

PAGE LAYOUT AND STYLE SHEET FOR NMF PRINT PUBLICATIONS*

PAGE LAYOUT

Title

(Georgia, 14, Bold, Initial Capitals, Centre-aligned, no underlining)

Author's name*

(Georgia, 12, Initial Capitals, Right Aligned)

Date

(e.g. 03 August 2015, right-aligned)

Plain text (First line not indented, Georgia, 12, 18 spacing, exactly)

(a)...(b) ... (use alphabetical ordering within paragraphs in sentence form from left to right.

Plain text (Second para first line indented by 0.5, Georgia...)

Group Heading (Georgia, 14, Bold, Initial Capitals, justified)

Sub-group Heading (Georgia, 14, Bold, Italicize, Initial Capitals, justified)

Plain text (First line not indented, Georgia, 12, 18 spacing, exactly)

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(Use bullets to enumerate elaborate points)

Second line of a bullet not indented and should come right under the bullet marker.

**(Author's name) is (designation), National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed are his/her own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Indian Navy, the NMF or the Government of India. He/she can be reached at (email ID).*

Notes

All references in endnotes, only Arabic numerals in superscript e.g. ¹, Left-Aligned

1. Georgia, 10, Single spacing, all hyper-links removed.

[All text in English U.K.]

*Other than Maritime Affairs journal.

STYLE

Authors are responsible for ensuring that their manuscripts conform to the given style. The Editors will not undertake retyping of manuscripts before publication. Use Figures for denoting numbers 11 and above. **British spellings are to be used (eg. colour, neighbour).** Subheadings and sub-sub-headings should be unambiguously marked on the copy.

Title: The title of the article should clearly convey its aim.

Abstract: This is an indented summary of around 100_150 words describing the objective, main arguments and conclusions of the article. (Only applicable for Research Papers)

Article text: All diagrams, charts and graphs should be referred to as figure and should be consecutively numbered. Source tables should be kept to a minimum and contain only essential data. Each figure and table must be given an Arabic numeral, followed by a heading, and be referred to in the text.

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FOOTNOTE NUMBERS

- In the text, the footnote number must come after the period/full-stop. (Not applicable for View Points, which are not referenced)
- In case a sentence ends with a quotation, insert the closing quotation marks after the period/full stop, followed by the footnote number.

- In Short, this is how the Commas, Quotation Marks and Footnote Numbers Should Appear in the Text and References:

DO'S	DON'TS
"	",
,12	12,
"	".
.12	12.
p.123 (no space)	p. 123
pp.123-185 (no space)	pp. 123-185

FOR CITATIONS (Not applicable for View Points, which are not referenced)

Books

One Author

Wendy Doniger, *Splitting the Difference* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 65.

Two Authors

Guy Cowlishaw and Robin Dunbar, *Primate Conservation Biology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 104_7.

Four or more authors

Randall, John E. et al., *Fishes of the Great Barrier Reef and Coral Sea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), p. 262.

Editor, Translator, or Compiler Instead of Author

Richmond Lattimore, trans., *The Iliad of Homer* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 91_92.

Editor, Translator, or Compiler in Addition to Author

Yves Bonnefoy, *New and Selected Poems*, ed. John Naughton and Anthony Rudolf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 22.

Chapter or Other Part of a Book

Andrew Wiese, "The House I Live In': Race, Class, and African American Suburban Dreams in the Postwar United States," in *The New Suburban History*, ed. Kevin M. Kruse and Thomas J. Sugrue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 101_2.

Chapter of an Edited Volume Originally Published Elsewhere (as in primary sources)

Quintus Tullius Cicero. "Handbook on Canvassing for the Consulship," in Rome: Late Republic and Principate, ed. Walter Emil Kaegi Jr. and Peter White, vol. 2 of University of Chicago Readings in Western Civilization, ed. John Boyer and Julius Kirshner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 35.

Preface, Foreword, Introduction, or Similar Part of a Book

James Rieger, Introduction to Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus, by Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. xx_xxi.

