NMF Exclusive: The ‘Dark Chill’ in the Persian Gulf

Developments in the Persian Gulf in the last week of December 2011 point to an escalation of tensions between Iran and the US. Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if Western governments impose any more sanctions aimed at thwarting its nuclear program. The US has responded by issuing a counter-threat of sorts, warning Iran that it would “do everything within its powers” to make sure the world was not held hostage to Iranian bluster.

In the past, Iran has displayed a penchant for rhetoric in issuing threats of halting oil trade in the Persian Gulf. This has usually served its desired objective of raising oil prices, also highlighting Tehran’s credentials as the player that holds all the strategic cards in the region. In keeping with past practice, Mohammad-Reza Rahimi, Iran’s first vice president indulged in some old-fashioned grand-standing, pronouncing ominously that “If the West imposes sanctions on Iran’s oil exports, then even one drop of oil cannot flow from the Strait of Hormuz.”  Iran’s chief of Naval Staff Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari went a step further saying, “Iran has total control over the strategic waterway. Closing the Strait of Hormuz would be easy for Iranian naval forces.”

The Iranian navy has been carrying out maritime exercises in the Persian Gulf in a vast swath of international waters between the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. Codenamed Velayat 90, these exercises have been going on since December 24 and are scheduled to last about two weeks. Statements by Iranian Naval top brass are meant to underscore Iran’s primacy in the region. As if to drive the point home, Iranian Naval forces test fired missiles during the exercises. Qader, a medium-range missile capable of hitting Bahrain and other US allied Gulf states and another surface-to-surface missile, the Nour, were test fired on the first day of the New Year.

Iran’s testing of missiles is widely being perceived as a sign that it is preparing to up the ante in its tussle with the West. Iran is located only about 150 miles from Bahrain (at its nearest point), and Admiral Sayyari’s suggestion that the missile firings demonstrated Iranian military’s ability to close the Strait, has send shock-waves through the West.

Iran’s display of military might in the Persian Gulf must be seen in the context of contemporary geo-political developments in the region. In October 2011, America claimed to have unearthed an Iranian plan to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to the US. An indignant Tehran protested, saying the allegation was a ruse by the US to muster support for President Obama among the American pro-Israel lobby in an election year, and to distract attention from the US’ own economic woes.

Then, in November 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency issued a report detailing Iranian nuclear weapons plans. The evidence of an operational and active Iranian nuclear weapons program put out by the IAEA only served to further agitate Tehran. As the war of words was heating up, Iranian forces supposedly shot down a US surveillance drone – a move that was construed by the US military as openly hostile. The US congress has now passed a law that has made oil trade with Iran illegal. The law imposes sanctions on financial institutions that deal with Iran's central bank seeks to place out-of-bounds the entire Iranian financial system.

The US’ moves to restrict Iran seem, to a large extent, driven by its concerns about Iran's rising geo-strategic influence. Tehran has been quick to move into the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq. Washington fears that with Tehran already having significant clout in Lebanon and Syria, Iranian influence could, in matter of time, extend all the way to the Mediterranean. But more than the US’ own concerns about expanding Iranian influence, Saudi Arabia has been pressuring the US to act against Tehran. Riyadh is in an ideological and strategic tussle with Tehran and is loathe to the spectacle of an enlarged Iranian sphere of influence.

Iran appears to understand this dynamic well enough. The timing of the maritime exercises and the test firing of missiles indicates that the Iranian leadership is in a defiant mood and has decided to on take on the West in frontal fashion. Hostile statements by its military leaders are meant to signal to the US and its Gulf allies that Iran is not going to be bullied into submission by any Western threats over its nuclear program.

At the same time, Iran would conceivably not jeopardise its own interests in the region by either targeting shipping in the Gulf, or by getting into an open conflict with the US. Realistically speaking, Tehran would probably let its threat of “closure of the Straits” remain notional - its utility confined to deterring additional sanctions by only invoking the spectre of a military confrontation. This would raise shipping insurance rates, leading to international opposition to the sanctions – exactly the end-state Iran desires. The regime’s outwardly hostile stance is doubtless a considered, well thought out and calibrated move, predicated on support from Russia and China, who are expected to oppose any new sanctions on Iran’s oil exports.

But the game of geo-political one-upmanship and military brinkmanship being played out in the region is more than just about national primacy and strategic influence. There are clear domestic advantages of the ‘stand-off’ for both Iran and the US. Iranian leaders might be hoping to show their people how tough they are in defending Iranian interests from foreign challenges. Certainly, making threats is less costly than attacking foreign targets in other Gulf States or Israel. President Obama, will on the other hand be hoping, his firm stand vis-a-vis Iran would have been taken note of by the Israeli lobby (critical for his re-election) and his political detractors who have been portraying him as a weak leader.

There is however a counter-narrative to the dominant view. Some Iran sceptics posit that the Iranian regime is bluffing with its threats to close the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian blustering, they aver, is just another attempt to divert attention from their banned nuclear activities. In reality, Iranian leaders know that any embargo on oil exports would gravely harm their economy. This is because two-thirds of the Iranian government’s revenues are derived from oil exports. Iran’s overall strategy has been to develop its conventional military and nuclear weapons on the sly, rather than act provocatively and precipitate a military conflict with the West.

Notwithstanding the diverse nature of expert opinion on the matter, Iran’s threat to the Persian Gulf cannot be discounted. If American and Iranian naval forces continue to brush-up against each other in the region, there will always be the risk of an inadvertent conflict, caused through a misunderstanding or misperception of each other’s military manoeuvres. The Straits, after all, is only about 35 miles wide (at the narrowest point), with the navigable part only 20 miles wide.

This is not to suggest that Iranian Naval forces will be looking for excuses to take on the US naval might in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s navy perhaps knows that it does not stand much of a chance in an open conflict with the US navy. In the 1980-88 war with Iraq, as well as during the 1988 clash with the US navy (Operation ‘Praying Mantis’) the Iranian navy had suffered the loss of two corvettes (one completely destroyed, the other severely damaged). The Iranian leadership realises the futility of a conventional naval battle against the US. Iran’s navy would therefore likely use asymmetric tactics such suicide attacks on large warships through speed boats, and the mining of the straits.

The Iranian Navy could also use low-level means of following through on its threats. Since international law guarantees freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz (being an international waterway), Iran’s maritime forces may well use ship safety as a pretext for impeding shipping, insisting that tankers slow their speed, travel one at a time at a great distance through the straits.

Should Iran decide to close the Straits, it would be reasonable to expect the U.N. Security Council to take measures to protect the civilian shipping and reopen the waterway. As a member of the UNSC, India should be prepared for such an exigency, where it may be required to support measures against Iran. India’s response would most likely be predicated on the position taken by China and Russia, even though both nations are almost certain to insist on a less vigorous response. The Indian political establishment will however be careful not to be seen supporting any military action against Iran.