

Indonesia's New Maritime Doctrine: Continuity and Change

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Indonesia's new President, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), outlined an ambitious vision for his country as a 'Global Maritime Fulcrum' (GMF) at the 9th East Asia Summit meeting in November 2014. This vision represents a development agenda, which focuses on rebuilding the country's maritime culture as well as expanding its economy. His GMF vision focuses on five key areas: maritime culture; marine resources; archipelagic connectivity; maritime diplomacy; and naval development.¹ The principle aim of the GMF is to improve maritime connectivity and infrastructure by constructing sea highways, twenty four deep sea ports, and logistical networks. It would also facilitate economic development through the building of indigenous tourism, shipping, and fishing industries. Along with all this, it seeks to maintain and manage marine resources to ensure food security. Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic country, and is located at the cross-roads of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. This strategic location forms the cornerstone of President Widodo's GMF vision.²

Indonesia is endowed with more than seventeen thousand islands, with a rich cultural heritage and diverse ethnicity. The lack of connectivity between islands adversely impacts its economy. Efforts to remedy this problem have been undertaken by Jokowi's predecessors, but they did not lead to any fruitful results. This was largely due to their preoccupation with the internal security threats that plagued the country at the times they were in power.

Interestingly, Jokowi borrows very liberally from the visions of his predecessors: like Sukarno's 'Trisakti' vision for Indonesia that propagated a sovereign country with a resilient economy and a multicultural society. The underlying vision of the GMF is not new; but the approach being undertaken for giving shape to his ambitious vision are said to be more "assertive", "nationalistic" and "self-centred".³In the above context, this issue brief analyses Indonesia's New Maritime doctrine which propounds Indonesia as a 'Global Maritime Fulcrum' with the aim of identifying the fundamental changes brought about by Jokowi.

A Continuing Legacy

Although this doctrine is grabbing a lot of attention worldwide, the vision it propounds is an old one. Jokowi's doctrine derives from the visions of his predecessors and can, therefore, be said to be a continuing legacy.

PACINDO (Pacific and Indian Oceans)

In the Vision Mission statement (Visi-Misi), President Widodo emphasises at projecting Indonesia as an 'Indo-Pacific power'. It sees the closely inter-connected Pacific and Indian Oceans (PACINDO) as the primary theatre of Indonesian foreign policy engagement. This vision follows from former Foreign Minister Natalegawa's 'Pacific-Indo-Pacific', Australia's 'Indo-Pacific', and the USA's 'Indo-Asia Pacific' visions.

While addressing the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C in May 2013, Natalegawa stated that what is being imagined is, "a triangular (space) spanning two oceans, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, bounded by Japan in the north, Australia in the South-east and India in the south-west, notably with Indonesia at its centre."⁴

This vision was also clearly reflected in the statement of the former President Susilo Yudhoyono at the 2012 Shangri La Dialogue, where he stated that, "there is every likelihood that in the twenty-first century, the Indian Ocean will grow in geostrategic importance. We must make sure that the Indian Ocean does not become an area of new

strategic contest and rivalry. Indeed, now is the time to cultivate the seeds for long-term cooperation, based on common interests in that part of the world.”⁵

Maritime Identity

Geographically, Indonesia’s archipelagic disposition bestows it with a distinctive geo-strategic identity. If Indonesia possesses strategic depth and size, its geographic configuration also disrupts the unity of the Indonesian state. Therefore, Indonesia has always struggled to achieve national unity through diversity (Bhineka-Tunggal-Ika).⁶ The central idea of the GMF is to reassert the age-old archipelagic identity that recognises the link between the country’s geography, identity and livelihood. President Widodo clearly values the sea surrounding the Indonesian archipelago for its economic potential, rather than seeing it as a natural disadvantage. This idea of Jokowi is quite similar to that of President Djuanda, who believed that the economic development of Indonesia can come about only if the marine resources are properly managed. With this thought in mind, he issued the Djuanda Declaration of 1957. The Djuanda Declaration,—which later came to be known as the Archipelagic State Principles—was the “declaration of territorial unity that comprised the unity between the land, the sea, its seabed and subsoil area, the airspace and all the resources contained therein.”⁷ It was during this period that the principle of ‘Wawasan Nusantara’ (Unity/Archipelagic Outlook) was also announced; it has remained an official government policy ever since.