Book Published Electronically

Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., The Founders' Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), <http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/> (accessed June 27, 2006)

Journals

Article in a Print Journal

John Maynard Smith, "The Origin of Altruism," Nature, 393 (1998): 639.

Article in an Online Journal

Hlatky, Mark A., Derek Boothroyd, Eric Vittinghoff, Penny Sharp, and Mary A. Whooley. 2002. Quality-of-life and depressive symptoms in postmenopausal women after receiving hormone therapy: Results from the Heart and Estrogen/Progestin Replacement Study (HERS) trial. Journal of the American Medical Association, 287, no. 5 (February 6), <http://jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v287n5/rfull/joc10108.html#aainfo> (accessed January 7, 2004).

Magazine Article

Steve Martin, "Sports-Interview Shocker", New Yorker, May 6, 2002, p. 84.

Newspaper Article

Nieder Korn, William S. "A Scholar Recants on His 'Shakespeare' Discovery." New York Times, June 20, 2002, Arts section, Midwest edition.

Book Review

James Gorman, "Endangered Species," review of The Last American Man, by Elizabeth Gilbert, New York Times Book Review, June 2, 2002, p. 16.

Thesis or Dissertation

M. Amundin, "Click Repetition Rate Patterns in Communicative Sounds from the Harbour Porpoise, *Phocoena phocoena*" (PhD diss., Stockholm University, 1991), 22_29, p. 35.

Paper Presented at a Meeting or Conference

Brian Doyle, "Howling Like Dogs: Metaphorical Language in Psalm 59" (paper presented at the annual international meeting for the Society of Biblical Literature, Berlin, Germany, June 19_22, 2002).

Website

Evanston Public Library Board of Trustees. "Evanston Public Library Strategic Plan, 2000_2010: A Decade of Outreach." Evanston Public Library. <http://www.epl.org/library/strategic-plan-00.html> (accessed June 1, 2005).

Weblog Entry or Comment

Peter Pearson, comment on "The New American Dilemma: Illegal Immigration," The Becker-Posner Blog, comment posted March 6, 2006, http://www.becker-posnerblog.com/archives/2006/03/the_new_america.html#co80052 (accessed March 28, 2006).

Item in Online Database

Pliny the Elder, *The Natural History*, ed. John Bostock and H.T. Riley, in the Perseus Digital Library, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup_Plin._Nat._1.dedication (accessed November 17, 2005).

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

POINTERS FOR LANGUAGE, USAGE, AND PUNCTUATION

FIGURES & DATES

DO'S	DON'TS
1,200,000 or 1.2 million	12,00,000
100,000	1 lakh or 1,00,000
1 million or 1,000,000	10 lakhs
10 million or 10,000,000	1 crore or 1,00,00,000
10 kms	10kms
1500 MW	1500MW
38 per cent (in text) or 38% (in tables)	38 percent or 38 %
One, two, three....., nine.	1, 2, 3..., 9
figures in millions, billions	in lakhs, crores
per cent	percent
US\$ 35	US\$35 or \$35
US\$ 35 million	US\$35million
9 am	9 a.m.
32 kg	32kg
14 March 2009 (date month year)	March 14, 2009 or 14th March 2009
the 1980s	the 1980's
9/11	911 (this isn't America; Dial 100 for the cop's in Delhi)
29AD	29 AD
12th ASEAN Summit	12 ASEAN Summit

- The names of all newspapers and publications are to be italicized.
- The names of all chemical elements should be in small letters, unless it is their abbreviations that are used. For example, uranium BUT U235 or U238; and plutonium BUT Pu239.
- Whether terms such as jihad and Sharia are italicized within the text depends on how frequently they occur. If they occur very frequently, leave them un-italicized. An argument can be made that these are also now very common terms and should not be italicized. In long research papers, special reports, etc., it's the author's call. In the web articles, we prefer not to use italics for common phrases such as jihad because they require additional work from the formatters. Others will be italicized.

