule for ships constructed before its expected entry into force date of 01 Jan 09. It also identifies which authorities may have access to LRIT information. Further no interface is envisaged between LRIT and AIS. 

Under LRIT, nations can source positional reports in three capacities namely Flag State, Port State and Coastal State. As a port state, nations are entitled to receive position data from the time a ship makes its intent to visit the port, irrespective of 1000 NM limit. LRIT information would be provided to Contracting Governments and SAR services, 

upon request, through a system of national, Regional, Cooperative and International LRIT Data Centres. Each Administration would provide to the selected LRIT Data Centre a list of the ships entitled to fly its flag-which would be required to transmit LRIT information. These ships would be transmitting LRIT information data, only to the LRIT Data Centre selected by administration. However, it maintains the right of flag states to protect information about the ships entitled to fly their flag, where appropriate, while allowing coastal state access to information about ships navigating off their coasts. 

The cost implication of putting in place such system was a big bone of contention. During the deliberations at IMO, entities with greater shipping tonnage argued, with success, that the cost for LRIT should be borne by the state and not the shipping fraternity. Thus cost for transmissions of position reports by ships were to be borne by the Flag states. The financial implications, thus, were clearly on setting up of the data centers, cost of transmission of reports and on the cost of each report sought. It was estimated that if four reports were sought by nations, the average cost per report could be in the region of 25 cents. 

The Data Centers would be the transiting hubs for sourcing report as well as billing. For eg, if India demanded report of all ships with 1000 NM, then data of all ships present within the envelop would be sourced from different Data Centre’s and made available to India’s Data Centre. Subsequently, respective Data Centre would forward billing charges to India’s Data Centre. Thus if reports sought from a particular Data Centre were low, keeping overhead running costs constant, the cost of the report sought would be higher. Further, the cost for the International Data Exchange, the logic for ensuring flow of data between data centers, and the LRIT Coordinator also needed to be shared. This put severe constraints on the financial viability of the Data Centre and thereby on the implementation of LRIT. However, with constant backing from US, the implementation of LRIT has continued. In fact, US had also offered to host and operate both the IDE as well as an International Data Centre4 (for countries that do not wish to setup a DC or partake in a Cooperative DC), on gratis terms till the arrangements were put in place. The offer of US for the IDC was viewed with suspicion by many nations on the count that the data would be resident with US and could be used for other purposes. 

Whilst a number of states such as US, Russia, Marshall Island etc have setup National Data Centers5 , certain others such as EU6 have gone ahead with the concept of Regional Data Center. Due to cost implications as also perceived irrelevance of the LRIT, a number of nations have decided not to setup a Data Centre and have opted for Cooperative Data Centre. India has decided to setup a National Data Center at DG Shipping premises at Mumbai with the assistance of M/s Antrix/ISRO. The nodal agency in India for LRIT is the DG Shipping and the other stakeholders include the maritime enforcement agencies, shipping companies and the port authorities. Whilst the Application Service Provider is M/s CMC, the Communication Service Provider would be M/s Tata Communications.

 Though the deadline of 31 Dec 08, has elapsed, the implementation of LRIT could not be executed due lack of conformity by all contracting nations. IMSO7 , the LRIT 
Coordinator8, is still grappling with the task of setting up the IDE and DDP. Therefore, in Dec 2008, IMO agreed to transitional arrangements until 30 June 2009, following legal implementation on 31 December 2008. However, the United States, amongst others, have advised IMO that after 30 June 09, ships could be detained if their flag state has not fully implemented LRIT.9 International Chamber of shipping (ICS) has stressed to governments that imposing sanctions against shipping for non-compliance with LRIT measures that are the responsibility of administrations, and beyond the control of ships, would be inappropriate and unacceptable.

Though India has indicated its intent to IMO to set up a National Data Center, it might be prudent in the country’s interest to expand it to a Regional Data Center. It may be of some interest to note that participation of South Asian countries at the IMO deliberations, particularly the Arabian and Bay of Bengal littorals has been minimal. The cold response could be attributed primarily due the cost factor, technological issues as well as threat perception. Further neither of these countries has a sizeable merchant marine that would make them a key player. Expanding the National Data Centre to Regional one augurs well for both for India as well as the littoral countries. In fact, the services could be offered on only use basis thereby reducing cost implications and thus acceptance. There is thus a need to proactively pursue diplomatically and gain consensus for a Regional Data Center which could also include countries on the fringes such as Oman, Kenya, Mauritius etc. In the larger sense it would ensure larger domain awareness at significantly lesser cost implications. This would also have way for larger participation in India’s other initiative of developing coastal security framework such as national AIS Network, tracking mechanism for minor crafts etc. This could be taken on the IONS forum for ascertaining consensus. 