Sovereignty and Maritime-Territorial Jurisdiction

Indonesia lies at the heart of Southeast Asia. It is home to most of the strategic chokepoints of this region. Unresolved maritime boundaries have been the primary security concern for Indonesian foreign and defence policy-makers. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in Indonesian waters and maritime piracy or sea robberies are other issues of concern. The Jokowi administration is determined to uphold the territorial sovereignty of Indonesia against any intrusions and intensify diplomacy to settle boundaries with neighbouring countries. The country has always been over sensitive towards its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It was the first

country to submit its proposal to the International Maritime Organisation for giving it the status of an ‘archipelagic nation’⁸ (increasing its territorial limits from 3 nautical miles (nm) as was set during the colonial period to 12 nm) to secure its waterways. After the failure of the Second UN Law of the Sea Conference in 1960, the government issued its own domestic regulation No.8/1962 authorising ‘innocent passage’⁹through the Indonesian waters.¹⁰ Later that year, an Indonesian Maritime Council was established to consider and coordinate activities dealing with various maritime issues, including fishing, navigation, seabed resources, and others.

After the announcement of the MALSINDO in 2004, many were of the view that there was a change in the attitude of Indonesian policy makers. It is useful to say the MALSINDO is not a joint patrolling exercise; it is a coordinated patrol where the navies of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia patrol their own waters. The wariness of Indonesia to join the Japan-sponsored ReCAAP¹¹ initiative to control piracy attacks in the Straits of Malacca is another case in point.

Maritime Diplomacy

The Jokowi administration hopes to intensify maritime diplomacy to settle existing boundary disputes with its neighbours. This is also in line with the mediator role Indonesia has been playing in the ASEAN. For long, Indonesia has believed that the sea does not divide countries, but only unites them. The fact that Indonesia was the first country to try to resolve the dispute in the South China Sea through the Workshop on the South China Sea illustrates this. It was also the forerunner in initiating the Declaration of the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea in 2002. Domestically, since 1969, Indonesia has concluded some 17 agreements with neighbours on maritime boundary delimitation—like the one with Singapore over the territorial sea delimitation in the Singapore Strait in 2009.¹²

Maritime Connectivity

Maritime connectivity has been an important agenda for Indonesia and the ASEAN for some time now. For Indonesia, it was an important agenda during the APEC Focus Group Discussion in April 2013.¹³ ASEAN has also sought to achieve inter-island

connectivity through its plans of developing a proposed 'ring shipping route' in maritime Southeast Asia as part of the ASEAN Connectivity plan.¹⁴

What is New?

Although the Jokowi administration's vision is like 'old wine in a new bottle', nevertheless the initiatives being undertaken for the realisation of this vision are more proactive. For instance, this is true of the orientation of his current foreign policy, the protection of marine resources of Indonesia, and the development of its naval power.

Foreign Policy Orientation

In January 2015, the current Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi officially laid down three foreign policy priorities of the Jokowi Government. These are: a) maintaining Indonesia's sovereignty; b) enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens; and c) intensifying economic diplomacy.¹⁵ Today, Jakarta is more active in defending its sovereignty and its national interests. Moreover, the free and active (*Bebas Aktif*) nature of its foreign policy appears to be reinterpreted. Under Yudhoyono, it was seen as amounting to 'a thousand friends, zero enemies'. However, the current policy stresses that 'All nations are friends until Indonesia's sovereignty is degraded and jeopardised'.¹⁶ Also, Yudhoyono's policy was said to be more elitist, whereas Jokowi is following a 'pro-people' policy.¹⁷ According to Rizal Sukma, 'Indonesia will no longer row between the two reefs, but will sail in the two oceans.'¹⁸