For the below mentioned words, American spellings are to be used.

DO'S	DON'TS
analyze	analyse
institutionalize	institutionalise
modernization	modernisation
capitalization	capitalisation
civilization	civilisation
organization	organisation

Others

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- Please do not use the period or space after initials.

For “QUOTES”

- Use double quotation marks for quotations, and single marks for quotations within quotations.
- While using double quotes please keep in mind that the period will come within the quotes, as in, single quotes are also used to highlight a word or term. Please note that in such usage the period come after the quotes.

ABBREVIATIONS

- Abbreviations including those in common use (BJP, IAEA, DPRK), are spelled out at first occurrence
- No periods are used with abbreviations that appear in full capitals, whether two letters or more, as in BBC, CITU, US and acronyms, as in NATO.
- Ditto for abbreviations that appear in lowercase, as in am, pm.

(Viewpoint Sample)

‘Sea-based’ PLA Navy may not need ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean

Gurpreet S Khurana*

03 August 2015

In May 2015, China released its biennial 2014 Defence [White Paper](#) titled ‘China's Military Strategy’. It indicates that the PLA Navy would undertake a more proactive protection of its interests in ‘open waters’, which implies – albeit implicitly – the waters of the Indian Ocean. The White Paper also brings to the fore PLA Navy’s strategy for the ‘sustenance’ of the forward-deployed naval platforms in these waters through “strategic prepositioning”. What precisely does this mean?

Until lately, strategic analysts worldwide were smitten by the concept of [‘String of Pearls’](#) propounded in 2005 by Booz Allen Hamilton - a US based think-tank. The scholarly extrapolation of China’s increasing geopolitical and strategic presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) led to the prognosis that its port and maritime infrastructure projects in the IOR were precursors to China eventually establishing military bases in the region. In case of an armed conflict, such overseas military bases would be valuable for China to protect its strategic interests in the interests, particularly its crude-oil imports. These bases could provide logistics support the Chinese maritime-military forces in the region *inter alia* in terms of machinery and equipment spare-parts, technical services and ammunition depots, besides general replenishment of fuel, food and water. Analysts in India generally took the lead in the [academic inquiry](#) into the potential of the Chinese military bases in the IOR.

Rattled by the String of Pearls ‘theory’, Beijing decried the military-strategic connotation of its financial and technical assistance to the IOR countries; and devoted

much intellectual capital to prove that its intent was only economic and commercial. Among its efforts in this direction, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) published the June 2013 Blue Book called '[Development Report in the Indian Ocean](#)'. The Blue Book said that China has no maritime (-military) strategy for the Indian Ocean. The [Maritime Silk Road](#) (MSR) concept initiated by President Xi Jinping later that year in October 2013 was used to reinforce the message that China sought only economic objectives in the IOR.

However, analysts and the media – particularly in India – persisted upon China's doctrinal intent to develop military bases in the IOR, averring that the MSR was only a 'reincarnation' of the 'String of Pearls' concept. Notably, the Indians are not the only ones wary of the potential of PLA Navy's use of the maritime facilities in the IOR. Notwithstanding the strategic convergence between Indonesia's 'global maritime axis' and China's MSR concepts, eminent Indonesian statesmen have advised Jakarta to be cautious since the maritime infrastructure being constructed through MSR could be used by China for '[military penetration](#)'.

In July 2015, [news-reports](#) indicated that Maldives was encouraging foreign entities to own its island territories to undertake land reclamation. Coming amidst the growing anxieties caused by China's controversial "[island -bu il din g](#)" activities in the South China Sea, this reinforced the theory of 'Chinese military bases' in the Indian Ocean. Even while Maldives is under severe strain of the long-term effects of sea-level rise caused by climate change, its government is unlikely to be ignorant of the near-term adverse geopolitical and security consequences of permitting Chinese military bases on its territory. Besides, it is most unlikely that the Chinese would need such bases anyway.