It suffices to say that the world economic trade literally moves on the ocean and will continue to do so. It is important to realize that the threat of maritime terrorism and piracy are prevalent today. During the past few years, a number of initiatives have been seen towards improving and defining the maritime security environment. These issues have been ‘in primacy’ only due to the perceived threat of maritime terrorism and Piracy. These initiatives were towards processing and managing a ‘Recognizable Maritime Picture’ to enhance security environment in day to day operations. Whilst it’s all too apparent that the LRIT initiative is literally a development over the USCG ANOA and is being driven by US, one should look at the benefits that could accrue. The availability of data on merchant traffic, justifiably, raises concerns wherein the same could be used by adversaries to target a nation economically. However the LRIT initiative and the issue of data security need to be evaluated in the present concerns of the world. What needs to be analyzed is – the pros of such initiative in enhancing maritime security against terrorism and piracy as against the cons of such data falling in hand of adversary which in times of war could be used to target the nation economically. The operational implications, thus, are much deep rooted than what is apparent and there is a need to review our operational tactics to address the challenges thus posed. Positional inputs from LRIT would provide maritime domain awareness upto 1000 NM from our coastline which will indeed enhance maritime security. 

Whilst there have been hurdles in pursuing the LRIT initiative, the technological advances in the recent past also seem to threaten the same. The AIS, being V/UHF based, has been exploited within its restriction for coastal surveillance through institution of Costal AIS Networks. In the recent past there have been developments wherein efforts have been made to capture the AIS signatures through a Low Earth Satellite (LES). With low orbital period, these LES provide periodicity of approximately 2 to 3 hours. A Canadian firm, M/s COMDEV International10 is carrying out development work in the area of maritime domain awareness. In Apr 08, the firm placed a payload on the PSLV launched from Sriharikota and the payload is 

successfully capturing the AIS signatures of the vessels in its orbital footprint and transmitting back at intervals of about 2 to 3 hours. In a press release, the firm intimated that it had validated the advanced space-based AIS performance capability which COM DEV has developed. In fact, the firm plans to place several of such payloads on various satellites being launched to cover the globe. The firm has also been awarded an $8.6 million contract to design, build and launch a micro-satellite for the Government of Canada. The Maritime Monitoring and Messaging Micro-satellite (M3MSat) is a technology demonstration mission which will be launched in 201011. M3MSat is expected to demonstrate the full capability of advanced spaced-based AIS (Automatic Identification System) technology developed by COM DEV. This initiative prima facie appears to provide faster positional updates with significant lesser cost implications. This could then also threaten the concept of LRIT and needs to be evaluated. 

Whilst we are at the threshold of entering an LRIT enabled maritime awareness domain, it would be prudent to put in place procedures and setup in place that would maximize the data received. DG Shipping, in partnership with Navy and ICG, is setting up the infrastructure with assistance of M/s Antrix. 

LRIT and the maritime domain awareness are relevant to DG Shipping, Navy and ICG which would need joint effort in enhancing the overall effectiveness through following:- 

(a) A joint mechanism comprising DG Shipping, Navy and ICG to coordinate and manage the LRIT. 

(b) A separate and dedicated body to effectively address the data management and analysis body through scientifically derived procedures. 

(c) Integration of LRIT into the coastal surveillance schemes (namely radar and AIS chain) to arrive at a seamless recognized picture. 

(d) Rationale approach, through sharing, towards meeting the expenditure incurred. 

(e) Discourage individualistic attempt at LRIT utilization. 

 

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* Cdr BK Verma is a Research Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation. He has been involved specifically in Ocean Management Issues for the last three years and is currently working on a Coastal Security Issues’. The officer was involved in LRIT implementation and also participated at IMO deliberations on LRIT as part of the Indian Delegation. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Maritime Foundation. The Author may be reached at bkverma@maritimeindia.org

 

Notes and References

1 AIS Transponders, http://www.imo.org (accessed January 03, 2009) 

2 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, http://www.imo.org (accessed January 20, 2009) 

3 Maritime Security, www.imo.org (accessed January 20, 2009)

4 Para 5, Guidance on Implementation of LRIT IMO MSC Circular MSC.1/Circ 1298 dated 08 Dec 2008, www.imo.org (accessed January 20, 2009)

5 LRIT, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_Range_Identification_and_Tracking (accessed January 20, 2009)

6 EU LRIT System & Data Centre, https://extranet.emsa.europa.eu. Also EMSA Selects CLS to deliver European LRIT Data Centre, http://www.cls.fr/documents /solutions/ maritime /news/2008-11- 06_press_release_EMSA-LRIT-CLS_en.pdf (accessed January 20, 2009) 

7 The International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO) is the intergovernmental organization that oversees certain public satellite safety and security communication services provided via the INMARSAT satellites

8 LRIT Coordinator, http://www.imso.org/whatisimso_UK.asp (accessed January 20, 2009) 

9 International Shipping Federation Monthly Newsletter Jan 2009, www.marisec.org/news/index.htm (accessed January 20, 2009) 

10 http://www.comdevintl.com (accessed January 20, 2009)

11 COM DEV Awarded AIS Micro-Satellite Contract with Canadian Government, http://www.gisdevelopment.net/news (accessed January 20, 2009)

Department:NMF Exclusive