Indonesia's position towards the South China Sea dispute has been consistent for the past several years. It claims that it is not a party to the South China Sea dispute, though China's nine-dash line encloses the Indonesian-claimed Natuna Islands. This position is likely to change under Jokowi. According to a recent update in the *Jakarta Post*, Indonesian officials are planning to build a new base near the Natuna Islands. In March 2015, President Jokowi commented that, 'The 'nine-dashed line' that China says marks its maritime border has no basis in any international law.'¹⁹ Nevertheless, Jokowi is very cautious in his approach towards China since a lot is at stake. An interest has already been expressed to benefit from China's Maritime Silk Route plan.²⁰

Protection of Marine Resources

In 2014, the marine law enforcement authorities confiscated over a hundred foreign vessels for illegal fishing in Indonesian waters. According to an official estimate, Indonesia loses an estimated US\$24 billion due to illegal fishing by China, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.²¹ Responding to this problem, President Widodo ordered the sinking of foreign fishing boats that unlawfully enter Indonesian archipelagic waters. This is in accordance with Indonesian domestic law.²² This policy is negatively impacting the image of Indonesia. The neighbouring countries are concerned that Indonesia is finally coming out of its shell, and beginning to use hard power.

The Development of Naval Power

According to *IHS Jane*, the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) is upgrading two provincial naval bases to the status of district bases. One is located on the island of Tarakan near North Kalimantan (Lantamal XIII), and the other in Sorong (Lantamal XIV) in West Papua and these would be ready by the end of 2015. The upgradation of Lantamal XIV is for a third fleet called the Central Fleet, which will be added to the already existing Western and Eastern Fleet in Jakarta and Surabaya. On the other hand, the upgradation of Lantamal XIII would strengthen Indonesia's position in the Amabalat Sea Block in the Celebes Sea where it has a dispute with Malaysia.²³

The new maritime doctrine envisages the development of a formidable naval power. Defence modernisation is not only critical in ensuring Indonesia's territorial sovereignty and safeguarding its marine resources, but also to maintain free and safe navigation through the international shipping lanes. For that purpose, the Widodo administration seeks to modify existing defence planning from the modest 'minimum essential force' (MEF)²⁴ strategy towards a more ambitious defence policy. President Widodo will maintain his predecessor's commitment of rebuilding indigenous defence industries and expanding defence industrial cooperation with potential partners. He also plans to carry forward the proposals laid down for the development of a green water navy²⁵ and the Sea and Coast Guard Indonesia (SCGI). He has promised to increase the military budget from the existing 0.9 percent of the GDP as well as attracting foreign investment.

In December 2014, Jokowi took another important step by setting up a new Maritime Security Agency (Badan Keamanan Laut, BAKAMLA) under the Coordinating Ministry of the Political, Security and Legal Affairs to replace the previous BAKORKAMLA.²⁶

Conclusion

Jokowi's vision for his country is a continuing legacy; he also seems determined to uphold and revive the long established principles of Indonesia, such as 'Jalesveva Jayamah'(in the ocean we triumph).Indeed, the actions being undertaken for the realisation of this vision are proactive. This is what is garnering worldwide attention towards this doctrine. This vision may have existed for a long time in the minds of Jokowi's predecessors; but it is his approach that is giving this vision new recognition. Given Indonesia's geography, this doctrine seems to be long overdue although there is no doubt that this seems to be the most opportune time to propagate it steadfastly. It must also be kept in mind that, given the scarcity of resources in Indonesia, it will not be easy to give shape to this ambitious vision, and needs a more than five year long commitment.

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Notes

¹JalanPerubahanUntuk Indonesia, Yang Berdaulat, Mandiri Dan Berkepribadian, 'VisiMisi, Dan Program AKSI',<https://translate.google.co.in/translate?hl=en&sl=id&u=http://efekjokowi.com/visi-misi2.html&prev=search>,accessed 8 August 2015

²LisGindarsah and AdhiPriamarizki, "Indonesia's Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns", RSIS Policy Report,https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/PR150409_Indonesias-Maritime-Doctrine.pdf,(accessed 5 August 2015).

³HikmahantoJuwana, "Insight: Jokowi's Foreign Policy: Assertive or Nationalistic", <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/06/25/insight-jokowi-s-foreign-policy-assertive-or-nationalistic.html#sthash.8Xm70o65.dpuf>, (accessed 12 August 2015).