Since 2011, China has been seeking a hub-and-spoke logistics support agreements with the IOR countries like [Seychelles](#) and [Djibouti](#). Undeniably, therefore, China is seeking [access facilities](#) in the Indian Ocean, whether known by the 'String of Pearls' nomenclature, or fructified through the 'MSR Concept'. Some more bilateral pacts may be added over time. However, these are not potential Chinese 'military bases', but agreements for peace-time replenishment of fuel, food and water for Chinese naval

units, something that even India has forged with many countries, including those in the western Pacific littoral.

China's intent to sustain its naval forces in the Indian Ocean through the concept of 'sea-basing' has not been widely noted. The concept refers to a naval capability to undertake overseas military missions of expeditionary nature without reliance on land-based operational logistics and command and control infrastructure, either of home bases or the overseas bases. The concept was developed by the US expeditionary forces, largely due to the increasing constraints to maintain overseas military bases, besides for catering to the emerging concepts of amphibious warfare.

This high probability of the PLA Navy's resort to 'sea-basing' concept is supported by its July 2015 induction of the first '[Mobile Landing Platform](#)' (MLP) similar to the US design. The U.S. expeditionary forces are themselves new to the MLP concept. China is also known to be building naval Logistic Support Ships with roll-on, roll-off (ro-ro) design and bow and stern ramps optimised for amphibious operations.

The numbers of PLA Navy's advanced underway replenishment ships are also increasing. Notably, media reports indicate that in June 2015, China launched its [fifth Type 903A](#) replenishment ship, and more are under construction. With these six new replenishment vessels added to the older fleet tankers, the PLA Navy is clearly being given the means to support distant missions in the IOR.

PLA Navy's own increasing sea-based logistics capability could be supplemented by the capacity of state-owned commercial ships, following the implementation of the [new guidelines](#) for building merchant ships to conform to naval standards. These guidelines called "*Technical Standards for New Civilian Ships to Implement National Defense Requirements*" were approved by the Chinese government in June 2015. The guidelines *lay down not only the provisions* to requisition civilian ships for naval missions, but also *how* future construction of Chinese merchant vessels would need to adhere to naval specifications.

China is also formulating a [‘National Defense Transport Law’](#) to cover the additional financial costs of shipbuilding and insurance for employment for military missions. These commercial vessels are quite numerous. According to statistics from China’s Ministry of Transportation, in 2014, about 2,600 ships are capable of ocean transport, which represents a major element of asymmetry with any major navy operating in the Indian Ocean. The US Navy’s 31 Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) of its Military Sealift Command (MSC) pales in comparison.

The concept of ‘military base’ necessary for executing a full-fledged armed conflict may be a thing of the past. Politico-military manoeuvres in short-of-war situations are more contemporary. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, a maritime-military strategy that combines ‘peacetime replenishment’ with ‘sea-basing’ may be more than adequate for Beijing to meet its national-strategic objectives in the IOR.

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(Issue Brief Sample)

Evolving India-Australia Maritime Interface in the Indian Ocean

Saketha Potlapalli*

31 July 2015

Naval engagements are significant as they are seen as instruments of diplomacy, building trust and confidence between the countries, as also increasing the interoperability between the navies.¹ The Indian Navy (IN) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) have scheduled their first ever combined naval exercises, IN-RAN, in October-November 2015, thereby deepening maritime ties between the two countries. The exercises also indicate the growing convergence of interests between India and Australia in the Indo-Pacific, wherein the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are considered to be “interdependent economic and strategic spaces, particularly in relation to maritime security of the long Asian littoral.”²

India-Australia Relations

Relations between India and Australia have undergone a number of ups and downs due to a number of political and strategic factors. First, during the Cold War era, India took a non-aligned stand, whereas Australia aligned itself with the USA. Second, India’s nuclear program was a major irritant in India-Australian ties. Third, India was preoccupied with its volatile neighbourhood, whereas the strategic focus of Australia lay in the Pacific Ocean, and it operated in the Asia-Pacific sphere. Lately, however, Canberra seems to be devoting much emphasis on its western maritime theatre of the Indian Ocean. The growing relevance of India in the regional dynamics is an important factor in Australia’s altered strategic calculus.

Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper articulated the Indo-Pacific as the ‘logical extension’ of the Asia-Pacific that “adjusts Australia’s priority strategic focus to the arc extending from India through Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia.”³ It also announced Australia’s economic and strategic shift towards the Indo-Pacific. For Australia, the

Indo-Pacific is “driven by the major economic and strategic shifts that are now occurring in broader Asia, including the expansion of the strategic interests of China and India into the core areas of interests.”⁴

Former Australian Senator Gareth Evans had defined Australia as an ‘Indian Ocean nation, with considerable strategic and commercial interests in the region.’⁵ However, Australia’s interests are largely lie in the north-eastern Indian Ocean⁶, encompassing Southeast Asia and Australia’s northwestern border. Australia’s interest in the region also lies in the security of its own gas fields located in the Northwest Shelf.⁷ Australia has been participating in naval operations to ensure maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Yet, Australia preferred the term Asia-Pacific to describe its strategic sphere. It can be argued that the change in terminology from ‘Asia-Pacific’ to ‘Indo-Pacific’ indicates Australia’s desire to include India in its strategic sphere.

Maritime Cooperation

The decision to conduct IN-RAN was taken in 2013, when then Defence Minister AK Antony met with his counterpart Stephen Smith in Australia. The IN and the RAN were involved in naval engagements since the 2000s. The RAN had participated in MALABAR 07 along with navies of India, USA, Japan and Singapore, and has also been involved in MILAN at Port Blair since 2003.

Increased joint naval collaboration, maritime security, and cooperation in various multilateral forums were always on the agenda in the India-Australia ties. Maritime security and piracy was also recognised as a priority area for cooperation.⁸ A stable Indo-Pacific⁹, the security of Asia-Pacific and enhanced cooperation in the Indian Ocean, and freedom of navigation in accordance with UNCLOS¹⁰ were discussed and mentioned in the joint statements released. In Framework for Security Cooperation established in November 2014, India and Australia agreed to hold regular bilateral exercises, annual security dialogues on maritime security, including non-proliferation and disarmament.¹¹

Why India is important to Australia

The liberalization of the Indian economy, the USA-India rapprochement and growing economic relations have paved way for the growing cooperation between India and Australia.¹² India's nuclear program no longer remains an irritant. In September 2014, India and Australia signed the MoU for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. Australia's 2009 Defence White Paper says that India will increasingly become important economically and strategically.¹³ Australia has also said that as New Delhi increases its reach and influence in the region, there is a need to "understand India's strategic thinking" as well as to strengthen defence ties with it.¹⁴ Australia recognises that India will play an instrumental role in maintaining peace and security not only in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) but also in the boarder Indo-Pacific region.¹⁵ Therefore, Australia seems to welcome India's raising naval power.

Australia also sees India as a potential economic partner in the Indo-Pacific region. Being an ally of USA and given its close economic relations with China, Australia risks getting caught in the cross-fire as USA and China contest for hegemony in the region. Given this situation, fostering stronger relations with India would enable Australia to hedge against any economic and security adversity.

Why Australia is important to India

During his visit to Australia, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that Australia would no longer remain on the periphery but would be at the centre of India's vision.¹⁶ Australia is increasingly becoming crucial for India and is important for India's Act East Policy. Developing closer ties with Australia, in addition to good ties with Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and ASEAN, would allow India to become an increasing presence.¹⁷ India also sees Australia as a security partner in the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁸ Apart from this, Australia's resources can also fulfil India's increasing needs in terms of imports of coal, uranium and natural gas.¹⁹

India-Australia Maritime Convergences

Geographically, India and Australia are maritime nations. India is strategically located in the Indian Ocean, whereas Australia is situated on the rim of the India Ocean and Pacific Ocean.²⁰ Maritime security is one area where India and Australia's interests converge, and merit for cooperation.