⁴ChinyongLiow and VibhanshuShekhar, 'Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi's Vision, Strategies and Obstacles Ahead', <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2014/11/indonesia-maritime-liow-shekhar>, (accessed 10 November 2014).

⁵Ibid.

⁶HasjimDjalal, 'Regime of Archipelagic Sates', <http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/archive/18th/ARF%20Seminar%20on%20UNCLOS,%20Mani>

la,%208-9Mar2011/Annex%20K%20-%20Prof%20Hasjim%20Djalal%20-20%Regime%20of%20Arch%20States.pdf, (accessed 8 April 2015).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸Chris Forward, 'Archipelagic Sea Lanes in Indonesia: Their Legality in International Law', <http://maritimejournal.murdoch.edu.au/index.php/index/maritimejournal/article/viewFile/113/152>, (accessed on 10 April 2015).

⁹The Act deals with navigational conduct and establishes the operational criteria by which to determine the 'innocent' character of maritime passage through its waters. It also contains regulations which must be obliged by foreign ships intending innocent passage. Under the July 1962 Regulation No. 8 that defined the 12 mile limit of the territorial sea, foreign warships and other non-commercial vessels must give notice before entering the territorial sea.

¹⁰HasjimDjalal, n.4.

¹¹The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia is the first regional government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance cooperation in the areas of information sharing, capacity building and cooperative arrangements against piracy and armed robbery in Asia. It was finalised on 11 November 2004, and entered into force on 4 September 2006.

¹²LisGindarsah and AdhiPriamarizki, n.2.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴ASEAN, 'NaiPyiTaw Declaration on the Realisation of the ASEAN Community by 2015', <http://www.asean.org/images/documents/24thASEANSummit/Nay%20Pyi%20Taw%20Declaration.pdf>, (accessed 26 August 2015).

¹⁵Prashanth Parameswaran, 'The Trouble with Indonesia's Foreign Policy Priorities Under Jokowi', The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/the-trouble-with-indonesias-foreign-policy-priorities-under-jokowi/> accessed 10 August 2015.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷Hikmahanto Juwana, n.3

¹⁸ RSIS Distinguished lecture by Dr. Rizal Sukma on 4 March 2015, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EG3yurxmst4>

¹⁹Hikmahanto Juwana (2015), n.3.

²⁰Lis Gindarsah and Adhi Priamarizki, n.2

²¹Ibid.

²²According to Article 69, Paragraph 4 of Law No. 45/2009 on Fisheries, Indonesian authorities are allowed to burn or sink foreign fishing vessels conducting illegal fishing within the Indonesian fishing management area, subject to the sufficient preliminary evidence. That law—amended Law No. 31/2004 on Fisheries— stipulates that the Indonesian fishing management area consists of Indonesian waters (internal waters and territorial sea) as well as the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Indonesia. Source:<http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/is-indonesias-sink-the-vessels-policy-legal/>

²³Prashanth Parameswaran, 'Why is Indonesia upgrading two naval bases?', <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/indonesia-to-upgrade-naval-bases-in-boost-to-maritime-capabilities/>, accessed 9 August 2015.

²⁴The Minimum Essential Force (MEF)—a twenty year plan (2005–2024)—sets forth a military modernization agenda, with a special emphasis on the modernization of the Indonesian navy and air force. In the context of naval build up, the MEF goal is to develop a five-fleet force, totalling 274 ships with striking, patrolling and supporting capabilities by 2020. The plan involves weapons procurement, the development of an indigenous defence industry, and the revamping of defence research facilities.

²⁵Green-water navy describes a naval force that is designed to operate in its nation's littoral zones, and has the competency to operate in the open oceans of its surrounding region.

²⁶PrashanthParameswaran (2015), "Indonesia's New Maritime Ambition: Can Jokowi Realise It?", RSIS Commentary, Number 044, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/04032015-indonesia-maritime-ambition-can-jokowi-realise-it-analysis/>, accessed 8 March 2015.