The China Factor

China's increasing capabilities and aggressive posture in the South China Sea is a cause of concern for India and Australia. For Australia, this could lead to a "disconnect between Australia's economic (China) and strategic (USA) partnerships."²¹ India has an unresolved boundary dispute with China and New Delhi views China's increasing presence in the IOR with suspicion.

Rising China and the threat it posed to the regional order was always a cause of concern. A Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with India, Australia, Japan and USA as its members, was proposed in 2007,²² but the idea was soon abandoned after China reacted strongly against it.

Regional Groupings

Both India and Australia have always believed in strong multilateral forums for a stable region. They have cooperated strongly in several multilateral platforms such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), etc. In 2011, Australia and India were instrumental in placing maritime security issues on the IORA agenda through the formation of a maritime security group.²³ New Delhi and Canberra also agreed to cooperate in various regional and multilateral forums such as the East Asia Summit (EAS); the ASEAN Regional Forum; and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+).²⁴

Southeast Asia

With the intensification of India's Look East, now Act East Policy, and Australia's Look West Policy, Southeast Asia is an area of converging Indian and Australian interests. Australia also sees the Indo-Pacific as a "maritime domain with Southeast Asia at its geographic center."²⁵ The growth of Islamic terrorism is also a security concern. A politically stable Southeast Asia is in the interests of India and Australia. Hence, both the nations have agreed on "counter-radicalisation exchanges".²⁶

Security of SLOCs

Secure and stable SLOCs are of paramount importance for both the nations because of the high volume sea borne trade. More than 90 per cent of India's trade by volume, and 77 per cent by value is sea borne.²⁷ Australia, being a resource rich country, needs free sea lines for its trade and even as it develops its North-West Shelf as a major source of natural gas and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG).²⁸ Any disruption of SLOCs or blocking of choke points would have repercussions for both the Indian and Australian economies. During the Australia-India Security Roundtable held in 2005, participants agreed that Indian and Australian interests converged in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca.²⁹

Non-Traditional Threats

The region is plagued by a number of non-traditional security threats and challenges such as piracy, narcotics, humans and arms trafficking, IUU fishing, natural disasters³⁰, and illegal immigration. Australia's northern shoreline is quite vulnerable to trafficking as well as illegal immigration. Countering these threats is another area for cooperation. Fisheries management³¹/ IUU fishing is also a major challenge for the regional countries, which could be addressed through India-Australia cooperation.

Freedom of Navigation

India and Australia believe that "freedom of navigation in accordance with the principles of international law is critical for the growth and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region."³² Australia reckons that the conflict in South China Sea

has the potential to destabilize the whole region; however, this could be tricky for Australia as China is its largest economic partner.

Scope for Maritime Cooperation

Being major maritime powers, there is a high potential for maritime cooperation between India and Australia, which is being explored. India already plays an important role as a security provider in the Indian Ocean, whereas Australia has started to play an enhanced political and security role in the Indian Ocean. Australia has started also to “rebalance its naval and other defence resources to the Indian Ocean.”³³

Divergences

China

Even as the ‘fear of an unpredictable China’³⁴ is a converging factor in India-Australian relations, the same can also be seen as a divergent factor. Ostensibly, Indian and Australian views on China differ, which could lead to a possible ‘disconnect’ between the two countries. Australia seems to be more tolerant of Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean as it believes that peaceful and stable relations between the USA and China are essential for “continued stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.”³⁵ India, on the other hand, is circumspect on China’s naval build up and increasing presence in the IOR.

Pakistan

Australia has been trying to bring Pakistan on board the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC)³⁶, now renamed as Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Given the turbulent India-Pakistan relations, this could be possible reason for discord. Australia has been assisting Pakistan in capacity building to counter “serious and sophisticated crime” through several training programmes and by supplying “specialist training equipment”.³⁷ Therefore, Australia-Pakistan ties could be seen as potential irritant in the evolving India-Australia ties in the future.

Trilateral Naval Exercises

As India and Australia deepen their maritime relations and enjoy strong ties with the USA, there is a possibility of a trilateral framework in the Indian Ocean. It has been argued that the India-Australia-USA trilateral could 'complement' the already established trilateral framework between India-Japan-USA and Australia-Japan-USA.³⁸

A possible trilateral naval exercise between India-Australia-Japan is also on cards as the high level representatives of the three nations met in New Delhi for discussions in which maritime security topped the agenda. The security of SLOCs is paramount for India, Japan and Australia. The Indian, Japanese and Australian navies have been participating actively in combating piracy and trafficking in IOR. Once again, USA is a common element here. The question is: will the 'Quadrilateral Security Dialogue' be revived? Any sort of trilateral in the region might invite strong reactions from China, as it did during the MALABAR 07 and when the idea of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was first proposed.

The Australian diplomat Peter Varghese had said that the meeting should not be seen as an 'anti-China Front'.³⁹ But China cannot be ignored, as the three nations discussed about freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

Conclusion

With Australia shifting its focus from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific, there will be more interactions between India and Australia in the maritime domain. The combined naval exercises will not only deepen the cooperation, but will also ensure greater coordination between IN and RAN. For Australia, the country of interest in region will primarily be India. Australia also believes that India will play a larger role in maintaining peace and stability in the region. However, the China factor cannot be ignored in the evolving India-Australian maritime cooperation since they share similar views on the freedom of navigation, especially in the South China Sea. Therefore, it will be important to watch China's reaction to the deepening maritime ties between India and Australia, and the possible trilateral ties in the Indo-Pacific.

*The author is a Research Intern, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. The views expressed are her own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF. She can be reached at saketha.potlapalli@gmail.com.

Notes

¹ Indian Maritime Doctrine, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, p.114

² David Brewster, 'The Idea of the Indo-Pacific: What It Means for Australia', *Journal of Indian Ocean Studies*, 14 (2015): 1

³ Defence White Paper 2013, Department of Defence, Australian Government, p.7. http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf (accessed on 12 July, 2015)

⁴ David Brewster, 'Looking West and Acting West', *Seminar*, 52 (2015): 670

⁵ Gareth Evans, 'The Indian Ocean Region: An Australian Perspective', *Lanka Guardian*, 11 (1995): 18

⁶ Sandy Gordon, 'Australia-India', in *Australia as an Asian-Power Regional Power: Friendship in Flux?* (ed.) Brendon Taylor, New York: Routledge, 2007, p.89

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Joint Press Statement on the State Visit of Prime Minister of Australia to India, Ministry of External Affairs, <http://bit.ly/1Aaoffm> (accessed 14 June 2015)

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Minister for Defense and India's Minister of Defence – Joint Statement – Visit of Mr. AK Antony, Defence Minister of India, Ministry of External Affairs, <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/06/05/minister-for-defence-and-indias-minister-of-defence-joint-statement-visit-of-mr-a-k-antony-defence-minister-of-india-to-australia-4-5-june-2013/> (accessed July 19, 2015)

¹¹ Framework for Security Cooperation between India and Australia, Ministry of External Affairs, <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24268/Framework+for+Security+Cooperation+between+India+and+Australia> (accessed 12 June 2015)

¹² Sandy Gordon, 'Australia-India', p.80, n.6

¹³ Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030, Department of Defence, Government of Australia, p.36. http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf (accessed on 17 June 2015)

¹⁴ Ibid, p.96

¹⁵ 2013 Defence White Paper, p.16, n.3

¹⁶ Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Address to the Joint Session of Australian Parliament, <http://www.narendramodi.in/prime-minister-narendra-modis-address-to-the-joint-session-of-the-australian-parliament> (accessed on 17 June 2015)

¹⁷Danielle Rajendraam, 'Modi in Australia: an Unprecedented Level of Engagement', *The Interpreter*, 19 November

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